

Governance, Economy and National Security in Nigeria

Edited by

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PREFACE

The Proceeding with the theme *Governance, Economy and National Security in Nigeria* is a publication of the Nigerian Political Science Association based on papers presented at the Nigerian Political Science Association annual conference of June 29 through 1st July, 2015, at the Nasarawa State University, Keffi.

Collectively the papers presented concise and concrete perspectives of the state of the nation and Nigerian politics. Members of the Nigerian Political Science Association, after deliberating for two days at the Keffi conference, came up with diversifying but illuminating perspectives on issues bordering on governance and management of the common wealth and the implications on National Security and development. To further disseminate the scintillating perspectives, the leadership of the NPSA was able to compile, edit and put together this robust academic publication, for our rank and file, the academic community and the public readership.

It is worthy of note that many papers were presented at the conference. The papers transcend issues of national security, political boundaries, neo-liberal economic policies, insurgency, electoral violence, ethno/ religious identities and conflicts in Nigeria, while it also recommended some solutions to the nation's problems.

Suggestions were equally proffered on how the nation can move forward on issues of political transformation, governance, socio-economic cum religious perspectives of a multi-cultural nation. A lot of the presentations dwelt on nationhood and institutional leadership within Nigeria, Africa and beyond. Spanning over a decade, our assessment of the Nigeria condition remained a testimony of how bad governance, corruption, inappropriate economic policies have remained major cankerworms and obstacles to our quest for nationhood.

I welcome this publication, as a unique development that will help in enhancing our academic pursuit in Social Sciences. The journal is highly recommended for our tertiary institutions and the general public as a positive contribution by academics eager to emancipate the Nigerian nation. On behalf of all our members, I welcome this academic exercise. This, I do to the glory of God and the benefit of mankind and humanity.

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Chapter Thirteen

CITIZENSHIP AND THE SETTLER-INDIGENE DICHOTOMY IN NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Dr. Moses Metumara Duruji

Abstract

The question of citizenship has not been fully defined in Nigeria. Consequently, the problem of who is a citizen vested with all the rights and privileges that accrue to such a person under the constitution arise in the practice of Nigeria's federalism. Naturally the need for survival and improved quality of life precipitate movement of persons and groups from their areas of origin to new areas. When this movement by a particular group gets intense, the environment for friction is thus created. This friction often culminates in crisis, most times very fatal and destructive. The Nigerian State has been plagued by multiple crises of violence and communal crisis, like the Kafanchan uprising of Kaduna State in 1987, the Wukari-Takum conflict in Taraba State since 1990; the mass killing in Tafawa Belewa local government of Bauchi State between the Semayi and Hausa. The 1992 Zango-Kataf clashes between the indigenes of Katab and the Hausa-Fulani migrant community. The Aguleri-Umuleri and Ife-Modakeke clashes; the intermittent Warri crisis between the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo, the clashes between Hausas and Yoruba in Sagamu, Ilorin and Ibadan, the sharia legal controversy, the Nasarawa crisis involving the Tiv and other ethnic groups. The Yelwa-Shendam as well as the perennial inter-ethnic clashes in Jos between the Biron and Hausa-Fulani. The Nigeria State has not been aloof to all these crises stemming from settler-indigene question. Several panels have been constituted to look into these crisis especially when they assume violent dimension and many reports has been churned out suggesting the way forward for the country but almost in all the cases, the problem still remains. The paper focused on these issues by interrogating the factors that create the environment for settler-indigene dichotomy in Nigeria. It also examined the management of this dichotomy by the Nigerian state with the view to explaining while it still persist in spite of the many reports that were churned out by committees and panels of inquiry.

Keywords: Inter-Group Relations, Settler-Indigene Dichotomy, National Integration, Civic Citizenship

Introduction

The question of citizenship has not been fully defined in Nigeria. Consequently, the problem of who is a citizen vested with all the rights and a privilege that accrue to such a person under the constitution arises in the practice of Nigeria's federalism. A citizen is a legal member of a state who enjoys protection and privileges, and has full power to exercise political rights in the society in which he finds himself (Haas, 1978). This implies that such a person enjoys the right to live in and receive protection from the state. But the case of Nigeria has proven different as the quest by individuals to assert these rights are hampered by in-group - out-group definition that categorises some as indigenes and others who share different attributes from the original occupants of a particular homeland as settlers (Adesoji & Alao, 2009). This issue has been so pervasive that it has generated a lot of conflicts and bad blood in the social fabric of Nigeria. The definition of who is a Nigerian citizen by the constitution has not been of help and the official practice in Nigeria of which individual as mandated to

provide state of origin has contributed in cementing this dichotomy. Though the constitution recognises four kinds of citizens; by birth, registration, naturalization and dual citizenship, however the provision that a citizen of Nigeria by birth is every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence (1st October, 1960), either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria, further stokes and compounds the problem whereby some people consider themselves as indigene and refers to others living in the same community with them as settlers in parts of the country (Ibrahim, 2006). This perception and image reflects in the socio-political and economic transactions that occur within that society. Often times the so-called settler's are made to feel alienated in the society even when they are contributing fairly to that community. This politics of exclusion poses problem for national integration of which a heterogeneous country like Nigeria requires for the flowering of an environment in which meaningful development can occur and take place (Elaigwu, 2005). Naturally the need for survival and improved quality of life do precipitate movement of persons and groups from their areas of origin to new areas. When this movement from a particular group gets deeper, the environment for frictions is thus created. These frictions often culminate in crisis, most times very fatal and destructive (*Daily Independent*, 2012).

The case of Nigeria is very glaring as the country has been plaque by multiple crises and violent cleavages and communal crisis, like the Kafanchan uprising that spread to other parts of Kaduna state in 1987, the conflict in Wukari and Takum in Taraba state between the Tiv and Jukun which began in 1990. The mass killing in Tafawa Belewa local government of Bauchi state between the Semayi and Hausa community. The 1992 Zango-Kataf clashes between the indigenous Katab and the Hausa-Fulani migrant community, the Andoni-Ogoni bloodshed of 1993. The Aguleri-Umuleri feud and the Ife-Modakeke clashes that is rather intra-ethnic. other violent manifestation that has occurred in the past include the intermittent Warri crisis between the Ijaws, Itsekiris, and Urhobos, the clashes between the Hausas and Yorubas in Sagamu, Lagos, Ilorin and Ibadan, the ethno-religious riots in Kano and Kaduna states stemming from the sharia legal controversy, the Nasarawa crisis involving the Tiv and other ethnic groups in the state. The Yelwa-Shendam as well as the perennial inter-ethnic clashes in Jos between the Biron and Hausa communities in Plateau state (Okafor, 1997). These crisis no doubt has had a toll on national integration.

The Nigeria state has not been aloof to all these crises stemming from settler-indigene question. Several panels have been constituted to look into these crises especially when they assume violent dimension and many reports has been churned out by various panels suggesting the way forward for the country but almost in all the cases, the problem still remains

The paper focused on these issues by interrogating the factors that created the environment for settler-indigene dichotomy in Nigeria. It also examined the management of this dichotomy by the Nigerian state with the view to exhuming while it still persists in spite of the many reports that were churned out by committees and panels of inquiry. The paper relied heavily on secondary sources, especially commentaries and reports of conferences, books, newspaper reports, conference materials. Materials sourced from the internet were also very useful. Data sourced through these sources were analyzed through the employment of content analysis with the backdrop of the theory of competition which is an aspect of social constructivism theory of ethnicity.

The Concept of Citizenship

From a theoretical point of view, citizenship refers to membership of a political community, and consequently the creation of life as political subjects. Marshall (1994) posits that citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal

with respect to the rights and duties with which the citizenship is bestowed. According to Held (1995) citizenship was connected to the civic virtue of the Athenian democracy that was marked by the subordination of private life to the dedication of public affairs and the common good. This stems from the notion of citizen as free individuals who were involved in public affairs. This perspective of citizenship predominated understanding up to the Christian era of the Middle Ages when a political life different from the religious outlook of man was superseded by that which emphasised submission to the will of God.

The political and social dominance of Christianity around the Middle Ages as a way of understanding citizenship eclipsed and was replaced by "homo credens". 'Homo credens' was a public political order or public life outside the religious order of Christianity (Soysal, 1994). The order of things was not connected to the public realm of republican commitment of the citizens, but to the commitment and subordination to the will of God (Soysal, 1994, 1996).

The republican virtues of citizenship gained new foothold during the Renaissance in the Italian city-states. Still, it was the French revolution, starting in 1789, that provided the framework for thinking and practising citizenship within the formation of modern nation-states (Brubaker, 1992).

Some of the central elements of citizenship, the formal, legal rights and duties of individuals and groups establish a legitimate sphere, according to which all members of the community in principle can act without arbitrary or unjust interference from other individuals or from the community. In a democracy it is the sovereignty of individuals and groups as political agents that is the key guiding normative principle of political life. To Held (1995b), this implies that citizenship is a principle that recognises the indispensability of "equality for all citizens". People's equal interest in a democracy can, therefore, be protected; because they possess equal capacity to act across key political institutions and sites of power

The membership of sovereign citizens to a political community is centred on two key aspects. The first aspect is connected to the political institutions of society. The relations of individuals and groups to these institutions are structured around the formal, legal rights, and duties which the members of the community possess. The second aspect is concerned with the public activities through which the members of the community clarify and debate communal affairs (Andrews, 1991). Here citizenship is not related directly to the formal and institutional feeling of belonging of the political subjects, but to the discussion and deliberating of communal affairs. Citizenship, according to this second aspect, is primarily related to the political identities that are expressed and created through participation in the political public life of the community.

It should however be noted that membership of a national or ethnic community, which are sometimes referred to as a historical, cultural community, is not identical with citizenship membership, even though categories of citizenship such as membership of a political community, very often overlap those of cultural similarity.

Citizenship gains a specific meaning in relation to the historical settings and socio-cultural conflicts that help establish and maintain the boundaries of a community. Because citizenship functions as a way of demarcating the boundaries of a community, and as a way of pointing out its members, it seems very difficult not to operate in the context of culturally defined categories and identities. In that respect the categories of citizenship are categories of identity and cultural policies. It is within this perspective that Turner (1994) points out that citizenship are not merely concerned with the membership and status of a political community. Turner wants to avoid the tendency to restrict the meaning of citizenship only to be of political character. The concept also has to be placed within a broader sociological frame of reference. A sociological understanding of citizenship focuses upon the

fact that citizenship identifies both a set of practises that are of social, legal, political and cultural character. These practises are institutionalised as normative social arrangements which determine membership of a community. Citizenship is seen here as the new fellowship of the modern state. Within this perspective, cultural citizenship consists of those social practices which enable a competent citizen to participate fully in the national culture. Educational institutions are thus crucial to cultural citizenship, because they are an essential aspect of socialisation of the child into this national system of values" (Turner, 1994:158)

When political and sociological consideration are applied to the understanding of citizenship, it becomes inclusive in terms of the different spheres it deals and the ways in which community membership is created and recreated and not the least, how and by whom the conditions of membership and feelings of belonging are constructed and limited.

For Marshall (1994) citizenship is seen in the light of those rights and duties that determine the legal status of membership of a community. Marshall's analysis follows the development of rights and duties of modern citizenship through three centuries. In the 18th century the civil rights were established, through which some basic rights of the individual were sanctioned: Freedom of speech, the right to private ownership, the right to enter contracts and equality before the law. The liberties of the individual were the main concern of civil rights. The task was to secure these liberties to everyone (in principle), through the construction of a legal system with the Court of Law as the institutional axis. The civil rights also had a narrower aim; viz. to secure that the individual could act and compete in the capitalistic market economy. In that respect, the codex of liberty of the civil rights corresponded to the development of modern capitalism.

In the 19th century, political rights were developed. These rights secured that individuals and groups had influence and were able to participate in exercising political power as members of a political group or party. By this, it became possible for hitherto politically excluded groups to mobilise in the political processes of society. The individual focus upon civil rights was reorganised in such a way that groups, parties, organisations and unions gained rights and power in the form of wages, better working conditions among others.

According to Marshall (1994), the development of citizenship is seen in the light of rights and duties that determine the legal status of membership of a community. Citizenship requires a bond of a different kind, a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is in common possession. It is loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law" (Marshall, 1994:23).

The socially constituted duties and loyalties are recognised as being the basis of the feeling of belonging to a culture, a national heritage. This is the second central feature of citizenship. Besides the formal status of the citizens, citizenship also contains socio-cultural bonds of belonging, "a direct sense of community". In Marshall's view it was the lack of education and economic resources that prevented the working class from being full members of the community and integrated in the common national culture. However, this could be obtained if the inequalities and conflicts of the capitalist society were modified and regulated by the social rights of the modern welfare-state. To him, social citizenship, including education, was considered to be a crucial factor in maintaining the social and cultural coherence of society, and the factor that was able to generate and reproduce the communal loyalty and solidarity across class-divisions and conflicts.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts the theory of competition an aspect of social constructivists' perspective to the study of ethnicity. The theory of social constructivism emphasizes the fluid nature of ethnic identification. It sees language, religion, physiology etcetera as creating the set of identities that one can choose as reinforced by economic, political and social condition. In other words, identity set is not adequate to explain ethnic identity unless reinforced by other material conditions. Therefore, ethnic identification results from a combination of inborn traits and social inputs which are impacted by experiences. In other words, identity can be constructed which means that group boundaries are changeable within limits of these factors. But Competition theory as an aspect of social constructivism views ethnic identification from material angle. It stipulates that the struggle over resource can explain the emergence and decline of ethnic groups. It also explains the reasons why ethnic identification appears visible and important at a certain time and not at another time. Olzak & Nagel (1986) in their study attempted to demonstrate how socially constructed identities come into being. Their emphasis centred on how economic and political competition arising from modernization explains the conflict in most developing countries. Joireman (2003) however argued that even in developed societies as the case of Scotland shows, competition for resources leads to strengthening of ethnic identity as demonstrated by the discovery of oil off the coast of Scotland. Thomsen (2001) in another study contended that to keep the nationalist fire burning, Scotland had to turn from economic to cultural nationalism because the discovered oil off its shores made little economic impact, however, it was the oil that sparked the fear of Scottish nationalism which is waxing stronger. Competition theory in social constructivism perspective to the study of ethnicity explains that the perception of taking advantage of some resource opportunity is the rationale that informs ethnic identity formation and rivalry.

This theory explains adequately the crisis of citizenship and the indigene-settler dichotomy in Nigeria because the central drivers of the crises are issues of access and distribution of economic and material resources in almost all the cases across the country.

The Nigerian Federalism

Even though Nigeria was a creation of British colonialism, its federal structure evolved the cacophony of voices at the Ibadan and London conferences of representatives of Nigerian people. The foundation was of course laid by the division of the country into three regions by the Richard constitution of 1946. The Macpherson constitution of 1951 gave further concrete support to this process by granting of legislative power to the regions. The Littleton constitution of 1954 which incorporated some of the views of Nigerians that emanated from the conference at Ibadan, removed the final shade of a unitary system of government from Nigeria by establishing a true federal state in the sense that it shared powers between the central and the regional governments. To avoid constitutional conflicts that might arise between the central and regional governments, a supreme court was established to handle such conflict (Awolowo, 1968).

Impliedly, the federal system was a deliberate and carefully considered choice of governance for Nigeria. The colonialists and nationalists who made the choice were not evasive to the heterogeneity of Nigerian polity, and so federal system was seen as the most viable option of protecting the core interests of the federating units.

This system was solidified during the First Republic when each of the federating units had its own constitution, one of the key properties of federalism. It should be noted that, before the attainment of independence by Nigeria in 1960, the three federating units of Eastern, Northern and Western regions were, virtually autonomous (Adileje, 2003). For instance, each of the three federating

units attained their independent in separate date. 1957 for Eastern and Western Region and 1959 for the Northern Nigeria, further buttressed their respective autonomy. The regions also displayed some semblance of autonomy by maintaining diplomatic relations with countries in the International Community as was the case with Israel which the Eastern and Western Regions maintain ties with in spite of the Federal government led OAU severance of ties following the Israeli occupation of Arab land (Ofoeze, 1999).

But just like Wheare (1953) posited in his conceptualization of a federal state, viz, the emphasis on financial autonomy was present at the onset of Nigerian federalism, because the regions generated their own revenues. Of the two principles of revenue system; the vertical principle which is a form of revenue system whereby the federal government retains some of the federally collected revenues as its independent revenue to be paid into the federation account for distribution among the tiers of government in accordance with agreeable formula and the horizontal principle that is a form of revenue system which has to do with the distribution of revenue among state and local governments (Ofoeze, 1999). In this form of revenue system, consideration is given to issues like land mass, population, large number of local government, and the Nigerian system embraced elements of the two but not at the initial stage of the operation. This period created an environment of competition among the regions (Dare 1979). However, the intrusion of the military into Nigerian politics in 1966 altered the landscape of Nigerian federalism and one area that witnessed fundamental change is revenue allocation system (Aba, 2006).

One of the major problems facing Nigeria federalism is the issue of revenue allocation especially on how the resources generated in the country should be shared among the three tiers of government (Adilije, 2003). In an attempt to solve this problem, various principle of revenue allocation have been adopted.

These principles are:

1. *Principle of derivation: This principle is based on the fact that the revenue in the country should be allocated on the basis of each state's contribution to total revenue i.e. major resources derived from a particular area should be allocated to the area. This principle was attacked because it makes rich states richer since the more developed states will contribute more to the federation account, starving need states of developmental funds.*
2. *Principle of national interest: This principle is based on the need to develop states, improve progress, and sense of belonging to the federation. This is important considering the fact that many states in Nigeria are not economically viable which make them to depend solely on the monthly federal government allocation to meet their developmental needs. This principle was also attacked by politicians from oil producing states, labelling the other states as "parasites".*
3. *Principle of independent revenue: This principle is based on the federal government discretion in allocating revenue to state and local governments. Before independence, the regional government revenue allocation was more than that of the federal government, but recent experience has shown the reverse in the sense that the federal government allocates more revenue to itself than the 36 states put together. This principle was attacked by experts who stated that by international standard, Nigeria discretionary transfer of revenue by the federal government to states and local government are small (Odion, 2011).*

Another unique feature of Nigeria's federalism is the incorporation of the principle of federal character by the military in the run up to transition to military to civilian rule in 1979 (Afigbo, 1989). The

principle of federal character is a mechanism devised to foster national integration to bring about a sense of belonging to the diverse groupings that make up the Nigerian federation. The principle of federal character intends to ensure that Nigerian affairs are not dominated by persons from a few states or ethnic groups (Afigbo, 1989). The architects of the idea considered the acrimonious existence among the diverse groups and interests in the country that had often led to endemic mutual distrust and communal conflict which threatens political stability. Therefore, the application of the principle manifests in a quota system in job placement and recruitment into the civil service and military services, in the granting of special consideration for educationally disadvantaged areas in admission into unity schools and higher institutions as well as the requirement for national spread in appointments into public offices (Uroh, 2000). The term was coined by the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) which drafted the 1979 Constitution and was enshrined in the 1979 Constitution and the subsequent ones thereafter. It states inter-alia;

The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity and to command loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or its agencies (CDC 1977: Article 123).

This stipulation is not limited to the central government as the constitution also mandates governments of states and local/municipal councils as well as their agencies to conduct and carry out governance in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority such as to achieve national integration (Ukwu, 1987).

Since 1979 the governments have struggled to apply this principle to achieve the intended objective. One area it has been visible is in the appointment of various positions in the administration. For instance the constitution demands that in the composition of federal cabinet, the president should nominate at least one minister from each state. This statutory provision gives the civilian administration challenges of over-bloating the cabinet in the fourth republic given the multiplication of states by the military juntas that held power for a long time. With the thirty-six states structure, the administration was saddled with at least thirty-six ministers against the nineteen states the country had during the second republic (Odion, 2011).

The long duration of the military regime in the country contributed significantly to the centralization of power.

Of course, it is a fact that highly centralised central government was injurious to the federal polity as it led to a quasi federal (or unitary) system as is the case in the present Nigeria federal system. A highly decentralized federalism, on the other hand, could destabilise the federal polity as it is capable of eroding the power of the central government and making the federating units too powerful which was the situation in Nigeria's First Republic. The current Nigeria federal system is highly centralised hence its unitary characterisation as evidenced in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Odion, 2011).

When the founding fathers of Nigeria opted for a federal system of government in 1954, as opposed to a unitary system, it was a conscious decision designed to protect the diversities and identities of the federating units. They agreed to establish central governments that unite them, while simultaneously agreeing to retain their independence in order to safeguard their respective diversities (Awolowo, 1968). This can be further buttressed by Awolowo's famous statement:

Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh' or 'French'. There are various national or ethnic groups in the country; it is a mistake to designate them tribes. Each of them is a nation by itself with many tribes and clans. The fact that they have common overlord does not destroy this fundamental difference (Cited in Odion, 2011:9).

In 1953, during the debate on the famous motion for independence by chief Anthony Enahoro, Sir Ahmadu Bello, premier of the Northern region and leader of the ruling NPC (Northern Peoples Congress), made one of the most eloquent cases for true federalism when he said;

Sixty years ago there was no country called Nigeria. What is now Nigeria consisted of a number of large and small communities all of which were different in their outlook and beliefs? The advent of the British and of western education has not materially altered the situation and these many and varied communities have not knit themselves into a composite unit (Cited in Odion, 2011:10).

Thus not only were Awolowo and Sir Ahmadu Bello's statement absolutely correct, it is even more accurate about today's Nigeria than the Nigeria of 1940s. Inter-ethnic intolerance which has become chronic, confirms that we are a country of nations, as is evident from the clashes we have experienced since the return of civil democratic rule in 1999.

However, the basic tenets of federalism that defined the federal structure of Nigeria between 1954 and January 1966 have been jettisoned in favour of a unitary structure robed in federal colour. The challenge, therefore, is for Nigerians to return to the principles of federalism (Itse, 2007). The founding fathers of Nigeria surely built a federal foundation but over the years, the Nigerian federal structure has been watered down and most of these were foisted in the 1999 constitution currently in practice in the country. Some of the flaws in the constitution include such provisions as:

- 1) The central government determining the number of local government councils in the federal units. A flaw which section 7 of the 1999 constitution could not clearly resolve.
- 2) The system in which revenue allocation to the states are based on the number of local government councils and or size of the state.
- 3) A system where reference to local government councils and state capitals are made in the constitution.
- 4) A system that considers state governor and/or his officials as representatives of the president is incongruous.
- 5) *The system that allows a state government to suspend/terminate elected or appointed official of a local government council.*

Some of these provisions in the constitution and the conventional practice have perverted the system of Nigerian federalism thus breeding the perception which creates room for the many crises of citizenship that is plaguing the country.

Settler-Indigene Dichotomy

According to Mandani (2001), there are three main principles that underpin indigene-settler dichotomy. The first principle states that settlers exist because some people have succeeded in defining themselves as indigenes in order to exclude others who they have defined as settlers. Secondly, settlers

are not defined by immigration, as virtually all African groups and peoples have migrated over time. The concept of settler is a political definition attributed on the basis of conquest, state power and law – customary and modern. Thirdly and most important, the settler can never become an indigene because the basis of the differentiation is the denial of civic citizenship through a political imposition of a permanent and exclusionary tribal or religious label. This means that the historical methods of gaining citizenship through migration, immersion in the language, culture and norms of the new community through time are excluded.

However, the problem of settler-indigene dichotomy confronting Nigeria has its root in the administrative style of British colonialism. In the first instance, the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in January 1914 was purely an imposition without any iota of consultation of the Nigerian people and their leaders (Duruji, 2010). The promulgation of the Native Authority Ordinance and the policy of indirect rule for many decades localised politics, making no room for inter-ethnic and cultural interactions among the Nigerian peoples. Consequently the environment for Nigerians of different ethnic and cultural groups to meet and understand themselves was not provided as such in the run up to independence, there was widespread suspicion among the Nigerian groups. This led to the formation of political parties as champions and projectors of ethnic interests. More so, the policy of the British colonialists to keep Nigerians of diverse ethnic and cultural groups aside and separated from one another helped to compound the problem (Uzoigwe, 1996). For instance southern non-Muslim migrants to the northern part of the country were kept in quarters called 'sabonger'. The same can be said of northerners that migrated to the south, the pattern of settlement which have endured till the present sees them converging and concentrating in a particular area such as 'Ama Awusa' in Owerri, Gariki in Enugu, Agege in Lagos etcetera.

This foundation culminated in creating the problem of citizenship in Nigeria resulting in the discriminations and exclusion meted out to people on the basis of ethnic, regional, religious and gender identities. This is because those who see themselves as "natives" or "indigenes" exclude those considered as "strangers" from the enjoyment of certain rights and benefits that they ought to enjoy as Nigerians upon the fulfilment of certain civic duties, such as the payment of tax (Bamidele & Ikubaje, 2004:65). The 1979 Constitution from which the 1999 Constitution was modified has been seen as laying the basis or foundation for the indigeneship problems. This is because it expressly provides that in order to enjoy access to positions and opportunities on the basis of "federal character" one needs to be an "indigene" of the state or local government concerned. Being an indigene involves showing evidence of belonging, through one's parents or grandparents to a community indigenous to a State or Local Government, which in effect suggests the membership of a local ethnic and linguistic community. Thus, the inability to prove such membership of a group of people will result in being defined as a "stranger" who cannot enjoy all the rights and privileges of indigenes and/or natives (FGN 1979; Bamidele & Ikubaje, 2004:76). Furthermore, section 147 of the 1999 Constitution states that the president shall appoint at least one Minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state. But what was the motive behind the incorporation of these provisions into the Constitution. Scholars have argued that the incorporation of such clauses in both the 1979 and 1999 constitutions is to strengthen the federal character principle. For instance, chapter 2, section 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution explains the reasoning behind the provision *inter alia*:

The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria's and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance

of person from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies (FGN, 1999).

Given the enormous problem this indigene-settler dilemma has generated, it has been suggested that citizenship rights should be tied to either place of birth (different from one's ethnic groups) or residence so that any Nigerian who has lived in any part of the country for certain number of years can enjoy full residency rights, which must include all rights normally available to the traditional indigenes of the area.

While observing that in 1987, the political bureau set up recommended this and suggested ten years residency for the enjoyment of this right, Oyeweso (2006) commended the example of Group Captain Dan Suleiman who as governor of Plateau state in 1976 had proposed that any Nigeria born in Plateau state or from any other state who has lived in Plateau state for twenty years should enjoy all the rights and privileges of a native of Plateau State. Observably, *progressive as the Suleiman principle was, it was not adopted as a national policy, and neither was there any evidence of its workability, even in Plateau State.*

The discovery of oil in commercial quantity and the royalties accruing to the various communities, as well as the different local government reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, which placed more powers in the councils, particularly that of revenue disbursement, inflamed the indigene-settler conundrum in Nigeria. Greed and maladministration by corrupt council officials helped to further deprive many of their right to self determination and social justice. Thus, the persistent absence of democratic reforms encouraged a legion of unemployed youths to resort to violence as a means to vent their bottled up grievances. Hence, the fierce and devastating communal clashes such as the Ife and Modakeke conflict, Ijaw and Itsekiri, Zango and Kataf, Tiv and Jukun, Izzi and Ezza, Fulani and Berom, to mention just a few can be traced to these sources. In these clashes, several people have either been killed or injured, others rendered homeless while economic activities have suffered the greatest debilitating effects. With the escalation of crisis all over the country, many now live in perpetual fear while foreign investment has been drastically reduced.

The dominant perception is that the indigeneship of a particular society, group or region confers certain rights, which others should not enjoy by virtue of being settlers or migrants or strangers. Such rights included but not limited to unhindered access to education and employment opportunities, land, political participations or even right to produce the chief or head of a community.

Meanwhile, settlers' groups in different parts of the country have consistently maintained that having settled in a place for a long period, it is not proper to refer to them as settlers, but rather as indigenes. Their contention is that while their kiths and kins could be located elsewhere, they could not really trace their root appropriately neither could they fit properly into the old society they or their forbears left several years ago. To worsen matters, there have been raised in the new locations, some generations of people from their lineage who have come to see where they were born and raised as their homes. For instance, the prolonged crises between the Tiv and other ethnic groups, particularly the Azara in present-day Nasarawa State, could be explained from this perspective. Whereas other groups in the region considered the Tiv as non-indigenes, the Tiv who constitute a strong numerical force in the areas considered themselves indigenes of the areas particularly on account of their long residence (Ali & Egwu, 2003).

Settler-Indigene Crisis

The crisis of citizenship that have bogged Nigeria and the inability of the managers of state to properly define, who a citizen of Nigeria is and the rights that accrues to such a person, have escalated to tension point in heterogeneous communities across Nigeria. Some of these tensions have grown so intense that they have boiled over into deadly crisis as the following exemplifies.

Warri Crisis

Warri is a coastal city that came into prominence following the discovery and exploration of oil in the delta. The Itsekiri ethnic group had laid claim to the city as indigenous to them and justified this claim on the title of their paramount ruler, the 'Olu of Warri'. However, other ethnic groups such as the Ijaw and Urhobo have contested the claim of the Itsekiri that Warri belong to them exclusively. The contenders argue that the title of 'Olu of Warri' was a recent phenomenon imposed by the Action Group to reward the Itsekiri for their political support against the Urhobo that solidly supported a rival party the National Council of Nigerian Citizen. The splitting of Warri into three local government areas in the 1990s and citing of one of the headquarters in Ogbelowo dominated predominantly by the Ijaw ethnic group, sparked off a violent conflict between the ethnic groups that paralysed the city. The Itsekiris can only be found in Warri whereas both Urhobo and Ijaw their larger ethnic neighbour has other homeland were they homogeneously occupy, as such the attempts of the Ijaw and Urhobos that are native to Warri to assert themselves as a group have always been resisted by the Itsekiris.

Jukun-Tiv Crisis in Wukari

The right of the Tiv to participate in the politics of community has been the most contentious issue in the crisis between the Jukun and the Tiv in Wukari division of Taraba state. The Jukun saw themselves as the indigenes of the region having being firmly established there by the 17th century. Their contention therefore is that while other groups in the region like the Tiv as well as the Hausa-Fulani have other places to go to, the Jukun have only Wukari as home.

Whereas the Tiv had arrived in the region as far back as the 1840s when the present Wukari was established, and notwithstanding the efforts made by the colonial government to recognize them as being part of the society where they lived, the Jukun essentially saw them as settlers. More importantly, the political reversals suffered by the Jukun at different times not only woke them up from their slumber, they became more rigid in refusing or denying the Tiv access, relevance, entitlement, political participation and power on the ground that they were settlers (Best *et al*, 1999).

Things started to change as the Tiv continue to expand in population and the farmlands became more densely occupied. By 1940, the Tiv were not only the largest ethnic group in the Middle Belt, but also three times more numerous than the Jukun in the Wukari Division which the Jukun considered their home (Anifowose, 2003). The British even recognised this by establishing Wukari Federation Council that excluded the Tiv (Auni, 1999). The agitation of the Tiv for inclusion often becomes source of conflict between the Jukun and the Tiv. However, party politics in Nigeria has often escalated this conflict as both ethnic groups find themselves in different political camps in both the First and Second Republics. In the Second Republic, for example, Alhaji Abubakar Barde who became governor of the old Gongola State on the platform of the Great Nigeria Peoples' Party (GNPP) gave preference to the Tiv over the Jukun for not supporting him. This he did by appointing a Tiv, Iyotyer Tor Musa as the chairman of Wukari local government, a situation that did not go down well with the Jukun, who saw it as an insult on their collective psyche (Best *et al*, 1999). Similarly, when Governor Jolly Nyame became civilian Governor of Taraba state in the aborted Third republic, he appointed Tiv

people into the government on the basis of the support he got from the Tiv. Although these appointments deepened the hostility between the Tiv and Jukun of Wukari, the end as far as parties and politicians are concerned, justified the means (Best *et al*, 2003). The local government election of 1987 that saw the Tiv gaining powerful positions reignited the conflict after the Jukun felt uncomfortable. Another fracas of 1990-92 saw most Tiv been chased out of Wukari and the elections of 1996 and 1997 were a somehow peaceful because the Tiv yet to recover were unable to voice dissent.

Taiyawa-Fulani Crisis in Tafawa Belewa

The Taiyawa ethnic group sees themselves as the original owners of Tafawa Belewa local government area against the encroachment of their Fulani neighbours. Even though the Taiyawa people and the Bauchi emirate have been engaged in a sort of cold war for many years, the crisis busted to the fore over disagreement that revolves around the leadership of Lere District of Tafawa Belewa Council. The Taiyawa majority of the district has felt that the Emir of Bauchi who appoints district heads has denied them responsible positions accusing him of appointing non-natives and Fulani as head of the district. It was against this backdrop that a Taiyawa native Gonto Mwari mobilised other Taiyawa folks to resist Fulani hegemony in April 1992. The incident that sparked off the violent confrontation occurred in the abattoir when Fulani Muslims disapproved of Christian brothers of Bemayi tribe slaughtering pigs in the abattoir which they see as desecration of the abattoir, notwithstanding the fact that the abattoir was divided into three sections, one for Izala Muslims, one for other Muslims and the other for the Christians. The protest of the Muslim butchers against this action generated heated argument that led to physical combat between Muslims and Christians, a situation in which the Taiyawa Christians exploited to vent their vengeance on the Fulani Muslims and ever since, the crisis in Tafawa Belewa has been a recurring event.

Kataf-Hausa crisis in Zango-Kataf

The dispute between the Kataf and Zango Hausa in southern Kaduna is a protracted misunderstanding over land ownership. The Kataf claim that the land on which the Hausa occupy is theirs and the Hausas are settlers, a claim the Hausas rejected but rather claiming that the Kataf met them in the place. This vexed issue of land ownership is rooted in the emirate system under which predominant Christian communities in southern Kaduna submit to the authority of the Emir of Zauzau. The Emir always appoints district heads for the Kataf, most of whom are Muslims that share no common linguistic, cultural or religious bond with the Kataf a situation the Kataf resented. This misunderstanding boiled over and exploded in a violent crisis in May 1992 following a proposal to relocate a market. This was following an order by Mr Ayole a Christian Kataf who was the Local Government Chairman, but the Muslims led by Alhaji Mato an uncle to the then sitting Governor Dabo Lere countered. This new site was located in the Kataf area was welcome by the Kataf but opposed by the Hausa. The claim of Kataf women who went to the site for market activities of harassment and assault by Hausa men led to the ensuing bloody conflict that left many dead and properties destroyed.

The situation in Zango-Kataf is fairly unique and more complex as centuries of interaction between the Hausa on the one hand, and the other communal groups such as Bajju and Kataf (Atyab) have failed to produce the basis of a more enduring harmonious community life. In this respect the situation differs from other cases where the adoption of Islamic religion and inter-marriages have tone down the level of social and cultural distance between "immigrant" Hausa population and the "host" communities. The case of Zango-Kataf area of southern Kaduna is the tendency for ethnic boundaries to remain inflexible to social and cultural exchanges such as marriages across ethnic and religious boundaries.

The representation made to the Cudjoe Commission by the Kataf following the violence of February 1992 is largely hinged on the claim that the land belonged to the Kataf who accommodated Hausa immigrants on generous terms. By the traditional system of land holding, the Kataf claim, such land in principle should revert to the original owners. However, this historical claim to indigeneity is contradicted by the position of the Hausa community who claimed centuries of effective residency.

Mambilla Plateau Crisis

The use of history of migration, early patterns of settlement or local history about patterns of power and domination among the different ethnic groups in establishing "indigenous" claims are evident in virtually all the cases. On the Mambilla Plateau, the series of attacks in the early 1980s on the Bansa and Kamba by the Mambilla is hinged on this conception of citizenship. The indigenous claim of the Mambilla over the entire Mambilla Plateau is anchored on the historical bases that their settlement predated the arrival of other ethnic groups such as the Fulani, Bansa and Kamba. For the Bansa and the Kamba whose presence on the Plateau is more or less recent, the bulk of them have arrived in the post-second world war period, it is a lot easier to label them as "aliens". It is in this context that one understands the basis of exclusion that the so-called indigenous group seeks to subject the stranger elements.

Takum Local Government Area Crisis

Claims by "indigenous" groups aimed at excluding "strangers" is central in the communal conflicts between the Kuteb and Chamba in Takum Local Government Area of Taraba state and the interminable circle of communal clashes in Nasarawa involving the Ebira, Bassa and Gbagyi. These cases illustrate the enormous difficulty of resorting to history in the contest over identity. The difficulty arises from the fact that there can be no such thing as eternal historical facts. There is the tendency for facts to be either carefully selected or for the same set of facts to be subjected to conflicting interpretations.

Take the Kuteb/Chamba conflict for example. Although a number of ethnic groups such as Hausa, Jukun, Kuteb and Chamba are found in the Takum area, the major contest has been between the Kuteb and Chamba. From available historical evidence, both Kuteb and Chamba had taken effective residency of the area around Takum prior to the colonial intervention. However, in the present context of contestation over the "ownership" of Takum, each of the two communal groups has resorted to different accounts of history to bolster their claim. The Chamba account, which is strongly challenged by the Kuteb appeared to have been the version initially accepted by the colonial authorities. It suggests that the Chamba as a warrior group, conquered and displaced the more numerous Kuteb around 1830. The Kuteb on the other hand, who make a strong historical claim over the area in addition to being the most populous in Takum area refute the claim that the Chamba conquered them at any point in history, and even cite colonial records in support of their position. Their counter claim is that the Chamba having migrated from the Camerouns were given a place to settle by the Kuteb.

The rule of the Kuteb in Takum was later codified by the government of the Northern region in 1963. The situation was, however, reversed in 1975 when the Chamba, apparently using their influence in the military government that followed the collapse of the First Republic, got the then Benue-Plateau state government to amend the 1963 law. The amendment ensured the eligibility of two Chamba families to contest and ascend to the *Ukwe* throne, increased the representation of the Chamba and Jukun on the Kings Selection Committee to three, while reducing that of the Kuteb to two thus ensuring advantage for the Chamba.

In 1976, a riot broke out between the Chamba and Kuteb in Takum. The cause of the riot was the alleged manipulation of electoral wards by the Secretary of Takum local government, a Chamba, to give

electoral advantage to Chamba contestants. The victory of a Chamba candidate where the Kuteb constitute the majority was not acceptable to the latter. Some of the allegations were later confirmed by a government panel, which had been set up to investigate the communal disturbances. However, renewed violence between the two communal groups has its roots in the process of democratising the local government, which commenced in 1987. The numerical strength of the Kuteb had conferred on them electoral advantage in the elections that had been organised since then until the outbreak of violence in 1997. Although it would appear on the surface as tension between democratisation and multi-ethnic existence, it has a deeper basis in contestation over identity and for control of local power and resources.

Beron-Hausa-Fulani crisis in Jos

The crisis between the Hausa-Fulani and the Beron in Jos has of recent become so perennial that a state of emergency has to be imposed in the whole state. As far as the Berom, Amo, Buji, Anaguta, Jere, Jarawa and Afizere are concerned, they are the indisputable indigenes of the state (Jos and its surrounding villages) whereas the Hausa-Fulani are settlers or strangers who migrated into the region for various reasons ranging from commerce and employment to desire for fortune. In particular, tin mining was seen as a major factor for the influx of the settlers though with the active encouragement of the colonial government. Even after mining was no longer lucrative, the Hausa/Fulani embarked on dry season farming which proved so lucrative that it attracted more of them to the region. However, for the Hausa-Fulani, the contention is that they had produced the rulership in Jos since 1902 up to 1947 and are therefore not strangers or settlers. Specifically, thus the Hausa-Fulani desire to have an emir appointed in Jos and to have the *Gbong Gwon* institution abolished. Besides, they aspired to political leadership position and succeeded a few time (Jibo et al, 2001). But not surprisingly, crises arising from a clash of interests occurred in the state at different time between 1994 and 2002.

Realistically, however and particularly in the context of a modern nation it is not impossible for a settler to aspire to enjoy rights and attain positions ordinarily reserved for indigenes, particularly as citizen irrespective of origin, place of birth or ethnicity. The Hausa-Fulani in Plateau State as in other parts of the country could have been emboldened by this understanding; hence the clamour for entitlements, rights and relevance in the places where they are located. But the problem associated with this development is the nature of successive Nigerian Constitutions which emphasize what constitute indigeneship in a nation, and more importantly who is a citizen. This has led to distinguishing between national and local citizens (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979), and more importantly, it has made it difficult to promote citizenship and constitutionally guaranteed citizen rights particularly in the absence of any enforcement strategy or procedure.

Government Response to Settler-Indigene Crisis

The response of the government to Nigerians settler-indigene crisis that reoccurs from time to time is nothing to write home about. In the first instance these crisis are escalated by government policies and actions. Just like the colonial government that encouraged inter-ethnic suspicion to serve their end of capital exploitation, the various Nigerian successors has not been too keen on finding a lasting solution to the tension of settler-indigene dichotomy and the crisis that burst out from time to time (Thisday, 2012). In fact most of the actors in government atimes fan the embers through their utterances and action as the case of Dariye in Plateau who made incendiary remarks questioning the citizenship of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim population of the state, who he refers to as settlers, reveals below:

"Jos, capital of Plateau state is owned by the natives. Every Hausa man in Jos is a settler whether he likes it or not." "Even if I spend 150 years in Bukuru, I cannot become an indigene of Du." "It is an Al Qaeda agenda to bring down Plateau state... The ulama were chased out of Kaduna during the Babangida regime. If they were so good why were they sent out of Kaduna? And they came to form their headquarters in Jos (*Weekly Trust*, 2004).

Given this backdrop, then, it should not be surprising that most of the panel reports on the various violent conflicts emanating from settler-indigene confrontation are lying on the shelves gathering dust. The case of Jos is most pathetic as several reports including the General Abisoye Report and that by Advisory Committee on Jos Crisis headed by Solomon Lar are not implemented and this is true of other crisis across the country. The government most of the time pays lip service to this problem and some other biased political actors through their utterances inflame the crisis instead of calming situations that have gone out of hand. The final point is that governments of the years has ran out of ideas on how to contend the settler-indigene challenge in Nigeria or the greater problem of citizenship. In fact some governments and actors feel comfortable with some foreign elements than their fellow Nigerian from another ethnic group, which is indeed a huge problem.

Pathway to Peace

The categories of "indigenes", "settlers", and "natives" are social and political constructions of the Nigerian power elite in their search for legitimacy within the local community/state and their quest for access to power and resources. In the ordinary meaning of the words, "indigenes" and "natives" simply refer to a region or country of birth - aborigines and autochthones. Such usage does not make sense in Nigeria given the country's peculiar history of state formation, constant migration of people and population shifts in the period prior to and after colonisation.

A major study termed the "West African Long Term Perspective Study" in 1994 by the African Development Bank and the Club du Sahel in 1994 revealed that West Africa had become a region of migrants and settlers with two profound modes of migration that had completely transformed the population dynamics of the region (Brunner *et al*, 1995). The first is movement from the Sahel to the middle belt and forest zones, which has produced profoundly cosmopolitan towns and cities. The second is movement from rural to urban areas, which has turned the region into an urban majority zone (Brunner *et al*, 1994). By 1990, almost 50% of the people in Nigeria had moved from rural to urban settlements in the post independence period. When we factor in the pre-colonial migration patterns to current trends, it becomes clear that the great majority of Nigerians, and indeed West Africans are settlers, not indigenes of the places in which they live and work.

In spite of this fact, self-declared indigenes and natives are pitched against settlers in deadly confrontations over access to local power, resources and questions of identity. These labels have become potent instruments for the negative mobilisation of peoples' sentiments and feelings in ways that undermine the national political objectives of integration and the evolution of a harmonious political community.

Citizenship in the modern state should not only be based on what legal rights citizens have and what they can expect from their government, but should also be based on citizenship as an active political role. In some western countries, residents from other countries having met some laid down

Requirements are entitled to political rights such as the right to vote in local and national elections and in some cases even the right to stand for elections.

Citizenship in its modern form consists of three essential and central propositions: the notion of individual and human rights, the idea of political participation and the principles of socio-economic welfare. The entrenchment of these basic constituents of citizenship will go a long way in resolving the dynamics of conflict in any political community (Kazar-Toure, 2004).

In a modern state structure the acceptance of ethnic and cultural groups that are not indigenous to the majority can represent one of the greatest challenges, yet this diversity could be an enormous asset if these differences in identity, culture and values are treated as an advantage that can strengthen and enrich them, not as a threat.

National citizenship in Nigeria is far from being resolved and this inability is due to the fact that various ethnic groups that compose the Nigerian nation state have conceived different attitudes to Nigerian citizenship. Nigeria does have identity differences which have heightened to the point of political significance bringing about the incidence and outbreak of conflict in the country. In defining who an indigene is particularly in the context of the Federal Character principle, the 1999 Constitution emphasizes showing evidence of belonging to a community indigenous to a state or local government through one's parents or grandparents which in effect suggests membership of a local ethnic and linguistic community. Ironically the experience of the different groups referred to as settlers or strangers in different parts of the country indicate that they settled in places now known to them several years ago. In other words, several generations of these groups, perhaps not limited to that of parents and grandparents or even great grandparents were born or grew up in their present locations.

Consequently, beyond being eminently qualified as members of communities indigenous to a state or local government, they are also in position to participate meaningfully in the socio-political and economic life of the community; fulfilling their obligations and enjoying basic rights. Therefore, the provision, which was meant to exclude some people particularly from the political life of their community and by extension, the whole country could actually serve their interest if properly interpreted. And second, the provisions expose the weakness inherent in determining Nigerian citizenship particularly in the light of the limitations imposed by the federal character principle, and implicitly, there is the need for a re-thinking or a redefinition of citizenship vis-à-vis other limiting factors; apart from involving or introducing changes that are capable of challenging the *status quo*, a re-thinking or strengthening of citizenship that will address the problem of indigene versus non-indigene.

Essentially, there appears to be agreement among authors and scholars on the need to strengthen individual rights and accord them more importance than group rights, the reason being that efforts at protecting and promoting group rights have been directly responsible for the escalation of indigene versus non-indigene problems, including the numerous crises witnessed in different parts of the country in the past (Kazar-Toure, 2004). Towards this end, it has been suggested that citizenship rights should be tied to either place of birth (different from one's ethnic groups) or residence so that any Nigerian who has lived in any part of the country for certain number of years can enjoy full residency rights, which must include all rights normally available to the traditional indigenes of the states.

While observing that in 1987, the political bureau set up recommended this and suggested ten years residency for the enjoyment of this right (Oyeweso, (2006) commended the example of Group Captain Dan Suleiman who as governor of Plateau state in 1976 had proposed that any Nigeria born in Plateau state or from any other state who has lived in Plateau state for twenty years should enjoy all the rights and privileges of a native of Plateau State. Observably, progressive as the Suleiman principle

was, it was not adopted as a national policy, and neither was there any evidence of its workability, even in Plateau State.

However, beyond being a mere proposal, it has been suggested that there is need to build a national citizenship through a reform of the Nigerian Constitution which involves incorporating the "Residency Right" mentioned above into the Constitution. This section as suggested should provide that a Nigerian citizen who has resided continuously for a period of five years in any state of the federation and performs his/her civic duties, including the payment of taxes, shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of the state. Hence, this would be in accord with the practice in most federations, and would strengthen the provisions in the Constitution in addition to removing restriction on who can contest elections in different parts of the country (Bamidele & Ikubaje, 2004). And whether twenty, ten or five years, what is being advocated and what is considered relevant is that residency rights should be incorporated into the Constitution.

Besides, the need to reform section 147 of the 1999 Constitution which states that those to be appointed as ministers from each state of the Federation must be indigenes of that state was suggested. Conversely, in this sense it was suggested that indigenes must be defined as those who meet the residency requirement in any particular state (Bamidele & Ikubaje, 2004).

Thus, in agreement with the issues of residency as a major factor in defining citizenship, Taiwo (2001) maintains that every Nigerian citizen has a right to everything; land, resources and so on within the borders. His contention is that if a foreigner could become a Nigerian after fifteen years of residency through naturalization, then it should not be difficult for Nigerians to enjoy citizenship right irrespective of where he or she lives; stressing that anything short of this represents a diminution of citizenship.

Conclusion

The settler-indigene dichotomy in Nigeria is a deep problem rooted in the foundation of the Nigerian state and fanned by the various succeeding administrations that had held sway in the country for so many decades. Issues of access to resources and economic opportunities have sparked tensions that boil over to violent confrontations which leave trail of death and destruction of properties. The response of the government over these issues has been appalling and disappointing. In fact, the policies and programmes of government whose actors are not neutral in most of the crises tended to exacerbate and inflame the crisis. However, Nigeria clocking hundred years cannot continue in this path. It has, therefore, become imperative for there to be a comprehensive solution to issue of citizenship in Nigeria and the creation of a situation where every bonafide Nigeria is accorded all the rights no matter which part of the country he or she resides. However, there is need to build a national citizenship through a reform of the Nigerian Constitution which involves incorporating the "Residency Right" into the Constitution and expunging the term indigene. Furthermore, the requirement for state of origin in forms for admission and appointment purposes for federal institutions should be discontinued.

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