



Xenophobia and Migrants' Irritants in Nigeria-South Africa Relations: A Discourse

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ABSTRACT

The paper interrogates the undercurrents of xenophobia and its nexus with irritations from migration, and how these impinge on Nigeria-South Africa relations. The study is predicated on historical design with a reliance on secondary data which were thematically and textually analysed. The adoption of Realist Conflict Theory with emphasis on conflictual outcomes in the struggle for limited resources illuminated the discussion and findings of the paper. It is observable that Nigeria and South Africa are regional hegemons, and the relationship between them has been oscillating between competition, cooperation and rivalry. The two countries as economic giants in Africa would require sustainable framework for robust collaboration and timely response to manage issues or irritants that occasionally dampens their relations. Deliberate efforts and strategies are canvassed to neutralise anti-migrant sentiments that could exacerbate xenophobic tendencies which diplomatic instruments are currently attenuating.

Keywords: Historical, Irritants, Migrants, Relations, Xenophobia

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Relations between Nigeria and South Africa can be traced back in history. After Nigeria gained independence from the colonialists on the 1st of October 1960, the country supported the struggle for liberation of African countries from racial discrimination, colonial rule and apartheid systems. South Africa became the focus of Nigeria in a bid to end apartheid and its quest for freedom. Migration from African countries to South Africa has been on the increase with the fall of the apartheid regime and the introduction of constitutional democracy in 1994 (Ogunnubi and Amusan, 2018). The huge influx of documented and undocumented migrants gradually became a worrisome issue for the South African indigenes. This introduced a new dimension of prejudice and segregation (Isike and Isike, 2012). The local indigenes saw these migrants as threats and competitors for their limited resources, jobs, housing and means of livelihood (Dodson, 2010). Locals also accuse these migrants of indulging in sex works, crimes, drug and people trafficking, which plagued their country (Crush and Williams, 2013). This led to the aggression and violence by the locals in South Africa who are mostly in the lower economic strata, which further ruptures the relations between the two countries.

These challenges led to the May 2008 riot in South Africa, where the targets were migrants in search of asylum. Sixty-one migrants were reported dead, and one hundred thousand displaced. Migrants in their thousands took refuge in churches and police stations as the violent attacks intensified. Angry mobs armed with sticks, clubs and axes raided homes and stores, targeting refugees (Lyn, Robert, Katherine and Ashraf, 2011). According to Akintola (2014), Xenophobia in South Africa is not a new phenomenon; rather, it is the continuation of other forms of discrimination. Regrettably, it is known that state security agencies like the immigration service and the police have little or no compassion for the displaced (Moses, 2018). Sporadic attacks on Nigerians have been on the increase for over four years. In 2015, several Africans died in Durban and thousands fled South Africa after these attacks (Lynsey, 2019).

Violent anti-immigrant demonstrations occurred in 2017 in Pretoria. Protestants forced foreigners out of their homes and had their shops looted in Durban (Philip, 2019).

In addition, on the 3rd of September of 2019, Nigerian citizens' properties in Johannesburg were destroyed. The South African police arrested more than eighty people and confirmed the deaths of five foreigners in Johannesburg. Those who participated in the riot destroyed a number of target businesses owned by foreigners, particularly Nigerians (Onke, 2019). Nigerian migrants were the most affected in the recent xenophobic outrage in South Africa. Violent locals perpetrated attacks on foreign owned businesses, burning Nigerians who were caught at sight. In retaliation, angry Nigerians called for a boycott of South African companies operating in Nigeria, such as Shoprite, and Mobile Telephone Network (MTN). The South African embassies in Abuja and Lagos were temporarily closed, and other South African businesses in Nigeria (Neil, 2019). This made Nigerian celebrities to cancel their shows already-scheduled to take place in South Africa. Nigerians were angry at the number that died, coupled with the fact that they believed the government should have done more. This led to the recall of Ambassador Kabiru Bala, the Nigerian Ambassador to South Africa and the Nigerian Government's boycott of the World Economic Summit (Ameh, 2019). One hundred and seventy-eight Nigerians were evacuated from South Africa by a private Nigerian airline, Air Peace, which operated voluntarily on the 11th of September 2019 (Salome, 2019). This paper therefore examines the causes and recurrence of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, and how it constitutes a threat to migrants. It also explores the extent to which these irritants shape relations between Nigeria and South Africa, and proffers remedial measures.

2.0 METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

This is a qualitative study that relies on historical design. Data were collected from secondary sources, such as books, journals, newspapers, internet among others, and these were discussed in themes using textual analysis. The combination of this analytical tool with Realist Conflict theory as framework invigorated the discussions, findings and recommendations of the paper.

The paper is structured thus: Abstract; Introduction; Methodology and Structure of the paper; Literature Review; Theoretical Framework and Application of the Theory; Research Setting: Nigeria-South Africa Relations; Discussion; Conclusion and Recommendations.

3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

The concepts of Xenophobia and Migration are discussed in this section. Other issues that received attention here are: empirical discourse on xenophobia in South Africa and migration of Nigerians to South Africa.

3.1.1 The Concept of Xenophobia

Xenophobia is not new in literature; it has existed alongside the existence of man, but became evidently manifest in the ancient Greek city state where nationals saw foreigners as inferior to the Greeks and referred to them (foreigners) as "barbarians" (Solomon, 2013). Over the years, xenophobia has gained recognition as a global phenomenon which cuts across the continents. The word xenophobia was formed from 'xénos' and 'phóbos', with translation in Greek. Xénos refers to a person who is seen as a guest, stranger, foreigner or someone who appears different, while phóbos is translated to mean an experience of horror and trembling (Hussein and Hitomi, 2013). Bordeau (2010:4) defines xenophobia as the fear of an outsider or newcomer. The Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance of the UN, sees xenophobia as rejecting visitors (United Nations General Assembly, 1994:29). This fear and rejection are expressed in discriminatory behaviour and often results in violence (Mogekwu, 2005).

According to Yakushlo (2009), xenophobia is an affective and behavioural distortion towards foreigners, and people seen as aliens. Reynolds and Vine (1987) maintain that it is clearly a psychological state of mind which makes one fear or become hostile to visitors. They believe xenophobia is an anxiety disorder which manifests when one comes in contact with people of different historical descent, it is perceived as the discord and hatred of strange things or foreigners. According to Sarah (2018), it involves the

perceptions of an ingroup against an outgroup as they suspect the activities of the outgroup. The “outgroup” in this context are other nationals or citizens of other nations.

Igwe (2005) sees it as a primitive group syndrome, expressing itself in the dislike of and even hostility towards outsiders and encouraging an attitude of suspicion and exclusion in the place of trust and inclusion. Xenophobia is specific and possibly more dangerous when it is targeted at a particular alien group, as a case in Europe against the Jews and other minorities in the era of anti-Semitism. This alien group was given derogatory and classificatory names and labels (Karlsson, 2018).

Furthermore, xenophobia has bearings in ethnocentric and nationalistic ideology, due to the fact that they believe one’s nation is superior to that of anyone else (Licata and Klein 2002; Schirmer 1998). This however, elevates the desire to eliminate the individuals in the “outgroup” so that they don’t influence, change or corrupt the nation, identity, ethnicity and ideology of the nationals. Radkiewicz (2003:5) captures it as an ethnocentric syndrome which exercises violent, reluctant and hostile attitudes towards other countries’ nationals with the belief of national superiority by the indigenes of that country. Watts (1966:97) buttresses that xenophobia has a discriminatory potential.

3.1.2 The Concept of Migration

Migration issues have dominated several bilateral and multilateral forums in Africa, regional and global levels. Gencler and Apak (2009) argue that migration phenomenon has deep roots as the history of mankind. Human beings had the right until the beginning of the nineteenth century to change their places of residence without any limitation. In international relations and diplomacy, migration has been a key topic of discussion (Drake and Gatehouse, 1996). International migration is significantly becoming part of international economic relations and globalisation. It is not just for people, animals also migrate, but people's migration is central to global academic discourse (Roger, 1983). It is the transit made by a person or group of persons across political or administrative boundaries for settlement.

Migration can be temporary or permanent, willing or compelled, or in certain situations, voluntary or forced (Gatehouse, 1987). According to Taylor (1986), Migration refers to heroic movement of a population over a long distance. Imohi and Gyang (2014) describe migration as any long-distance movement across international boundaries (in the case of international migration) or national administrative boundaries (in the case of internal migration), where the migrant has been staying for at least six months. Migration is a global phenomenon that affect all countries, though in different times and for various reasons. There have been mass movements of people in human history, all of which have been triggered by specific events during those periods. Over 50 million people have left European countries for the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Chile and South Africa in recent years, according to Adepoju (1988).

Migration is the international movement of people to a destination country of which they are not nationals or citizens, in order to reside and settle there permanently (Hill, 1987). These people come for the purpose of raising a family and working there. According to Borjas (1999), early immigration theory upheld that the primary decision of leaving a country to another country was on the basis of the expected income that could be made in the receiving country when compare to that of the migrant’s country. The cross-national variation on income and earning opportunities determines migration flow and the percentage of migrants (Galor and Stark, 1991).

Moreover, the perception that migrants are more costly to the receiving country than they are beneficial does not have empirical evidence. In reality, studies show that the economies of the destination countries can grow positively due to the movement (Edin, Lalonde and Aslund, 2000). This is because migrants contribute to the labour market, and in partner countries, have higher employment rates and higher labour force participation than nationals of the host countries (Dustman, 2003). Due to this, it is unlikely that immigration will reduce the Gross Domestic Product per capita of the destination country, but only increase economic growth. Migrants increase the fiscal balance and public revenues of the destination countries, especially developing countries (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988).

3.1.3 Xenophobia in South Africa

On the 11th of May 2008, riots broke out at the Alexander Township of Johannesburg, South Africa. During the first violent outrage, two people were killed and over forty injured. Many protests broke out during the next few weeks in a more informal settlement near Johannesburg, and in communities around Durban and Cape Town. Despite the efforts made by community members and local leaders to protect them, hundreds of thousands of African migrants (despite their actual legal status) were targeted in widespread eviction campaigns orchestrated by vigilante groups, of mostly unemployed youths (Lyn, Robert, Katharine and Ashraf, 2011). The coverage of the pogroms circulated through the newspapers under the caption of “South Africa Descends to Hell”, frequently depicting the famous image of Mozambique refugee, Ernest Nhamuave necklaced with a gas tire was set ablaze by a mob. At the end of the first outbreak of xenophobia protests, sixty-two people had been killed and more than one thousand rendered homeless, forcing them to take shelter in the massive government settlements (Akintola, 2014).

One year after the attacks of May 2008, foreigners were at risk of violence and with little being achieved to address the causes of these attacks. Articles concerning the revival of xenophobia and assault organizations in the Western Cape were released in late May 2009 (Moses, 2018). During this period, a population of 1,500 to 2,500 farm workers from Zimbabwe were forcefully expelled from their homes. Few citizens were physically assaulted, and homes were looted. This led to a major displacement of foreign nationals (Lynsey, 2019).

Abdi Nasir, a twenty-five-year-old, was stoned to death on 30 May, 2013. The violence was captured and shared on the internet. The Somalian Government asked South African authorities to do more for the safety of their citizens after three of their citizens who were shopkeepers were killed in June 2013 (Philip, 2019). A Somalian was reported to have died in his 50s on the 7th of June, 2014, alongside two other nationals who were seriously injured when an angry mob of locals invaded their shop (Dodson, 2010). An anti-migrant protest was organised on Friday the 24th of February 2017 in Pretoria. Demonstrators went as far as the Foreign Ministry to present a petition to the official authorities which claimed that migrants who took employable jobs from South Africans, were the cause of criminal activities in the country. During the march, one hundred and thirty-six protesters were arrested (Ogunnubi and Amusan, 2018).

This xenophobic outrage witnessed attacks being made on Nigerians’ property in Johannesburg on the 3rd of September, 2019. More than eighty people were arrested by the police, while five foreigners were confirmed dead. A number of foreign-owned companies (mainly by Nigerians) were destroyed in the riot (Onke, 2019). Violent residents carried out attacks on companies belonging to foreigners, burning Nigerians captured at sight, and this resulted in some Nigerians demanding that South African firms such as; Shoprite, MTN and PEP in Nigeria be boycotted (Neil, 2019).

3.1.4 Migration of Nigerians to South Africa

Nigeria and South Africa are two African countries that, for several purposes, have been internationally recognised and regarded. Nigeria is regarded as the most populous black nation on the planet with an estimated population of 180 million, with South Africa having approximately 57 million people. Although Nigeria and South Africa are located separately in Western and Southern Africa, they are involved in various areas of economy and politics (Adebisi, 2017). With the abolition of segregation and the advent of democratic governance in 1994, migrants from other African nations to South Africa rose greatly (Ogunnubi and Amusan, 2018:61). The 2011 South African Census gave the number of foreign-born individuals in South Africa as 2.2 million (Heleta, 2018).

There are complex and specific explanations why Nigerians decide to leave their country. Extant literature posits that Nigerian citizens leave their country based on economic and coercive drivers. Crawley’s (2016) investigations establish a number of causes for migration which include; increased tensions due to differences and resource sharing, inter-generational conflict related to family and marriage, religious obligations and lack of standard living conditions. The International Organisation on Migration profile for Nigeria (2014) also documents that the continuing outbreaks of conflict; intra-state ethno-religious crises, unemployment among others are partly responsible for migration to South Africa, and other countries. Motivated by the success stories, youths tend to ignore failure stories or the danger signs abroad (Malakooti, 2015).

4.0 Theoretical Framework and Application of Theory

The Realist Conflict Theory is considered relevant as the framework for the robust discussion of this paper. Donald Campbell propounded this theory in 1965, and subsequently, it has been expanded by other scholars in the Social Sciences and Psychology (Jennifer, 2015). Realist Conflict theory is also known as Realistic Group Conflict Theory. This theory is also known as social psychology model of intergroup conflict.

The struggle for limited resources is seen as a trigger for conflict between individual and groups (Shrief, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif, 1961). This theory focuses on the major sources of conflict between individuals and groups. These sources are the struggle for limited resources and the incompatible goals set by different persons in the society (Shrief et al., 1961). Groups compete for real or perceived scarce resources which may be monetary, military security and protection, social status or even political power. Apart from conflict, this theory is used to explain discrimination and prejudice that exist between those in competition for the same resources. Whenever individuals or group seek scarce resources, it is inevitable to avoid negative stereotypes, conflicting interests, different belief systems and discrimination (Oksana, 2008). This could lead to violence and feud, due to the clash of interests between individuals in any society.

Realist Conflict Theory emphasises the role of violence and control in the development of social order. Social order is preserved through dominance, with power in the hands of those with the greatest political, economic and social wealth (Jim, 2019). Inequality exists according to this theory because of those who hold disproportionate share of the wealth in society and the working class, especially the poor in society (Ashley, 2019). The emphasis here is on social control because groups and individuals seek to follow their own goals by competing to regulate society's resources. In this respect, a lot of attention is paid to social groups such as class, ethnic, race, political, cultural, religious and gender, because they are seen to be potentials for injustice from rival groups. Violence can also arise when groups see the competition over the limited resources as zero-sum game, in which only one group is the winner, and the other, the loser. This constant rivalry between groups is the cause of the ever-changing nature of the society (Fermin, 2019).

In line with the xenophobia attacks in South Africa, the Realist Conflict Theory captures how the nationals of South Africa became hostile due to the competition for scarce resources which both the nationals and migrants have to share. South Africans are not hostile people, but the recurrence of xenophobia is traceable to the conflict that exists between the locals and the foreigners. One can therefore conclude that the Realist Conflict Theory applies to the situation of African migrants and South Africa, owing to the competition that exists over the limited resources and unlimited wants and needs of the population (Adebisi, 2017).

Apart from the conflict that exists between South Africans and foreigners driven by limited and scarce resources, another explanatory factor are incompatible goals. According to Milton (2019), Nigerians are perceived to be drug dealers, online scammers and human traffickers. Nigerians are often seen as foreigners who live larger than the South Africans in their own country. This further led to conflicting goals between Nigerians and South Africans. Nigerians aim to make a lot of money and are accused of exhibitionism, while South Africans just intend to live comfortably and modestly. This clash of interests and goals finds expression in South Africans violent approach to expressing their displeasure.

5.0 Research Setting: Nigeria – South Africa Relations

Nigeria and South Africa maintain hegemonic positions in Africa and without doubt, remains the continent's largest economies. Shortly after Nigeria became independent in October 1960, the apartheid regime received serious pressure to stop oppressing the black majority in Southern Africa (including Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa) (Nancy and William, 2013). In 1961, Mr Jaja Wachukwu, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke about how Nigeria's global interaction is explicit, that colonialism and all its manifestations must be brought to an end and that Nigeria will endeavour to make good use of its political and physical resources to free the rest of Africa (Agbu, 2013).

Earlier, Akinyemi (1979) described Nigeria's foreign policy as self-determination politique, and posits that after the nation gained independence, it adopted five principles guiding its African policy thus:

1. The recognition of the sovereign independence of all African states;
2. The respect for every African State's freedom, hegemony and territorial integrity;
3. Non-interference with other African countries in their internal affairs;
4. Commitment to practical collaboration as a means to promote unity in Africa;
5. Total eradication of African racism and colonialism. (Akinyemi, 1979).

According to Zabadi and Onuoha (2012), the state-sponsored Sharpeville massacre on March 21, 1960, led to the killing of over seventy blacks, this gave the Nigerian government an opportunity to formally intervene in the apartheid system. Nigeria interfered by banning South African goods from being imported into the country, and it became a leading voice in the international community on sanctions against South Africa (Agbu, 2010). The expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961; South African Dutch Church from Nigeria and the cancellation of contracts with South African firms shows that the Nigerian government hated the oppressive apartheid regime (Agbu et al, 2013).

The need to dismantle colonialism in Southern Africa led the Nigerian government to levy a special tax on public servants in the country (Mngomezulu, 2019). At the continental level, the end of apartheid and the consequent position of South Africa as a major power has brought about reforms that altered Nigeria's Afrocentric policy stance. Nevertheless, in the process of formulating a new African strategy in the post-apartheid era, it seemed certain that Nigeria would have to contend with South Africa for supremacy sooner or later (Bheki, 2019).

Relations worsened further after Abacha directed the detention of Ken SaroWiwa, an environmental activist, alongside eight other Ogoni activists who were instrumental to the founding of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Despite the plea from South Africa and other countries, the nine persons were tried and sentenced to death. Mandela persuaded the Commonwealth and the OAU to ostracise Nigeria and urged the international community to boycott Nigeria's oil (Mngomezulu, 2019).

The suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth contributed to the political and diplomatic isolation of Nigeria, with South Africa's increasing role in global relations. Late General Sani Abacha, the Nigerian despot, worsened the relationship by withdrawing the Super Eagles from the African Cup of Nations hosted by South Africa in 1996, causing Nigeria to be suspended by the Confederation of African Football (CAF). There was however a restoration of civic order and renewal of South Africa relations with Nigeria in 1999 (Ndlovu, 2010).

In 1999, both countries experienced change of governments. President Olusegun Obasanjo became the President of Nigeria, while President Thabo Mbeki took over the rein of affairs in South Africa. This period marked the beginning of strategic bilateral agreements between Nigeria and South Africa, in October 1999 (Akinboye, 2005). Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2005, Nigeria and South Africa were in good partnership due to the involvement of the then President of Nigeria and his South African counterpart in continental and global activities (Ngubentombi, 2004).

According to Ige (2018), another significant collaborative effort between Nigeria and South Africa to promote regional reconstruction was the 1999 transformation of the OAU into the AU. These countries played major roles in processing the new development plan for Africa, the 2001 New Partnership for Africa's Development and its governance tool; and the 2003 African Peer Review Mechanism. The expectations of the international community after 2000 are that Africans and the continent's political leadership will look inward to solve their problems: this desire undoubtedly made some efforts quite necessary and timely (NEPAD, 2001).

Late President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, who was not a popular candidate, took over leadership of the country at the expiration of Obasanjo's tenure in 2007. His administration was short-lived as he died in office in May, 2010. Not much could be said on Nigeria's interaction with South Africa under Yar'adua, as he was unwell and spent most of the time receiving treatment abroad. After his death, Goodluck Jonathan assumed leadership as the President of Nigeria. There was also a change of leadership in 2009 when Jacob Zuma assumed the leadership of South Africa. The Bi-National Committee negotiations signed twenty main agreements to improve their bi-lateral relations between 1999 and 2008 (Seteolu and

Okuneye, 2017). In 2008, their relationship was affected by xenophobia issues which raised questions about the country's long-term friendship and cooperation. During the Jonathan/Zuma era, interactions between Nigeria and South Africa became lukewarm. Ivory Coast in 2011 generated political tensions between the two countries. Nigeria went against Laurent Gbagbo, who did not want to concede electoral defeat. Nigeria mobilised West African countries to force Gbagbo out of control, which challenged South Africa's desire for political diplomacy (Seteolu and Okuneye, 2017).

In 2012, the two countries experienced diplomatic squabbles resulting from South Africa's action of denying one hundred and twenty-five Nigerians entry into Oliver Tambo International Airport, Johannesburg on the flimsy excuse of possessing expired yellow fever certificates. In retaliation, 128 South Africans were deported from Lagos by the Nigerian government within 2 days, citing "lack of proper documentation" as reason (Ige, 2018), and this act forced President Zuma to visit Nigeria to mend ties. Jonathan in return, visited South Africa in 2013. The two leaders agreed to revive and extend their meetings to include other heads of state in their bi-national committee. The position taken by both countries in the Jean Ping and Dlamini-Zuma contest for AU presidency also highlights a major rivalry in the Nigeria-South Africa relations (The Conversation, 2015).

The 2014 Nigeria and South Africa arms deal debacle affected their relations when Pretoria seized \$15 million from Nigeria. The \$5.7 million discovered in suitcases in a Nigerian private jet, and the \$9.3 million (Ujara & Ibietan, 2017: 134) confiscation almost endangered their relations when Nigerians demanded the government to recall Nigeria's Ambassador to South Africa. According to Kayode (2014), the Nigerian government's failure to officially report the \$9.3 million cash loaded in a Nigerian private jet drew negative diplomatic reaction.

In April 2015, the issue of xenophobia attacks on Nigerians further affected the relationship between both countries. Nigeria was forced to withdraw its ambassador as a result of the attacks; Uche Ajulu-Okeke and the High Commissioner, Martin Cobham (The Conversation, 2015). The expectation was that after President Cyril Ramaphosa took over as the President in February 2018, ties between South Africa and Nigeria will be improved. The relationship deteriorated that the Nigerian government had to evacuate about 600 of its citizens from South Africa. The attack in South Africa led to retaliatory attacks in Nigeria where South African businesses and investments were touched by angry youths, leading to the closure of its embassy and high commission in Lagos and Abuja respectively, thereby forcing President Muhammed Buhari to visit Pretoria to revive diplomatic relations between both countries, and the meeting was pleasant. It focused primarily on how the two countries could strengthen their economic, political and social relations, rather than focusing solely on the attacks. Following this meeting, and after diplomatic talks between both countries' envoys, relations between the two countries are currently being managed.

6.0 DISCUSSION

6.1 Xenophobia and Migrants' Challenges in South Africa

Migrants all over the world, irrespective of where they settle face one challenge or another. One of their biggest challenges is discrimination and segregation, due to the fact that these migrants are seen and perceived by the natives as aliens and are deprived certain privileges (Segal, 2002). In developed countries, migrants from Third World countries (Nigeria inclusive) are given the worst type of treatments. Most of these migrants work more than the normal hours in most cases and are underpaid (Alexander, 2003). In Europe, for example, most female migrants apart from working as maids in homes, also serve as "sex slaves" to their randy masters (Gijbert, 2004).

The constant killings and attacks by South African nationals on African migrants pose a major challenge to these migrants (Adeleke and Ademola, 2019). The vicious attacks on African migrants have also generated local and international condemnation. Migrants from other African countries face all forms of discrimination, unequal treatment, vicious attacks by mobs, segregation and even deaths in South Africa. Mobs attack their businesses without facing the law, and this also poses a challenge to these migrants (Steven, 2019). The xenophobic attacks by South Africans on migrants however is a challenge that requires attention (Claassen, 2014 cited in Claassen 2017:1).

According to Laczko (2019), migrants face challenges such as; transportation issues, language barriers, weather conditions, employment opportunities, prejudice, housing, cultural differences, raising children, isolation and access to local services. Xenophobia in South Africa is characterised by lawlessness and crisis due to avoidable killing of migrants which constitute irritations in Nigeria-South Africa relations.

6.2 Impact of Xenophobia on Nigeria and South Africa Relations

The impact of xenophobia on the relations between the two countries can be taxonomised into diplomatic; political; socio-cultural and psychological, and they discussed as follows. The two countries have constantly been working on their diplomatic ties since the anti-foreigner violence which took place in 2008. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which was signed in 2013, by Nigeria and South Africa, was aimed at reinforcing diplomatic relations and ending future xenophobia outrage (Babalola, 2017). Sadly, these xenophobia attacks on Africans have only continued, taking innocent lives. The UN Security Council condemned the 2015 attacks. Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi also did, following series of denouncements and criticisms of these actions (Claassen, 2015).

In September 2019, when the issue of xenophobia arose again, and where it was reported in some section of the media that the South African government and police were giving support to the locals attacking non-nationals (especially Nigerians), the diplomatic interactions between the two countries became severed once more. This situation led Nigeria to recall her Ambassador to South Africa (Onke, 2019). There were also calls for the Nigerian government to sanction South Africa both politically and economically. A chieftain of the All Progressive Congress in Nigeria suggested that the federal government should nationalise all South African investments in the country (Neil, 2019). Aside from the diplomatic row, there was also a legal side to the issue, as Nigeria considered filing a suit opposing the people and government of South Africa at the African Court on Human and People's Right in Arusha, Tanzania (John, 2019). Uzoho (2019) captured the story with the bold headline "Nigeria: Xenophobic Attacks Threaten \$60bn Nigeria-South African Trade".

Another aspect of this issue is the possibility of decimating African unity. The prevalence of xenophobia in South Africa goes against the African culture, creating a caricature of the African project. There are notable implications of xenophobia on the unity of African countries and Pan-Africanism (Ebenezer and Samuel, 2018). As enshrined in the UDHR of 1984 and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, people can migrate to any part of the world to access a more suitable and stable standard of living (Moses, 2018). Nevertheless, this freedom can be limited by strict visa policies. Xenophobic attacks could make African countries follow strict visa policies, thus destroying the initiative on the new Pan-African Passport and African integration. According to the Nigerian-South Africa Chamber of Commerce (NSACC), the economy of Africa is fragile and would remain stagnant if foreign businesses keep getting attacked (Woolfrey, 2019). Industries in Nigeria and South Africa are likely to lose human capital, and this could lead victims of the attack into joining terrorist organizations, with attendant security issues in both countries (Ismail and Sakariyau, 2017).

On the 23rd of February 2017, the head office of MTN located in Abuja was looted by protesters who vandalised their office equipment (Copley, 2017). There are a number of South African establishments operating in Nigeria's entertainment, construction, banking, telecommunications, hospitality, aviation, manufacturing and, oil and gas sectors. Some of these companies; South African Airways, Stanbic/IBTC Bank, South African Breweries (SAB miller), MultiChoice Africa (operating DSTV and GOtv), Power Giant, MTN, Eskom Nigeria, Umgeni Water and Shoprite, can become easy reprisal targets in future anti-foreigner attacks in Nigeria (Unah, 2017). Moreover, in September 2019, Nigerians retaliated as some South African investments such as MTN and Shoprite were touched and looted. It was reported in some sections of the media that the looted goods were worth more than five hundred million naira. This led to temporary unemployment and displacement as the Nigerians working for these establishments were sent home, while the companies were urgently shut down (Umezina, 2019).

According to Oyelana (2015), most international investors over the years do not invest in South Africa because they have lost faith in its courts and police, and do not feel protected. Some African nations such as Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe who in the past carried out xenophobic attacks in the form of sending non-nationals out of their countries have seen that such acts have negatively impacted their economies

since then (Mbamalu, 2017). This implies that xenophobia has negative impacts on the economies of nations that harbours it. In the case of Nigeria – South Africa relations, economic impacts of xenophobia are felt in many spheres. According to David (2019), this led to the loss of millions of Rands and Naira equivalent in properties. An example of this is the car dealer shop belonging to a Nigerian that was burnt down on the 1st of September 2019. This is the same for South African businesses in Nigeria. As a result of xenophobia, the percentage of income normally generated by the South African government from Nigerians securing visas has dropped drastically (Uzoho, 2019). Adeleke and Ademola (2019) submit that African migrants in South Africa no longer socialise freely with locals, and how living victims of xenophobic violence suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). It is not surprising that foreigners and locals no longer see eye-to-eye sharing values, history, norms and ideologies for fear of being attacked or killed.

The xenophobic assault on Nigerians has multiple socio-cultural impacts. These attacks have generated hatred in the affected Nigerians' minds, leaving only negative impression of South Africans. Several Nigerian musicians boycotted their musical concerts and tour to South Africa in reaction to Johannesburg's unrest (Milton, 2019). On 4th of September 2019, the Nigerian government announced that it was boycotting the World Economic Forum on Africa in Cape Town to condemn the violence (Ameh, 2019).

7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study assessed the impacts of xenophobia on Nigeria-South Africa relations noting the irritants to migrants or movement in Africa. The recurrence of xenophobia attacks or conflicts portends serious danger to the much desired collaboration between the two countries. Rapprochement/cooperation between these huge economies can galvanise Africa's development as envisaged by African Union 2063 agenda. The reverse application of Realist Conflict Theory that substitutes conflict for cooperation suggests huge potentials for marshalling and utilising the resources (that divides or ignites conflicts) for the greater good of Africans. Predicated on the foregoing discourse, the paper suggests as follows:

- There is the need for timely response by the South African and other national governments at reducing negative activities that could lead to xenophobia outrage.
- As a corollary, sanctions should be meted on persons, groups or organisations fanning embers of xenophobia or hatred or anything that abbreviates cordial relations among the people.
- Deliberate efforts and strategies should be evolved to temporise anti-immigrants statements/sentiments.
- The South African and other national governments should take full responsibility for all persons on its territory irrespective of race, ethnicity, gender or nationality in order to create and sustain African dignity.
- Adequate/effective institutional mechanisms are required to engender inclusivity and cohesion of communities.
- This paper recommends that xenophobic violence should be criminalised and punishable under the South African and other national governments laws.
- Finally, African countries/governments should evolve robust machineries or policy framework to manage migrations and boost their economies, in order to reduce the influx of migrants in receiving countries.

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