



Regional Integration and the Neo-functional Model: The Brexit Narrative

Oluwatobi Aje¹ · Felix Chidozie²

Received: 7 June 2018 / Accepted: 18 November 2018
© Fudan University 2018

Abstract

The socio-economic and political advantages derived as benefits of the integrative project have been the justification for most integrative initiatives. This has also made regional integration a major phenomenon in international relations, both as a field of study and as a sphere of actual relation. Many theories are paraded in scholarly circles explaining the rationale and process of the integrative project. However, little attention is paid to the fact that, on the continuum of integration, retrogression and disengagement is possible as social realities unfold. Using archival research method, the work examines the relevance of the neo-functional model in explaining recent trends on integration, using Brexit as a case study. It contends that the neo-functional model still holds analytical purchase in approximating contemporary trends of integration.

Keywords Brexit · Neo-functionalism · Regional integration · Regional disintegration · Spill-over · Spill-back

1 Introduction

The cooperation of nation-states has been accentuated through the penetrating forces of globalization. Thus, the topic has spurred critical engagements, eliciting varying ideological posturings. Regional integration became compelling after the Second World War, as European nations began to recognise the indispensability of cooperation and joint workings to reconcile the general interests and the distinct interests of states (Afinotan 2017). The shift to integration was reinforced by the forces of

✉ Oluwatobi Aje
ajeoluwatobi@gmail.com

Felix Chidozie
felix.chidozie@covenantuniversity.edu.ng

¹ Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria

² Department of Political Science and International Relations, College of Leadership Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria

globalization; the resultant interpenetration and interdependency equally accentuated the preference for integration. More so, the commonly cited socio-economic, political, and technological benefits of integration have been a major driving force and justification for regional integration (Park and Estrada 2010).

The phenomenon of integration is critical to the discipline of International Relations. It is one of the major concepts scaffolding the framework of international relations, therefore, scholars have risen to the occasion by providing holistic theoretical frameworks that can help explain the why, how, whence and whether of regional integration since it appeared in its earliest form in the 1950s. Among such theoretical structures laid down by scholars is the neo-functional model, which pertains to the primordial enterprise of offering explanations on the purposes, patterns and implications of integration, especially within the context of European integration.

Unfortunately, the neo-functional model has come under heavy criticism among scholars; some critics posit that the theory lacks the basic qualities expected of any social theory and thus dismiss it as obsolete and un-useful in contemporary political analysis. However, it is instructive to note that a theory of regional integration should offer explanations for regional integration and equally provide insights into the dissolution of regional integration. An apt theory of regional integration should theorize on both regional integration and disintegration (Vollaard 2008).

In light of scholarly advances made by neo–neo functional scholars, it is imperative to pose this question, is the neo-functional model still relevant in contemporary discourse on regional integration? Although no serious commentator on European Union affairs endorses the 1950s definition of neo-functionalism in its entirety; that is not to infer that the neo-functional model should be dismissed without critical examination of contemporary reality (McGowan 2007). Indeed, ‘confronted with concerns about a potential collapse of the EU among eminent Euro-politicians, political scientists should be able to discuss the question with logical theoretical undercurrent (Vollaard 2008). This work seeks to examine the relevance of the neo-functional model in the exploration of recent trends on integration, using Brexit as a case study. This work comprises a background of the study, theoretical framework, a review of the Brexit narratives, its theoretical implications, and conclusion.

1.1 Theoretical Framework: Neo-functionalism

There are distinct theoretical dimensions on regional integration which seek to explain the dynamics of cooperation and integration among nation-states, especially the European integration. One of such theories is the neo-functional theory as espoused by Haas (1958), Lindberg (1963), Schmitter (1969) and Rosamond (2005). This theory sought to justify the evolving trend of regional integration in Western Europe in the early 1950s. It partly emerged to challenge and provide an alternate model to the dominant theories of realism and liberalism. ‘Realism’s tendency to pose power-centred logic’ on inter-state cooperation was problematic for Haas as much as liberal idealism’s pretence that conflict will likely be transcended through the Kantian international legal order (Rosamond 2005, p. 4).

To Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006, p. 89), the neo-functional model 'is a product of the behavioural turn in American social sciences', which focuses on institutional forms, behaviour and process of integration. The neo-functional model traces its intellectual root to Mitrany's functionalism.

Functionalism argues that states are under domestic pressure to cooperate with other states to establish a functional supranational body on the premise that there are some needs that are transnational in nature and could be accessed only through transnational means (Peter 2018, p. 4). The neo-functional model views functionalism as naive, and it therefore seeks to offer a more coherent theory of integration. The neo-functionalists reformulated the basic principles of functionalism to reflect established institutions as the basis for integration through the mechanism of spill-over.

Neo-functionalism examines the process of evolution of a new political community through the voluntary transfer of sovereignty to a joint decision-making institution or a supranational body. This model posits that the increasing functionality of the supranational body elicits the support of the national elite and the public, thereby gradually shifting loyalty to the new political community. The driving force for regional integration is the existence of a supranational body that seeks to connect the economies of independent nations, and consequent to economic interdependence and reliance, a spill-over of the integration process into other realms of relations becomes inevitable (Laursen 2008; McGowan 2007; Ozen 1998; Vollaard 2008). To this extent, the model identified economic contacts and welfare needs as the tangible source that fosters constructive inter-state cooperation. The initial decisions to integrate in this sense unintentionally produces 'economic and political spill-over that push regional integration forward' (McGowan 2007, p. 6).

The spill-over is central to the neo-functional arguments. It represents the mechanism behind successful integrations, and when the integration process commences, the spill-over through the workings of a functional supranational body becomes inevitable and irreversible. To Lindberg, the spill-over denotes the 'situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth' (Lindberg 1963, p. 10).

To Gehring (1996, p. 229), the spill-over 'amounts to a (positive) feedback mechanism, stressing the possibility of self-supporting social processes that start modestly, gain dynamics and may over time produce dramatic outcomes'. The idea of spill-over as inevitable and irreversible once the integration process begins suggests that the logic of integration is somewhat self-sustaining and automatic. Rosamond, however, posits that the assumption of the automatic nature of spill-over is 'neo-functionalism intellectual error' (Rosamond 2005, p. 9). This notion of automatic spill-over opened the floodgate of criticisms of the neo-functional model. The slowdown of the integration process in the 1960s and 1970s and De Gaulle empty chair politics points at the inherent problems of the notion of spill-over.

Haas regretted the absence of a theory of integration that explains the ascension and retrogression of the integration process in response to the failure of the neo-functional theory to capture the social reality of integration in the 1970s and unprecedented nationalism (Vollaard 2008). While the spill-over attracted slight

revival in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this was not sufficient to debunk criticisms of spill-over and neo-functionalism (Rosamond 2005).

Haas agrees that the neo-functionalist model was defective to the extent that it did not envisage the basic possibilities of disintegration. He drew attention to the potential reasons for disintegration, which he identifies as follows: ‘a lack of European loyalty among the mass public, dissatisfaction with the output of the EU, and the lack of an ideological commitment to sustain the transactional contacts’ among others (Vollaard 2008, p. 7).

The idea of spill-back captures the dynamics of disintegration, which is characterized by a decline in the integrative process. It reflects the tendency to shun new integrative rules or cheat on existing rules. The process begins when states gradually withdraw from initial commitments or ‘...from a set of specific obligations’ to the extent that ‘rules are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The scope of Community action and its institutional capacities decrease’ (Lindberg and Scheingold cited in Vollaard 2014, p. 3).

With regards to the European community, spill-back could also occur ‘when members no longer want to deal with a certain policy issue at the European level’ (Vollaard 2008, p. 7) or when member states shun new integrative rules or cheat on existing rules. It occurs when there is diminished interest and shift of coalitions thereby undermining the commitments that bind the union. Haas posits that the spill-back process is aided by the lack of loyalty among the masses, dissatisfaction with the output of the union; and lack of ideological basis to sustain the union. When the unfavourable conditions persist, socio-economic and political policies that reflected transnational expressions, ‘will 1 day or another be confronted with national preferences’ (Vollaard 2008, p. 8).

The disintegration process is not a direct reversal of the integration process; it is not the automatic transfer of loyalty from the supranational organization to the state. The spill-back process, however, considers the possible transfer of loyalties towards ‘multi-layered, multifaceted political constructions’ (Vollaard 2008, p. 8). ‘Loyalties, activities and expectations could also be re-directed to other political entities, such as sub-national regions’, for example, Transatlantic Trade Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) amongst others (Vollaard 2014, p. 3).

The notion of ‘spill-back’ attempts to fill the gaps in the neo-functionalist model and lends analytical lens to this approach to explain the complexities of [dis] integration. The concept of spill-back has attracted the renewed attention of regional integration scholars. Philippe Schmitter and Zoe Lefkofridi (2016), bemoan the criticisms of neo-functionalism, insisting that the theory is misunderstood and misrepresented. The narrative of spill-back to explain the potentials of this approach is wielded to repudiate the criticisms of the neo-functionalist model (Hooghe and Mark 2005; Schmitter and Lefkofridi 2016).

1.2 The Brexit Narrative

The European Union is predicated on the ashes of post-war Europe. The need to foster cooperation in the hitherto war-torn region; and the reconciliation agenda of

France and Germany led to the Treaty of Paris; the formations of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957 (Beddoes 2016). Britain was pre-occupied with her relationship with the Commonwealth of Nations and America and it was wary of the integration project led by Germany and France in the formative years. The British were further discouraged at the possible surrender of the country's sovereignty. As Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour party warned in 1962, membership of the integrative scheme would end Britain's history of greatness that spans 1000 years. The economic turmoil that confronted Britain and the increasing benefits of integration led the country to join the community in 1973.

Britain's membership of the union has been evaluated in terms of costs and benefits (Beddoes 2016). The integrative project was perceived as bad news for most Britons when inflation level increased to 30% a few months after joining the union. The resultant mixed feeling occasioned by this development led Harold Wilson to call for a referendum on the continuing membership of the European Union in 1975 (Sully 2016). While the majority voted to remain in the community, the spectre of Euro-scepticism existed. The conflicting positions on the integration project reflected in the disagreements between the European Commission President, Jacques Delors in 1988 on the reinforcement of tougher labour and social regulations and Margaret Thatcher's hostile reaction that question the excessiveness of the integration project (Beddoes 2016).

The foregoing suggests that Britain had been uncomfortable with aspects of the integration project for a long time. David Cameron's Bloomberg speech in January 2013 expressed his growing concern about the friction between the European Union and Britain. He went further to state his plans for a re-negotiation for a favourable coalition with the Union and a referendum on its membership. In his words,

It will be a fundamental principle of a future conservative government that membership of the European Union depends on the consent of the British people... That's why after the election, we will negotiate a new settlement for Britain in Europe, and then ask the British people whether they want to stay in the EU on this reformed basis or leave...we will hold that In-Out referendum before the end of 2017 and respect the outcome (Cameron cited in Brown 2015, p. 3).

The Cameron speech offered insight into the attitude of a fraction of its political class to the union and the contestations in the British society on the integration question. Political and civil society groups emerged to campaign for and against the notion that Britain should exit the European Union. The key groups, which actively contested the motion for and against includes Vote Leave, Leave-EU, and the Labour Leave as the major Pro-Brexit camp; and Britain Stronger in Europe, Labour In, and the British Influence as campaigners for Bremain (Brown 2015).

The Vote Leave led by Matthew Elliot and other Eurosceptic business gurus argued that socio-political, technological and economic forces are undergoing a reconfiguration, which the EU cannot cope with and the membership of EU has hitherto affected the socio-economic stands of Britain. The sceptics insisted that Britain has lost control of vital and strategic policies, and to this extent, a vote to

leave the European Union implied a vote for a stronger and reliable Britain. The Eurosceptics posited that ‘We should negotiate a new UK–EU deal based on free trade and friendly cooperation. We end the supremacy of EU law. We regain control. We stop sending £350 million every week to Brussels and instead spend it on our priorities.’ It is safer and reasonable to cease transferring power and resources to Brussels annually, the group insisted (Brown 2015, 4).

Leave-EU led by Arron Banks and Richard Tice shared the view of the Vote Leave; that the annual contribution to Brussels created trade imbalance and economic disparity. The Leave-EU campaigners insisted that common trade and migration rules have diminished the influence of Britain on the world stage. This subgroup argues thus:

Imagine having £1000 more to spend each year... imagine not having our laws dictated to us by Brussels... imagine how we could then regain control of important issues such as borders... imagine having greater influence over our global trade, so that we can do our deals with fast-growing Commonwealth countries and with America... imagine the sense of pride we would get from negotiating our own global trade deals... it's time to be a bigger part of the world rather than a smaller part of Europe. We believe Britain could do so much better outside of the EU (Brown 2015, p. 4).

The Labour Leave led by Kate Hoey and Graham Stringer sought radical means to tackle the problems confronting their country by regaining control of certain issues and policies.

On the contrary, the Britain Stronger in Europe group argued that Britain is stronger, safer and better in Europe as against isolation. This tendency posited that the vote to remain in the European Union is a vote for a stronger, better Britain ‘that delivers an opportunity for individuals and families, now and in the future’ (Brown 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, the British Influence group conceded that the European Union might not be capable of handling the changing complexities of world politics; but a positive coalition and reformation of the EU with other member states could transform the Union.

The Labour In group led by Alan Johnson averred that remaining in the European Union is decisive for the survival of Britain in contemporary world politics. This group submitted that British commerce relies on EU for exports worth 227 billion pounds annually, and it enhances Britain’s global influence in the increasingly interdependent world. The core posturing of this stance is the avowal that Britain could achieve more by working with Europe than by not working with Europe (Brown 2015). The contentions among the groups formed the backdrops for the June 23, 2016 referendum. The turnout for the referendum was 71.8% with about 30 million voters. The Leave group won with 52% as against 48% that favoured sustaining British membership of the European Union (Hunt and Wheeler 2016). The results reflect regional and generational variations, with the younger generation voting in support of Remain and the older generation in favour of Brexit (BBC 2016). The somewhat tight margin of the referendum results pointed at the intensely contested nature of the debate on the Brexit question. It is noteworthy that the decision to exit the European Union was not predicated on the overwhelming votes of the British

populace. This suggests that the prevalent mood could change depending on new forces and realities across regions and generations. This paper notes that the fate of Britain following Post-Brexit is still attracting debates, and the subject matters include the parameters of exiting the European Union.

1.3 Why Brexit? Theoretical Reflections

The outcome of the referendum validated the spill-back aspect of the neo-functionalist model. Brexit, therefore, suggests that retrogression in the integrative process is possible; that actors can, and do withdraw support from supranational institutions. Meanwhile, Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016) posit that support for transnational institutions will evolve when the economic benefit of integration is directly felt by the majority of the citizens in the member states. Beneficiaries of the integration process will likely seek to preserve and offer support to the supranational institution depending on the magnitude of benefits.

In retrospect, the debate on Brexit is unending. This debate has been centred on the accruable benefits of the membership of the European Union. The economic cost and benefit of Britain's membership of the European Union has been a major issue underlying the debates on Brexit/Bremain. Hindley and Howe (2001) had predicted the decisive role of economic cost and benefit to the decision of Britain to quit the European Union. They assert:

If membership of the European Union is indeed essential to Britain's economic well-being, then going along with developments of the European Union even though they are politically undesirable might seem the lesser of two evils. On the other hand, if the net economic benefits of Britain's membership are modest, neutral or even negative, then Britain can afford to be far more robust. It might then, for example, feel far less inhibited in vetoing political developments of the EU which it does not like, or at least in pressing for exclusion from them and possibly for a special status outside an "Inner-Core" of more federally committed member state (Hindley and Howe 2001, p. 34).

To Beddoes (2016, p. 9), British citizens that were unsure of their position on Brexit decided at the referendum on the basis of whether leaving the 'EU is likely to make them better or worse off'. There is the argument, however, of the Bank of England that membership of the Union has boosted the British economy. Brexit campaigners, however, argued that the country's membership of the European Union has been damaging to its economic, political and historical fortunes. This group cited trade imbalance, which negatively affected the British economy as a result of British exports totalling 45% to other EU countries; while EU total exports to Britain came to 7% (Beddoes 2016).

The Pro-Brexit side insisted that aligning with other Pro multi-layered transnational institutions might be favourable; and it preferred reliance on the World Trade Organisation rules and free trade deal with Canada, the US and the Commonwealth. Anti-Brexit groups argued that the Pro-Brexit stance is unsound and illogical considering the prevalence of intergovernmental cooperation on the global scene. This tendency

insisted that the proposed integrative scheme with other countries outside Europe might not yield the expected output as would the European Union, which has over 500 million consumers as against Britain's 65 million people. Interestingly, the Pro-Brexit campaigners argue that the integrative project amid free movement turned Britain into a vulnerable state, where the likelihood of terrorism and other criminal activities is higher. These problems are attributed to the increasing integrative mission of the European Union, and the Pro-Brexit group argue that 'Britain has lost control of its borders... or they point to the European refugee mess' (Beddoes 2016, p. 6) as symptoms of negative integration. The rising number of migrants is perceived to be partly responsible for unemployment and migrants are viewed as competing for welfare packages of the state. As shown in Fig. 1, the attitude of British citizens to immigrants bothers on welfare chauvinism and economic nationalism with the latter assuming predominance since 2013. These issues are perceived as threats to the economic and socio-political survival of Britain, hence the call to exit the Union, as endorsed by the majority of the populace.

It is pertinent to mention that although some firms and individuals support Bre-main; the majority favours its exit. The neo-functionalists posit that the beneficiaries of the integrative process will likely offer support for its maintenance and survival. The non-direct beneficiaries will likely oppose and probably withdraw support to the institution. Neo-functionalism avers that it is advantageous that the integrative scheme directly benefits the majority of the populace of the member state to continually elicit support.

As seen in Fig. 2, the car industry in Britain, for example, benefits greatly from the integrative project and the majority of the car industry workers prefer that the country remains in the scheme. Tech UK, an IT Company, and the EEF Manufacturers Association had over 60% votes in the polls that support Britain's continued membership of the European Union. The United Kingdom arm of the International Chamber of Commerce found that over 80% of the international businesses domiciled in Britain supported Bre-main rather than Brexit. The




Fig. 1 Source: <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/how-has-press-coverage-immigration-changed>



Fig. 2 Source: Economist (https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/640-width/images/2016/04/articles/body/20160416_BRC081.png)

Aerospace and Defence association with diverse universities in the UK, as well as the Food and Drink Federation, found reasons to support Breain. James Dyson, of the eponymous manufacturing firm, and Alan Halsall of Silver Cross, however, rejected Breain arguing that European Union rules hamper the export of British products. Furthermore, many other small firms insist that, since they do not export at all, should be exempted from the Brussel's rules (Beddoes 2016, p. 10).

There is the argument that a Post-Brexit Britain would be less safe and insecure since the common foreign policy and security strategies, which are jointly designed through the decades, increased Britain's dependence on the European Union. However, Brexit apologists counter that NATO is a reliable replacement and formidable alliance on security issues. The link of Britain to the five eyes (America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) is considered sufficient for intelligence gathering (Beddoes 2016, p. 13).

The conflict arising from the integrative process and the expansionist reach of the European Union resulted in its politicisation and heightened by the public perception. The public perception had been decisive for the sustenance of Britain's membership in the European Union. The Pro-Brexit perspective is captured thus:

Those in favour of European Integration seem able to sustain a belief in large economic benefits without any supporting evidence at all, and in the face of mounting contrary evidence... the claim that the benefits are large plays an important role in Pro-integration arguments. But when challenged about the basis of this claim they all too often merely re-affirm their belief—their faith—that the economic gains must be large. They do not point to a

mass of serious and respectable studies underpinning that conclusion. They cannot. There are none (Hindley and Howe 2001, p. 24).

The preceding arguments suggest that Pro-Brexiteers are not concerned about the theoretical merits of integration, but rather, they are concerned with facts. They are concerned with the ‘concrete problems of European integration and their effects on British politics and society’ (Munch 2010), the germane question of decreasing sovereignty of the national parliament, the acceptance of Euro, the loss of individual self-determination to European regulation scheme, among others (Munch 2010).

The majority of the populace perceived that the European Union has failed to foster socio-political and economic convergence among European nations. The integrative project is criticised for offering greater advantage to Germany, while other states are increasingly peripheral. It was argued that Britain has lost its identity, glorious historical past, and was assuming the status of a minor power. The perceived dysfunctional nature of the European Union and the perceived laxness of its institutions to resolve the discrepancies influenced the decision to withdraw support from the Union.

The integrative project will likely suffer regression, as states begin to query aspects of the integration process. The German Finance Ministry has cautioned that Brexit could lead to new attitudes to the integration project in France, The Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Hungary ‘in a rash of anti-Brussels rebellions’ (Squires 2016). The shift of loyalty would likely be averted or mediated when the supranational institution reflects the preferences of the majority of the population in these states and allows for variations among the constituting states to safeguard strategic national interests.

1.4 Conclusion

The paper identified perspectives on regional integration; it also reiterated the need for a theory of regional integration that considers the possibilities of retrogression in the integrative project. While neo-functionalism as a theory of regional integration has been heavily criticised, the concept of spill-back and the reformation of this theory by Schmitter and other neo-functionalists not only improved its capability to explain regional integration, but also improved its ‘analytical purchase as a [mid-range] theory that is applicable to the dynamics and development’ of integration (McGowan 2007, p. 4). The arguments of Pro-Brexiteers validated the neo-functional theory as a valid theory of regional integration. The paper asserted that the dysfunctional and unpopular nature of supranational organization would likely attract spill-back. To this extent, the integration process fluctuates between integration and disintegration, depending on certain conditions which have been highlighted in this study. The ‘spill-over to spill-back’ concept explains likely fluctuating trends in integrating societies. The neo-functional theory remains relevant in capturing the dynamics of the integrative project.

References

- Afinotan, L. Andy. 2017. Brexit and the Poverty of Popular Democracy in Great Britain: An Analytical Perspective. *Asian Journal of Social Science Studies* 2(1):12. <https://doi.org/10.20849/ajsss.v2i1.134>.
- BBC. 2016. "EU referendum: The result in maps and charts." *BBC.COM*. 24 June. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028>. Accessed 29 Aug 2018.
- Beddoes, Zanny. Minton. 2016. *The Brexit briefs: Our guide to Britain's EU referendum*. Edited by Z.M Beddoes. June. <https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/EconomistBrexitBriefs16.pdf>. Accessed 21 Dec 2016.
- Brown, Tony. 2015. *Brexit: The 'Leave' Narrative*. <http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2015/Brexit-The-Leave-Narrative.pdf>. Accessed 19 Dec 2016.
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. 2006. *Debates on European Integration: A reader*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Gehring, Thomas. 1996. Integrating Integration Theory: Neo-functionalism and International Regimes. *Global Security* 10(3). https://www.uni-bamberg.de/fileadmin/uni/fakultaeten/sowi_professuren/politikwissenschaft_insb_int/Dateien/Mitarbeiter/Publicationen_Texterkennung/IntegratingIntegration_text.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan 2017.
- Haas, B. Ernst. 1958. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hindley, Brian, and Martin Howe. 2001. *Better Off Out? The Benefits or Costs of EU Membership*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Hooghe, Lisbet, and Gary Mark. 2005. *The Neofunctionalists Were (almost) Right: Politicization and European Integration*. https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb_Papers/conweb5-2005.pdf. Accessed 17 Dec 2016.
- Hunt, Alex, and Brian Wheeler. 2016. *Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU*. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887>. Accessed 21 Jan Nov.
- Laursen, Robert. 2008. Theory and Practise of Regional Integration. *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, February*. <http://aei.pitt.edu/8219/1/LaursenLongSympos08RegIntegedi.pdf>. Accessed 16 Dec 2016.
- Lindberg, Leon. N. 1963. *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- McGowan, Lee. 2007. "Theorising European Integration: revisiting neofunctionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC competition policy?" *European Integration Online papers* 11. <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2007-003.pdf>. Accessed 18 Dec 2016.
- Munch, Richard. 2010. *European Governmentality: The liberal drift of Multilevel Governance*. New York: Routledge.
- Ozen, Cinar. 1998. NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND THE CHANGE IN THE DYNAMICS OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS. *Journal of International Affairs* III (3). <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CinarOzen.pdf>. Accessed 22 Dec 2016.
- Park, Donghyun, and Ruiz Estrada. 2010. A New Multi-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Regional Integration: Regional Integration Evaluation (RIE) Methodology. *ADB Working paper series on Regional Economic Integration, May*. https://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP49_Multi_Dimensional_Framework.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
- Peter, Lamb. 2018. Harold Laski's International Functionalism: A Socialist Challenge to Federalism. *The International History Review* 1: 1–23.
- Rosamond, Ben. 2005. The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo-functionalism of Ernst B Haas. *Journal of European Public Policy (Routledge)* 12 (2): 237–254. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500043928>.
- Schmitter, Philippe. 1969. Three Neo-functional Hypotheses about International Integration. *International Organization* 23 (2): 161–166.
- Schmitter, Philippe, and Zoe Lefkofridi. 2016. Neo-Functionalism as a Theory of Disintegration. *Chinese political science review (Springerlink)* 1 (1): 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0012-4>.
- Squires, Nick. 2016. *More countries could follow UK out of the EU, says German finance ministry, as European leaders warn radical reform is needed, 25 June*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/25/european-leaders-fear-brexit-vote-could-herald-eu-collapse-unles/>. Accessed 11 Jan 2016.

- Sully, Melanie. 2016. *The Brexit Drama—final curtain or prelude*. 7 6. http://oegfe.at/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/OEGfE_Policy_Brief-2016.18.pdf. Accessed 1 Dec 2016.
- Vollaard, Hans. 2008. A theory of European disintegration. *Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics*. Riga: University of Latvia. <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-riga/virtualpaperroom/017.pdf>. Accessed 18 Dec 2016.
- Vollaard, Hans. 2014. Explaining European Disintegration. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (5): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12132>.



Oluwatobi Aje had his first degree in political science from Ekiti State University and a Masters degree in International Relations from Covenant University Nigeria.



Felix Chidozie is a lecturer 1 at the department of Political science and international relations Covenant University. Where he also obtained his doctoral degree in International Relations.