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MILITARY RESURGENCE IN AFRICAN POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

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Abstract:

The spate of democratic wave that blew across the continent of Africa in the 1990s came with the hope of economic transformation and an end to the decades of backwardness, poverty and want. Prior to this period, democratic governance was the exception rather than the norm. Military high command across the continent dictated the pace for many decades and most times falling short of the messianic appeal that drew them into politics and governing with their diktat nature and abuse of human rights, the economies of most countries of the continent where the military juntas were entrenched, experienced stall and retrogression, creating contrition for grumbling by the weakened civil society in these countries. However, the turn in the dynamics of the international system following the collapse of communism and insistence of the continent's development partners on democratization, compelled many of the military juntas to retreat back to their barracks, thus opening the space for inflow of investments which is in dire need to reverberate the ailing economies. But after a brief spell of power in the hands of the civilian authorities, the lustre of power seem to be drawing some elements in the military high command to the old scenarios which resemble a reverse wave of democratization, thus allowing the gains of civilian advancement to be lost while the countries relapse. One of the expected areas of relapses with the resurgence of the military back in power is in capital flows into the countries for development purposes. The examines these issues and concludes that the resurgence of military rule in the West African sub-region is a set back to the development of the countries in the sub-region,

Keyword: Military Resurgence, West Africa, Democracy, FDI. Liberalization

Introduction

The transition to civilian administration from the military in most West African countries was neither easy nor smooth. The countries have been facing pressures of development from different quarters including their development partners who insisted on democratic governance for continuous support. In addition, it was becoming anachronistic to have military or persons in uniform being in office apart from their main official duty. Some of the military high command in power changed uniform by transforming to civilians in power while some handed over to their

civilian cronies. The spate of democratisation sweeping across the entire continent of Africa as a result of third wave global democratization process ensures that the military governments became obsolete by design. It also became a campaign for most of the development partners, knowing the obvious disadvantage of Military institutions in power the military in power to cause an exit of the institutions from directly holding on to power in most African countries. On the side of business, most industrial nations also find it difficult to have contractual agreements with military men and found them difficult to

accommodate in the comity of nations where important issues that border on long term commitments are discussed.

After a brief spell of power in the hands of the civilian authorities, the luctre of power seem to be drawing some elements in the military high command to the old scenarios which resemble a reverse wave of democratization, thus allowing the gains of civilian advancement to be lost while the countries relapse. One of the expected areas of relapses with the resurgence of the military back in power is in capital flows into the countries for development purposes. Though African countries of the West have not been noticed or recorded to be doing well in the area of capital inflows (UNCTAD 2010, 2011), the conditions may worsen and developmental targets and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) not be met in these countries. The civilian administrations may have improved the environment somewhat, but it is evident the re-entry of the military into power cannot improve the situation no matter how altruistic their intention of man in uniform who seize power is (Abubakar 2008). Many of incursions are blamed on deteriorating conditions of life and institutions but it is not noticed that the military itself as an institution at the very least has received any benefit from such political expeditions. While capital flows into different sectors of the economies where benefits and returns can be reaped in accordance with the investors' horizon have been continuous in its little form, the fear that the flows may result in sudden stop or retrenchment or in certain cases expropriation of assets is palpable.

Many of the causes and determinants of lack of development in a military government can be traced to governance and transparency problems which the developed countries but the Multinationals or Transnational Corporations (MNCs and TNCs) in these countries are completely averse to. The basic objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the comeback of military governments can have on capital

flows or Foreign direct investment into these countries and to specifically discover if the level of development and its momentum can be maintained in spite of the loss of democratic governance by these countries. The paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with the review of available literature comes after the introduction. Sections 3 discuss the methodology, model and sources of data while section 4 discusses the results. The last section makes recommendations and concludes the paper.

Review of Literature

While the basic rule international investment flows in virtually every country has been attract FDI at all costs, it has been noted that it does not all the come with solid theorised benefit but with some costs as well. In spite of this its benefits to African economies cannot be overemphasised at this time for national development purposes. On the positive side are studies such as Bellak (2004) and Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2005). On the other side are studies of Van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg (2001) and Akinlo (2004). Evidence for need of FDI has tended to the positive side though the negative side has not been controlled by these economies. Stehrer and Woerz (2005) also found strong support for the clamour for FDI by countries including emerging and developed countries of the world by the impacts it has on the productivity and output. Its impact on export led growth and wages of the economies of the countries they studied were quite significant. The paper discovers a bi-directional causality between productivity and FDI inflows, but with inflows having little effect on the spurning of growth of domestic investment. It also is not significant in the pulling entrepreneurial growth efforts in the economies.

A plethora of determinants cause the FDI to flow in particular ways. Global causes of capital flows have been held to the real

interests in the United States and to a less extent the prices of commodities (Byrne and Fiess, 2011). The impact of the outflows on FDI is quite significant since the outflows impel some pressure on the performance of emerging and frontier economies and especially developing countries of Africa. Arguments have evolved on the push factors for FDI and generally revolved round about the Marginal PK which seems higher elsewhere especially in capital scarce countries. A large proportion of the profits of the MNCs are realised from the emerging and developing countries (UNCTAD, 2008). Large companies realize 26 to 28 percent rate of return from Africa which is one of the highest rates in the world (Snyder 2003). Other prevailing determinants of capital inflows and especially FDI flows into sub-Saharan Africa have been eclectic, localisation determinants while push factors have remained constant over the years. The importance of FDI is underscored by the ultimate net value additions to the entrepreneurial ability of the domestic investors (Kumar and Pradhan, 2002). FDI mainly come through Multinational Corporations which seek and obtain various advantages before investing. The more profitable inflows of FDI have been through *greenfields* rather than through mergers and acquisitions, while *brownfields* have not been so common.

Ahlquist (2006) discusses the role of stability of governmental policies on flows of direct and portfolio types. While portfolio investors react to fiscal policy outcomes, changes in the policies by reallocating their invested capital, direct investors react to changes in political institutions due to their more stable nature. The more stable the policies governing the institutions are, the more stable the direct investment. The Lucas (1990) paradox becomes real in the African situations where the MNCs are expected to lead in investment now lag and

sudden changes in the environments induce further capital retrenchment or flow reversals. Though answers were less plausible at the time, other solutions seem to have emerged as a result of the somersault type of policies that African governments plunge their economies into.

Over the years the traditional determinants of FDI have changed somewhat with globalisation leading the changes (Kokko, 2002). Also issues such as democratisation of the governance and polity have been key (Addison and Heshmati 2003). Ajayi (2007) reasons that the choice of a particular domestic environment to locate facilities is informed by whether the MNC is market and resource seeking (for example Nigeria) for its outputs or seeking cost reduction or efficiency in production to export (for example the Export Processing Zones). Undoubtedly, portfolio flows have less stability and therefore less reliability and less sought after than FDI which tends to be more reliable. Irrespective of policies of the governments in place, (military or civilian) the environments, (industry and business) do matter. The environments dictate the cost and pricing structure of the eventual products of the foreign investor - the MNC.

Military incursions in the politics of African countries have many root causes ranging from acute contestation of political power to mismanagement of the economy. More importantly the military have blamed civilian governments for economic mismanagement and corruption and have cited this as the reason for their incursion to power. It is clear from literature that the military is not respected in the international financial and economic community due to their lack of legitimacy and more importantly possibility of lack of respect for agreements. Military governments are more likely to foist restrictive regulatory regimes on the country leading to reversals of earlier gains of deregulation and liberalisation. Nevertheless the interest in the exploitation of resources from Africa either by the foreign powers or by the Multi National Corporations MNCs has continued unabated

(Barnes, 2004). Coups and countercoups were rife with no accountability; factionalism occurred but with support of foreign powers while authoritarianism and high level of corruption existed. Military governments have tended to weaken economic performance with their focus on extractive industries basically for the purpose of exploitation of resources and undermine the institutions that encourage the entrenchment of democratic values.

Resurgence of Military Coup D'états

According to Oyediran (1989), there are three dominant positions in the literature on military rule in Africa. Some see the military as the best organised institution and a reliable manager of social change in developing countries. This is hinged on the fact that the military institution is highly disciplined, as such having the capacity to guarantee the necessary stability for economic development (Guteridge 1982, Horowitz 1966 Pye 1960). Others believe that development and reform can only be brought by revolution to which only the regular constitute the principal obstacle to such process of change in developing countries. This is because the military institution is naturally conservative and oligarchic and always allies the middle who tries to uphold the status quo which is in their class advantage (Nun 1957). The last perspective views the military as incapable of making real efforts towards building lasting political institution. It sees the military as conservative and unproductive (Huntington 1969).

The 1960s were once called the “the military decade in Africa,” given that the continent was plagued by coups during this period (Zoiberg 1973). In West Africa, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Mali all experienced one or more successful coups between 1960 and 1970 alone.(McGowan 2006) In the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of African leaders were assassinated or forced from office by coups d'état. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, only five countries in Africa held competitive elections on a regular

basis.(Greenblatt 2012). The dynamics was changed following the third wave democratic wind that swept most of these regimes away and ushering in regimes that could lay claim to power through multi-party electoral processes. These changes witnessed at the national political levels also played out in international relations. Apart from development partners insisting that African countries must democratize to have access to funds, regional institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS and the African Union AU has enshrined it in their protocol and charter that only democratically elected officials would be allowed to have dealings with the institutions respectively.

The shared combination of these factors is enough to push almost all the countries in the continent towards the path of democracy and openness. However the nature of these societies particularly countries of the west African sub-region and the structure of the political economy makes the foundation of these democracies shaky with constant threat of collapsing or not holding up. Some of these countries have been able to endure great elastic push which others such as Mali, Niger, Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome/ Principe were not able to withstand. In these counties the intervention of the military can no longer be said to be corrective as the military institution has been fingered as the problem for most of them but the trail of these scenario is uncertainty and instability that is detrimental to the economic wellbeing of these countries.

The question we should attempt to answer here is why does the military institution abandon its traditional role for the society and dive into direct participation and control of state apparatus? So many factors have been advanced as responsible for this development.

The first point here is the complex relationship that exists between the civil authority and the military, the problem of civil-military relations. Some scholars such as Wintrobe (1988), Wintrobe (1990) and Mcguire, Olson (1996).and

Besley and Robinson (2009) has analyze the opposition between civil government (democratic or non-democratic) and military dictatorship. Acemoglu *et al.* (2010) on his part attempted to categorize dictatorial regime types into three viz; non-democratic civil government, military dictatorship and democratic civil government. The study identifies the army as agent of the powerful elite which uses it as an instrument to guarantee its survival through repression of decent. The uneven income distribution in these societies and the relevance of the army becomes stronger, especially in a contest where the political competition takes shape between polarized groups, fighting to obtain power and rents. The origin of these groups develops along different cleavages, such as ethnic or regional origins, religion, ownership of the production factors and so on. The clash between these polarized and fragmented groups determines winners and losers, involved in violent fighting to gain the control of the State (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Montalvo and Reynal Querol, 2007; Alesina et al., 2003 and Fearon, 2004). It is this kind of social situation with different groups fighting for power that raises the opportunity for civil war and coup d'état.

The continent of Africa is characterized by a high degree of unconsolidated democracy, hybrid democracy, civil autocracy and military dictatorship in spite of third wave democratization that blew across the continent. For example, authoritarian systems are based on a nonexistent political pluralism where power is shared between some organizations that guarantee support and security to the regime. Under military dictatorship the army has the most important role on stage, its power is less checked which a times produces kleptocratic regimes (Acemoglu e al., 2003), where the dictator can grab a lot of resources and guarantee his survival through the *divide-et-impera*. This scenario makes it possible for elite contestation for the control of the State. This occurs when new group emerges, thus

giving rise to new elites that want to handle the rents and revenues (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). In the case of the developing countries – where productive sectors like manufacturing, productive agriculture, utilities, services and others are very weak, this process has the goal to obtain central power, with the wealth given by oil, diamond or other resources. Here contestation for control is hinged on three basic aspects regarding the production factors: appropriation, division and production. This ultimately, drives differences in the opportunity to enjoy the public goods between losers and winners, through different enforcement of the property rights and contracts (Tangerås and Lagerlöf, 2008; Gonzales, 2005, 2010; Dal Bò and Powell, 2007).

Bolhken (2009), has noted that the risk of a coup d'état could be a strong deterrent to uncontrollable episodes of rent-seeking, corruption and extra-budget funds than the electoral process in democracies. The blend between the democratic checks and military risk reduces the commandeering of the state wealth. This is the same dynamics that Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use to explain the transformation of the political system: 1) a situation without violence, because there is redistribution between the groups, driving to cooperation. Here income inequality would be very low, so that the elite does not fell threat from the extending of the redistribution; 2) to respond to the violence caused from no fairness in the redistribution, the ruling elite could draft in the most productive and dangerous groups, sharing with them the wealth and the rents of the country. In this situation, income inequality is higher than before, and this threatens the conservative elite; 3) the elite does not want to share the rents with other groups, therefore causing competition and violence. Just like before, income inequality is very high. Hence, it is possible to say that higher income inequality could raise the probability of a civil war and, consequently, request a larger army for the repression. But, at least, this could increase the opportunity for coup d'état. In this contest,

both Besley and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2010) see the army like guardian of the elite, as an agent that acts to defend it from the risk of civil war. The central government will choose the size of the army, but it faces an agency problem: the army may not only be the instrument to defend the elite, but may seize the power. If the government increases the size of the army to respond to a higher risk from the loser groups, this increases the opportunity for a coup d'état, but diminishes its opportunity cost.

In Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and Besley and Robinson (2009) state capacity, the quality of institution and the problem of violence are analyzed. State capacity here is the quality of the legal and fiscal capability of the central power. The low level of these two aspects raises income inequality, uneven distribution of public goods and bad use of wealth, creating tensions and grievances in the society. When property rights and contracts are not properly enforced (low legal capacity) and the level of taxation is collected from a source that is not under the complete control of the government - like natural resources - (low fiscal capacity) the distribution of the public goods between the different groups is highly uneven, thus raising the risk of civil unrest. To maintain their economic, social and cultural insulation, the elite have to establish an efficient monopoly of violence. The loser groups that are not protected by right and contract, and that could not check the use of taxation and state rents, presenting unequal and low income, have the opportunity to use the civil war to gain the central power. So, the government has to create an army in order to counter this threat. However, the establishment of a bigger army may turn to be dangerous, because the military can actually exploit the use of force. In such a case, a classical principal-agent problem would take shape. Persson and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2010), has pointed out that the military could act no more like agent of the government, but in their own interest. This happens when the military believes that they are not paid a

'fair wage', they could behave as more like self-interested agent than agent of the central government.

In sum, this increases the probability of a coup d'état. Acemoglu et al. (2010) identify three different patterns to underline this: 1) the civil government could decide not to use the repression and hence establishes a little army, favouring the cooperation and a smooth transition to democracy. The new democratic government faces a big problem: in order to consolidate democracy it is necessary to reform the army, but they do not want to be reformed. In this instance it becomes possible to find a commitment problem, because the government has to promise to the military that it will not reform it - otherwise they will block the transitional process - but to permit the consolidation of the democracy this reform is necessary; 2) the civil government may want to use repression against social opposition. They create a big army but they have to pay a right price (wage and public goods) that avoid the recourse to coup d'état. The non-democratic government remains in office and the coup d'état does not happen; 3) The government uses the army to avoid the opposition take over of power, so they create a big army but they are unable, or do not want, to pay the right price for their services. Ultimately the army takes the power establishing a military dictatorship. The same dynamics could be extrapolated from Besley and Robinson (2009): the civil government needs the help of the army, through the repression, to block the social opposition and the risk of civil war, but has to pay the right price for this action and protection. If this does not happen, the military seize the power putting down the previous government. This vicious cycle characterizes both models, helping to explain the relationship between the redistribution of public goods, civil war and coup d'état.

La Porta et al (1999) in their study has shown that there is growing evidence that a low level of institutional quality is a fundamental source of waste of the wealth.

It also determines an uneven distribution of public goods between different groups. As such, a low institutional quality stimulates the grievances of the loser groups, boosting their willingness to use violence and increasing the probability that a civil war takes shape. This makes it more likely that central elite/government resort to repression by the army, creating a larger one, raising the likelihood of a military dictatorship. In general, provision of public goods differs dramatically between democracies and dictatorships. Democracies exceed dictatorial provision (Deacon, 2009).

Needless to say, there is predictable linkage between the availability of natural resources and such kind of argument. The rents emerging from controlling the mining sector increase the likelihood of an actual conflict between the ruling group and the military or another competing group. In other words, the existence of natural resources contribute to the insulation of the elite in charge, by reducing the capacity of enforcing property rights and contracts, thus raising the risk that the loser groups use violence and civil war to depose the government. Consequently, natural resources increase the probability in the use of repression through the army, and, eventually the likelihood of a military dictatorship.

External Determinants of Coups D'état

External factors can also affect the probability of a coup d'état: if a country has some neighbours experiencing ethnic wars and violence, and inside its borders it reproduces the same cleavages, it could be influenced by this circumstance, reproducing these problems. That is, a contagion effect may exist. However, Besley and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu et al (2010) emphasize that if a country perceives a serious threat of a war between two states, this would reduce the risk of a coup d'état because the army is now necessary for the survival of both the government and the state. Therefore, the politicians (democratic or non-democratic) have to pay the right wage to soldiers, solving the commitment problem that we

have analyzed before. A credible threat on the borders can reduce the coup's risk. De Groot (2011) emphasizes the role of external influences in determining political freedom in Africa. He finds that the probability of an improvement in political freedoms increases with a history of political freedom, openness, and improvements in ethno linguistically similar neighbouring countries.

Coups d'état in Africa have received some attention in the literature by sociologists and political scientists. For instance Jackman (1978) estimates a model of the structural determinants of coups d'état for the newly emerged states of Sub-Saharan Africa in the years from 1960 through 1975. The results from that study indicate that social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group are destabilizing; a multiparty system is destabilizing (especially when a dominant ethnic group exists) while electoral turnout in the last election before independence is stabilizing. Johnson et al. (1984) replicate the previous work concentrating on military coups, finding serious weaknesses in the original Jackman model. The dataset in this study includes 35 Sub-Saharan African states from 1960 through 1982. They find that states with relatively dynamic economies and whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics. Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), using data on military coups in 33 Sub-Saharan African states between 1957 and 1984, discovered strong support for modernization and competition theories of ethnic antagonisms, military centrality theory and aspects of dependency theory. Political development theory is not supported. Ethnic diversity and competition, military centrality, debt dependence, and political factionalism are major predictors of coup de tat.

It was also discovered that ethnic dominance is a stabilizing force that create social integration and weakening opposition. Intractable conflicts rooted in ethnic competition and economic dependence appears to create a structural context for military coups and related instabilities. O'Kane (1993) argues that the underlying causes of coups are specialization in and dependency on primary goods for export, exacerbated by poverty. A testable hypothesis is deduced from this theory which is examined through the application of discriminant analysis to data for three sets of African countries. The models support the theory. Moreover, the chance of a successful coup is negatively related with the absence of a previous coup and the continuing or historic presence of foreign troops since independence. Tusalem (2010) finds that over the 1970-1990 periods the likelihood of a military coup is reduced by the protection of property rights.

Lunde (1991) studies African coups d'état during the period from 1955 to 1985. The starting point is a replication of Jackman (1978) when continuous-time hazard models of event history data are used instead of the panel regression approach. The event history approach focuses on the rate of *coup d'etats* over time rather than some index of *coup d'etat*. The results lend some support to modernization theory. The social contagion hypothesis and the history of political instability are also supported. Finally, the results indicate that the likelihood of a coup strongly depends on time.

Collier and Hoeffler (2005) in a panel of African countries from 1960 to 2001 highlight strong similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars, finding that low income and lack of growth are among the main determinants. Both are also subject to 'traps' – once a coup or civil war has occurred, further events are much more likely. Finally, policies that favour the military (high military expenditure) may increase the risk of a coup. These have been the bane of Africa prior to the third wave

democratic wind that blew across the continent. But even when some has begun to place regime change via coup de tat as a relic, resurgence is rearing up again in part of the continent. Ogude (2012) posits that this resurgence of military rule in parts of Africa especially West African sub-region can be attributed to many factors, which are not very different from those factors that pushed the military into politics in the years of post-independence. Specifically he identified the non entrenchment of democracy in some African countries, the quest by incumbents to subvert the democratic processes in other to hang on to power, the lack of socio-economic development in these countries which stokes instability, creating the condition for coup de tat. In that same study Ogude (2012) also identified destructive civil-military relation resulting in fight for power as explanatory variables for the resurgence of the military rule in West African sub-region.

Return to Military Government and Analytical Framework

Transitions to democracy became a fad for many countries of sub-Saharan Africa as from 1990s (Fosu, 2008). Some happened through blood and violence while others were negotiated. Iys were expected to felt in many areas and especially on the well being and development of the respective countries. Acemoglu, (2009) and Rodrik 2005 have reported positive impacts with expectation of strong institutions that eliminates some evils still in place; have not been entirely beneficial. The main impact of democratisation has been on the seeming progress towards a market based economy (Sorensen 2010) General conclusions have been negative on the immediate impact of democratisation as Sarky (2012) indicates the total impact of democracy has been the bane of income in sub-Saharan Africa. dominant West African countries have lost some ground in the FDI flows in the recent past due to changes in the domestic

environments in the oil industry and nascent entry of Ghana which is not sufficient to replace the reduction being suffered by Nigeria (UNCTAD, 2011) in the face of current internal securities challenges posed by the a supposedly religious sect. Worse still, the two countries have also lost the civilian governance to military which is expected to impact negatively against their financial interrelation with external world.

The West African sub-region has always been a mixed bag. During the colonial era the region produced a mixture of intense nationalist struggle that took the form of warfare and extreme repression as is the case with Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde to relatively easier struggles that centres on debate and superior arguments as is the case with Nigeria and Ghana. It is also within this region that the waves of military intervention in politics in the 1960s played out, while some states such as Senegal and Ivory Coast remained stable under civilian one regime that were not necessarily democratic. The region has also had its own shares of internal upheavals and wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Nigeria as well as an arena where the headwind of democratic third wave where a national sovereign conference turned around the dynamics in Benin and Mali. That trend almost spread across sub-Saharan Africa, but where it was most pronounced was the West African sub-region where almost all the countries of the continent embraced some form of democracy. This even went to the extent where it was stipulated in the ECOWAS protocol that only democratic change of government can be acceptable and recognised.

Though Acemoglu et al. (2010) and Besley and Robinson (2010)) analyses that the relationship between the civil government in Africa and the military as an agency

problem in the sense that the civilian government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d'état and seize power. The resurgence of military coup de tat in West Africa particularly required closer look to establish whether the main causes of military revolve around income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and external threat that seem to drive coups previously in the region.

The first sign came in the early hours of 22 March 2012, with news of a military coup d'état in Mali. The coup leaders claimed a lack of adequate means and resources to fight Tuareg insurgents in the north of the country as the main reason for their action. That announcement by on state television by the coup leaders effectively puts an end to the administration of Amadou Toumani Toure as president of Mali. Barely three weeks later, on 12 April 2012, the government of Guinea Bissau was toppled by elements of the country's military after alleged plans by the former to downsize the military. Interestingly, both coups occurred only a couple of weeks prior to scheduled presidential elections. In Mali, outgoing President Toure had made clear his intention to hand over power to a democratically elected president after the 29 April 2012 elections. In Guinea-Bissau, a second round of presidential elections was also scheduled for 29 April 2012, although the leading opposition candidate had opted to boycott the polls, claiming fraud in the first round. Although accession to power through elections has become the norm in Africa, the two recent coups d'état in West Africa have underscored lingering deficiencies in Africa's contested electoral democracies and their influence on the reoccurrence of coups, particularly in the West African sub-region (Ogude, 2012).

Niger

The kind of civilian rule perpetuated by President Mamadou Tandja of Niger and its potential catastrophic consequences has a lot to do with the success the coupists in

Niger recorded. This explains why the recent development in Niger did not arouse bitter resentment against the Junta by the Nigerien populace. The regional grouping, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) realizing this, did not outrightly condemn the coup, but urged the coup leaders to act quickly to restore civilian rule. The cynicism towards civilian governments and elections are being discredited by the actors within the democratic process which creates the opening for changes by other means. The contempt towards corrupt civilian governments is widely shared and Africans seem to have concluded that these governments that have upped expectations, fail to deliver and when the electorate appears helpless to hold them accountable, option from the military seem a welcome trend as indications show from the recent military resurgence in the sub-region.

Tandja used democracy to wage war against the media, the civil society and political parties. He hastily drafted a constitution that did not benefit from input from either civil society or the general public. He simply extended his term by 3 years, apparently without election, and allowed for an unlimited number of presidential terms. And yet there cannot be a democracy without a civil society; none without a media, and is almost unthinkable without vibrant opposition political parties, as there is no democracy without the state. Civilian governments without democratic soul or substance are sources of despair and instability, and no good can come out of them. At the same time there is less will and no international mechanism to enforce democratic elections. While banning taking force by force, we failed to come up with alternative sources of effecting political change.

Mali

Mali has clearly been portrayed as the poster-child of good democratic transition in West Africa following the democratic third wave that blew across the world. But this good report was shattered on Wednesday March 23th, 2012 when its president, Amadou Toumani Touré, was toppled by a military junta, thereby setting the clock backwards for the country that seemingly had made a progress on the path of democracy. What is ironic about the Malian coup was that it happened less than one month before the next presidential election. The big question that bugs the mind is to examine the reason behind a resurgence of the military in a country seen to have made a progress on democracy for over a decade witnessing transition from one administration to another in a democratic order (Ndonga, 2008).

The answer cannot be farfetched from the fall-out of the conflict in Mali involving the Tuareg minority in the North, the latest round of which has been simmering since the coup occurred, had been proving unexpectedly difficult for government forces to quash. It is obvious inability of the government in Bamako to act decisively over the Tuareg rebellion, that triggered a cabal of soldiers, and led by junior officers, to express their disaffection by seizing the Presidential palace and State TV station (Nossiter, 2012).


Seizure of the Palace therefore is sure part of a string of protests over the way the Malian government has failed to handle the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has been fighting for a separate state (its population is spread across the borders into neighbouring Algeria and Niger), and the army have felt increasingly on the back-foot, accusing the Toure

government of failing to provide them with sufficient arms and support to defeat the insurgency. The mutiny-turned-coup ignited as the Defence Minister, General Sadio Gassama, visited a military base in the town of Kati, approximately 13 miles from the capital, on the said Wednesday morning that the coup took place. As the General departed, protestors began stoning his car and by the afternoon had seized control of the television station in the Bamako, before taking the Palace in the evening.


The Army's disquiet is also reflected by military families and the wider populace, particularly in the south of the country, who

are unhappy at reports of heavy losses the army is suffering. February saw thousands of citizens take to the streets in protest over the way in which the government had been handling the uprising. Yet, that a coup should have occurred so close to the April 29th elections, when Touré was due to step down, is highly significant. It has been suggested that the seizure of power in this way is indicative of a sentiment among sections of the military, and their supporters in civilian society, who believe that politicians are unable to competently resolve the rebellion in the North.


FDI Flows



FDI Stocks



Depletion Rate of FDI Stocks for the Countries



Source: From Authors Calculations

The coup had indeed, interrupted of Mali's democracy and jeopardised its status as bedrock of democracy in West Africa. Not having the right weapons to kill their fellow countrymen may be one, catalytic, cause for the coup; just as likely, however, is the proximate explanation which has seen Touré divide and exploit internal relationships within Tuareg society, protracting violence to the point where the Army feel incapable of winning. Even though programmes for peace and reconciliation, promised by the president following previous rebellions, have failed to get off of the ground – although many Tuareg were previously integrated into the Malian Army, some do not see the Tuareg as Malian citizens. Inspired in part by the diversion caused by the military coup, Tuareg rebels in the north launched incursions deeper into Mali, seizing towns and bases formerly held by government forces fighting the conflict that caused the coup (Lewis, and 2012). As military forces have been engaged in consolidating their hold on the capital, the rebels have been able to push southward with little opposition. The distraction of the government troops provided avenue for the MNLA to make advances and consolidate their hold in the north of Mali. Their new found strength also attributed to the Arab Spring especially the fall of Ghadafi whose renegades ran to Mali and West Africa with lots of arms that has now got into the hands of the rebels. The capture of strategic towns in northern Mali by the MNLA including the ancient city of Tinbuktu, Gao and douzenta prompted the separatists group announce an end to the rebellion and declaring an Islamic republic of Azwad (Dioura and Diarra 2012) .

Though the events in northern Mali complicated issue, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International community stance on the coup in Mali was enough to force the coupists to recede even though president Traore was not restored back to government. A compromise was brokered in which an Interim government

headed by Cheick Modibo Diarra to organise an election to restore democracy but the issue of MNLA and northern Mali is posing a serious challenge to that that has seen the intervention of United Nations and African Union planning to launch an attack on Mali to dislodge the rebels from their position.

Guinea Bissau

The situation in Guinea Bissau prior to April 12th, 2012 when some elements in the military succeeded in toppling the democratic government of Carlos Gomes Junior, we had witnessed instability sparked by attempts to topple the government on previous occasion. The military unrest of 2010 and a failed coup attempt in 2011 as a result of infighting between the Navy and the Army and the free flow of drugs from Europe and Latin America which has made the country a narcostate. The death of Malam Bacai Sanha on January 9th, 2012 led to preparation for a new election which was scheduled to be held within 90 days in accordance with the Guinea Bissau constitution. Despite a peaceful campaign, there were fears of possible violence or a coup d'état if the army which is obviously not ethnically balanced did not approve of the winner (Zounmenou, 2009).

But the crux of the matter was the decision of Angola to withdraw its forces from the two-year old MISSANG mission to modernise the Guinea Bissau military. The Guinea Bissau military struck following the visit of Guinea-Bissau Defense Minister Jorge Tolentino Araujo to Angola for a meeting with his counterpart Cândido Pereira dos Santos Van-Dunem and the Army Chief-of-Staff Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda on the 16th of April 2012. He was also expected to visit the Higher Warfare School (ESG) and the Higher Technical Military Institute (ISTM). All these coupled with unpopularity of Carlos Gomes Junior

with the army for his attempts to reform the institution where significant explanation for the coup. For instance, there was a report by SIC Noticias of Portugal a day before the coup where an unidentified military commander claimed that Carlos Gomes Júnior would allow Angolan troops into the country citing a "secret document" in the possession of the soldiers to justify his claim that Guinea-Bissau government is about to sanction an Angolan attack on Guinea-Bissau's military. After they struck, the leaders of the coup released an unsigned communiqué that read they "did not have ambitions of power," the coup was a reaction to the alleged agreement with Angola that involved 200 military trainers because it would "annihilate Guinea-Bissau's armed forces.

The Guinea-Bissau coup d'état was staged by elements of the armed forces about two weeks before the second round of a presidential election between Carlos Gomes Junior and Mohamed lala Embalo. Both candidates and the president were initially arrested by the junta. Members of the Military Council, which ran the country until an interim National Transitional Council was established on April 15th 2012, said that one of the reasons for the coup was the incumbent civilian administration's call for support from Angola to reform the military. Following international condemnation and sanctions against leaders of the junta, an agreement was signed that led to the third placed candidate in the election, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, becoming the interim president.

Conclusion

There are, at least, three sources of military interventions in what could be considered as the new generation of coups in Africa. The first is the indignation of the Generals. The

second is the rage of the ranks. The third is when the state allows its own overthrow. There are cases when the civilians invited the military to take power. Probably a fourth aspect in the new generation of coups in Africa is what could be referred to as the French factor. Almost all recent coups took place in Francophone countries. Is it a Francophone phenomenon? If so, is it related to the way the French governed, and left, and returned? Or is it a coincidence?

The recent of coups in West African sub-region is not an anomaly and only epitomizes the current political ills, something like a quandary, in the African continent and should be treated as such. The resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa is a reflection of this deeper problem. What is common with these recent coups is that issues of spill over from election dispute is constant in all the cases as spark for the intervention of the military which shows that democracy in the continent is still fledgling. The second point is the issue of public service is yet to sink into the minds of people who seek power in Africa which is reflecting in the misgovernance that is cited by military juntas as excuse for upsetting the constitutional order.

There is always enough reason to oppose any form of the involvement of the military in politics as a system. But such a system can only work if civilians behave differently. Banning the military alone will not solve Africa's governance deficit. No one should expect the military to behave otherwise, while the civilian governments continue to act illegally, contemptuously and brutally. For it is a mistake to suppose that everything civilian or an elected government alone will save us from conflict and from the abuses of power to which it inevitably leads? Africans have forgotten a little too quickly that for the African army to be tamed, the African state has first to be democratized.

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