CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS AND LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN 21ST CENTURY AFRICA: AN INQUIRY

1WOGU, Ikedinachi Ayodele Power & 2IBIETAN, Jide PhD
Department of Political Science & International Relations, School of Social Sciences, College of Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria.
ike.wogu@covenantuniversity.edu.ng, wogupower@yahoo.com, wogupower@gmail.com.
+2348034956069

2Department of Political Science & International Relations, School of Social Sciences, College of Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria. jidebetan@gmail.com
+2347030892277

ABSTRACT
The paper is an enquiry into civil military relations and leadership crisis in 21st century Africa with emphasis on Mauritania, Guinea, Niger and Mali. Results from data collected over a forty-seven year period revealed that the countries under review witnessed fifty-five coups. These alarming numbers of coups have continued unabated in the light of notable theorizations by scholars, that military organizations are primarily servants of the state. Contrarily, other researchers have argued that governments in developing nations lacked the administrative skills to govern their geopolitical entities thereby resulting in militarism. While adopting the critical and reconstructive methods of analysis in philosophy, the paper identified the quest for self-determination, weak socio-political culture resulting from leadership failure, statelessness among others as major consequences of poor CMR in Africa. The study submitted that good governance is the antidote to acts of militarism and recommended that African leaders should begin to reconsider their approaches to governance.

Key Words: Colonial Frontiers, Crisis, Leadership, Militarism, Statelessness, Self-determination.

INTRODUCTION
Civil–Military Relations (CMR) describes the relationship between civil societies as a whole and military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. Studies on civil-military relations often rest on the normative assumption that civilian control of the military is preferable to military control of the state. The principal problem they contend with is to empirically explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained (Burk, 2002:7-9).

As an area of study in political science, CMR involves the study and discussion of a diverse range of issues including but not limited to the civilian control of the military and vice versa, military professionalism, war, civil–military operations, military institutions, and other related subjects. The theoretical discussion in this area can include non-state actors (Mandel, 2004:171-201), as well as more traditional nation-states. Other research and studies that could be conducted in this area include discerning the details of military political attitudes, for instance, voting behavior, (Inbody, 2008; Inbody, 2009:51) and the potential impact on and interaction with democratic societies (Janowitz, 1982:507-534), as well as military families.

The earliest use of the conception of CMR can be traced to the writings of Tzu (1971) and Clausewitz (1989). Both writers argued that military organizations were primarily the servants of the state. The opinion of these writers notwithstanding, concerns on growing militarism in societies all around the world is on the increase. The data in (Appendix1) however, largely indicate a sharp rise in the number of cases that have been recorded so far, Studies which indicate direct contradictions to the presumed roles of the
military in the society include: Marshall (2004), Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). They were some of the first thinkers who published their seminal books on the subject of CMR which effectively brought civil-military relations into the academia, particularly in political science and sociology. The versatility and notable force with which the Americans adopted Huntington's and Janowitz's theoretical arguments have become the basis on which most studies of other nations' CMR have been conducted.

The study problematize that states in Africa have witnessed and recorded an unprecedented number of coup d’états largely believed to be a consequence of poor and corrupt civilian leadership, among other things. This scenario which have created an unhealthy relationship between the military and their civilian counterpart. This alarming situation contradicts the basic theories formulated by Tzu (1971) and Clausewitz (1989) which initially captures the basic roles and relationship of the military as that of ‘servant-hood relationship’ to the state. From the frequent coup d’états witnessed in Africa within the period stipulated in this study, the reverse seem to be the case. Finer (1988) observes that - contrary to Huntington’s (1957) initial assumption on CMR, many governments do not have the administrative skill to efficiently govern their geo-political entities. Consequently, “such situations are known to open opportunities for military interventions, opportunities that are not as likely in more developed countries” (Finer 1988:14). A thorough scrutiny tend to show that leadership failure and weak institutions of governance among African states, partly explain the reasons for the prevalence of coup d’états resulting in a poor CMR among African states.

Further studies (Sabelo, J., Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Brilliant Mhlanga, 2013:1-7) also reveal that the high rate of coup d’états and leadership crisis recorded in Africa as indicated in (Appendix 1), are largely a consequence of the experiences of the ‘Cold War Era’ which took place during the second half of the twentieth century between 1960 and 1970. Some of the consequences of this era include the insistence on maintaining the sanctity of colonial frontiers (Uti Possidentis) by African leaders. Worthy of note here is the strong support of the Uti Possidentis principle as identified in Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s speech, of 20th August, 1960:

On the problem of boundaries, our view is that although in the past some of these were created artificially by European powers, which even went so far as to split some communities into three parts, each administered by a different colonial power, nevertheless these boundaries should be respected and, in the interest of peace must remain the recognized boundary units until such a time as the people concerned decide to - on their own free will - merge into one unit. We shall discourage any attempt to influence such communities by force or through undue pressure to change, since such interference could only result in unrest and harm to the overall plan for the future of the great continent (Boyd, 1979:50).

Other fallouts of this era as captured by Bereketeab (2013:61-74) include: statelessness factors, elitism and particularistic interests of most African leaders, and the factors of political legitimacy in governance among African states, as exemplified in the second Sudanese (North-South) civil war from 1983-2005 and the Darfur crisis (Johnson, 2003, Deng, 2010, Bartrop, 2011); the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war (Jacun-Berdal and Plaut, 2004, Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, Abbink, 2003, Lata, 2003) to mention but a few. Consequently, the rising wave of militarism and the attendant problems associated with it (leadership crisis) have in recent times, given writers and contemporary scholars on CMR and political science, reasons to further ponder and extend their studies in the direction of identifying the root causes of these various acts of militarism and leadership crisis with a view to proffering solutions to the troubling cases of militarism within African states.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Civil Military Relations (CMR)

What is the relationship between civilians (people without arms), the society at large, and the military (people with arms) established as a separate armed body in order to protect a society? This question has a long history which extends to the very beginnings of military organization in civilian societies. The
answer to this question is deeply influenced by national historic sentiments, and traditions. For some countries, it depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the given country and the subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements. These factors go a long way in determining how CMR is conceived.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) however, refers to CMR as “activities by NATO Commanders in war directly concerned with the relationship between allied armed forces and the government, civil population or agencies of non-NATO countries, where such armed forces are stationed, supported or employed” (NATO cited in Omoigui, 2005:1-9). Hernandez cited in Omoigui, 2005:1) defined CMR as the balance of power between the military and civilian branches of government. She further stressed that CMR has to do with the supremacy and guidance of the civilian populace over the military. It entails full democratic control of the military as it plays its role as the ultimate guarantor of national security. Ideally, the military is the servant of the society and it has the monopoly over the means of violence in the interest of its citizens in response to popular will and consent.

Ebo (2005), sees CMR as referring to the totality of relations between the military and society which it operates in and of which it is necessarily a part of. It comprises all aspects of the role of the military (as a professional, political, social and economic institution) in the entire aspects of national life. CMR also involves the attitude of the military towards the civilian society

Militarism

Luckham (1998) contends that militarism refers to the pervasiveness in society of symbols, values and discourses validating military power and properties of war. Militarism is the product of long and entrenched military involvement in politics in which military values and ethos; “immediate effect” syndrome and intimidation has replaced civil procedure of dialogue, negotiations and consensus.

Militarization on the other hand, is a multi-dimensional process through which a number of elements like coups and authoritarian governments, the dominance of powerful military and repressive state apparatus and arms import and external military intervention becomes linked both to each other and more unduly to capital accumulation and the project of national and international capital (Luckham 1998).

Military intervention according to Huntington (1976), is a phenomenon (internal or external) where for example, a country could be involved militarily in another country with the purpose of correcting or preventing some perceived injustice (peace keeping mission). Such could also take place but on humanitarian ground /intervention, where an intervening force aims to aid in a pressing crisis brought on by conflict or a natural disaster where there is a need to alleviate famine, structural damage or potential social conflict.

Today in most parts of Africa, the military have intervened in the domestic political activities of the states they were expected to protect from external aggression amongst other things. Most of these interventions have led to a total take-over of administrative power and leadership, while vesting themselves with the responsibility of governing illegitimately, the affairs of the state.

Leadership

Stogdill (1974:259) affirmed that “there are many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept”. The stream of definitions has continued unabated since Stogdill (1974) made his observations. Leadership has therefore been defined by some scholars in terms of traits, behaviors, influence, interaction patterns, role relationships and occupation of administrative positions. Richards and Engle (1986:199-214) have however defined leadership as “that which articulates visions, embodying values, and creating the environment within which things can be accomplished” For Jacobs and Jaques,(1990:218-295) “Leadership is the process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to collective efforts and causing willing effort to be expended to achieve purpose”. Leadership according to House and Adrtya, (1997:409-473) is “the ability of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute towards the effectiveness and the success of the state or organization as the case may be.
Most definitions of leadership reflect the assumption that it involves a process whereby intentional influence is exerted by one person over other people to guide, structure and facilitate activities and relationship in a group, society or organization. The salient points in the forgoing include who exerts influence, the intended purpose of the influence, the manner in which the influence is exerted and the outcome of the influence intended.

The notion of leadership for African rulers however, seem to have an entirely different meaning when compared to what obtains in other parts of the world. The “sit tight” syndrome of most African leaders, for periods as long as thirty years and above as in the case of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Mobutu Seseseko of Zaire and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, - leaders whose reign ended in civil crisis and military interventions - are typical examples of how most African leaders perceive leadership; as a family right that should be passed on from one generation to the other. These factors in most cases have been arguably responsible for leadership failure and weak institutions of governance which have become prevalent among African states. Consequently, situations like these tend to fuel political illegitimacy in governance among African leaders. The need to provide a viable theory of leadership for African leaders becomes very essential to this study, in order to correct this anomaly and several dysfunctions in governance.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Socio-Economic Theory

The Socio-Economic Theory has Putnam (1967); Agara (2004) and Finer (1975) as some of its major proponents. The theory states that when a country’s civilian democracy has failed to develop the stagnated social and economic institutions which run the system, the military is often left with no other choice than to take over the reins of leadership. In other words, where democratic tenets have failed to be the guiding and major modes of operation among the civilian populace - which consequently creates a stagnation in all spheres of social and economic institutions, the military most often than not, seize the opportunity to intervene with the view to salvage the already deplorable state of the country in question. It is plausible to argue based on the data in Appendix 1 that most military interventions recorded were as a result of issues arising from social and economic underdevelopment in the countries under review.

Putnam (1967) hypothesized on the correlation between the social and economic underdevelopment of a country and the propensity for military intervention, when he maintained that “the effects of economic development stems partly from the increased socio-technical complexity that puts public administrations beyond the skills of the armed forces, partly from the civilian opportunities for social mobility which economic development opens up, and partly from greater wealth which allows and encourages stable civilian government”. The above position was further strengthened by Agara (2004:290) who posited that economic development and industrialization diminishes the possibilities of military interventions in a state. Finer (1975:113-115) reiterates the likelihood of decreased military intervention with increased socio-economic development such as urbanization and mass education. These arguments by the proponents of the socio-economic theory of CMR, to some extent - we will argue - offer explanations for the coup d’états and leadership crisis proposed for discussion in this paper.

Political Development Theory

Political Development Theory has Huntington (1976); Lieuwen (1962); Finer (1975) and Putnam (1967) as some of the major proponents. The underlying argument here is that, where public attachments to civilian institutions are strong and firm, military interventions in politics and civilian governments will be weak. On the contrary, where the public attachment to meaningful political activities and ideologies are weak or non-existent, the military will find credible basis for assuming power (Finer, 1975:21). The basic trust of the theory is that “the propensity for military intervention in government decreases with increasing popular attention to participation in partisan politics” (Putnam, 1967).

Appendix 1 presents ample evidence which re-enforces the argument on leadership failure and weak institutions of governance in the African states under focus. These weak institutions of government, partly explains the very poor state of development in Africa. Weak institutions and low level of political development can be explained in the light of recurring military intervention occasioned by frosty CMR.
The net effect of these is weak governance and weak public administrative system, culminating in a lack of development in Africa, especially in the countries under review: Mauritania, Guinea, Niger and Mali.

**THE RELEVANCE OF THE THEORIES TO LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN AFRICA / DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

The data in appendix 1 highlights the alarming frequency of coup d’états occasioned by a failure of leadership and the nonexistent viable institutions of governance in the African states. The same results reaffirms the arguments supporting the claims that socio – economic factors and political development factors are some of the major CMR theories exerting influence on leadership crisis in Africa. The political development theory for instance, explains why members of the armed forces in the countries under review, continue to intervene in the affairs of civilian governments. Further analysis of the data collected reveals that most civilian governments continue to fail to transit from one democratically elected government to another as a result of the numerous violent clashes which have become a major feature of the electoral processes of the countries under review. We shall now closely consider special cases of poor CMR in the countries under review.

**Mauritania**

Mauritania’s history following the end of one-party rule in 1978 was highlighted by five successful coups out of twelve known incidences of coups: 1978, 1980, 1984, 2005, and 2008 (Appendix 1). While the coups of 1978 and 1984 installed military regimes, the 2005 coup was motivated by increasing domestic tension under the rule of Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya (Akinterinwa, 2008:20). This tension stemmed partly from Ould Taya’s limited tolerance for democratization. The coup leaders organized open elections, and a civilian president was elected in 2007. Feelings within the military leadership which indicated that the civilian regime was politically weak, especially in the face of a perceived Islamist and jihadist threat, prompted the coup in August, 2008. The leader of that coup, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, had been a key participant in the 2005 coup. In 2009, the junta organized Presidential elections. Abdel Aziz ran as a civilian candidate and won. He remains in power till today (Thurston, 2012:6). Here we see the socio-political theory of CMR strongly at play.

**Guinea**

Out of fourteen recorded instances of alleged coup plots in Guinea, three of the coups were successful. The coup of 1984 took place at the demise of independence-era leader, President Sekou Toure, and another in December 2008, at the demise of President Lansana Conte, who came to power in the coup of 1984 (Appendix 1). The junta installed in 2008 was led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. Camara promised that elections would take place and that he would not stand, but tensions rose as his promises came to appear hollow and his behaviour became erratic. Consequently, in September 2009, soldiers brutally cracked down on an opposition rally in the capital Conakry. Then, in December 2009, one of Camara’s guards shot him in the head. The junta leader missed death by whiskers. He was flown to Morocco and later to Burkina Faso. He was no longer permitted to re-enter Guinea. Power passed to General Sekouba Konate, who oversaw a two-round election in June/November 2010. The elections were marred by violence and allegations of fraud. The winner, long-time opposition leader Alpha Conde, is still the President (Marshall, 2004:4).

**Niger**

In the case of Niger, out of eight recorded instances of coup plots, four successful coup d’états were recorded: the 1974 coup that overthrew independence-era President Hamani Diori; a 1996 coup that installed Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara, after several attempts at installing civilian governments; the 1999 assassination of Mainassara by his bodyguards, who then organized civilian elections which was won by President Mamadou Tandja; and the February 2010 coup that ousted Tandja after he amended the constitution and remained in power beyond his original two-term limit (Appendix 1). The 2010 coup led by Colonel Salou Djiibo, exemplified continuities with the 1999 coup. Djiibo’s junta quickly organized civilian elections. The two-round contest held in January/March 2011, was won by opposition leader and current President Mahamadou Issoufou (Akinterinwa, 2008:20).
Mali
From the 16th of January 2012, several insurgent groups fought against the Malian government for independence or greater autonomy for Northern Mali, an area known as Azawad. ‘The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad’ (MNLA), an organization fighting to make Azawad an independent homeland for the Tuaregs people, had taken control of the region by 2012. On the 22nd of March 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis in his country, a month before presidential election took place in the country.

Mutinous soldiers, under the name ‘National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State' (CNRDR), led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, the Chairman of the Committee took control and suspended the constitution of Mali (Associated Press, 2012:8). In a television broadcast, the day after the coup was staged, he announced that the junta had suspended Mali's constitution and taken control of the nation. He also cited Touré's alleged poor handling of the insurgency and the lack of equipment for the Malian Army, among other socio-economic reasons, as justification for the overthrow of government. As a consequence of the instability following the coup, Mali's three largest Northern cities: Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, were overrun by the rebels in three consecutive days (Ahmed and Callimachi, 2012). On 5th April 2012, after the capture of Douentza, the MNLA announced that it had accomplished its goals and called off its offensive. The following day, it proclaimed Azawad's independence from Mali (Al Arabiya, 2012).

Statelessness and CMR in Mali:
‘Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality’ (UDHR, 1948:15). The article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights confers upon every individual in the world, the right to have a legal connection with a State, Citizenship or Nationality. Not only does this right provide people with a sense of identity, it also entitles individuals to the protection of a state and many other civil and political rights. Indeed, Citizenship has been described as “the right to have rights.” (Achiron, 2005:2). Statelessness therefore is a legal concept describing the lack of any nationality; it is the absence of a recognized link between an individual and any state. A stateless person is therefore someone who is "not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law" (Wiki, 2013). In other words, a stateless person has no citizenship or nationality. As a matter of international law, citizenship and nationality are congruous, although there may be differences between the two concepts in domestic law.
The independence of Mali in 1962 saw a forceful unification of more than two totally different groups of people among which are the Tuaregs, also known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) and the tribes and people of Southern Mali, who have opposing tribes and religion to those of their counterparts in the North (Fonbaustier, 2012). The Tuaregs find this amalgamation, a forceful act of unification which swallowed up their territory and identity, thereby rendering them stateless as a people, a people totally under the control of another state. They therefore see their quest and struggle for the independent state of Azawad as a mere expression of their fundamental human rights as contained in the UDHR article cited above. In states where these clashes and crisis are initiated by racism, nationalism, ethnicity, tribalism, homophobia, xenophobia, genocides, religious wars, violence and other phobias and conflicts abound, studies have shown (Zartman, 2011:11-15), Sabelo et al, (2013:2-4), that governance of any sort - whether civilian or military – can be very difficult or near impossible to achieve.
Can a multiethnic or a multinational state survive in a
state where conflicting groups are clamoring for power? The rapid collapse of ethnic or nationalist-based conflicts simmering in such widely separated countries like Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria and the countries under review here, demonstrates the durability of ethnic awareness as basis for political tension (Welch 1995:108-109) The existence of either small or large ethnic and tribal groups usually in the minority or majority have also been identified as one of the fallouts of the arbitrary divisions of the African states by colonial powers. (Olayode, 2013:290-295) & (Welch, 1995:108-109). The interplay and tussle for power and the control of resources for development in the state by these multiethnic and multinational groups - a phenomenon which is known to exist in both the civilian and in the military ranks – is also noted as another pertinent factor at the root of leadership crisis, which often translates to poor CMR for most states in the African context. Where there is a prevalence of such struggles, it makes governance for the civilians and their military counterparts too difficult as have been inferred by Boahen, in Sabelo et al. (2013: 1:3).

The long battle still being fought by the (MNLA), an organization fighting to make Azawad an independent homeland for the Tuaregs people in the North, against the people in the South for over four decades now, is a typical example of a state with a prevalence of multiethnic and multinational tribes and cultures seeking self-determination and identity under the article UDHR (1948) referred to above. This further explains why there was crisis in Mali. All efforts to successfully suppress the rebels for over four decades have failed because the Azawad people believe they are fighting for one just cause: “the right of a people to determine their own political status and economic, social and cultural development… the right to an independent state and therefore sovereignty (Knop, 2002:108-109), which culminates in regaining their long lost and scattered identity and nationhood status, a status which was lost by the amalgamation, which also united different people of multiethnic tribes and culture in Mali. This very fact and scenario lends credence to the comment by Boahen, (2013) when he exclaimed at the difficulty involved in trying as a government, to make true nation-states out of bastardised multiethnic and multinational peoples of various tribes and tongues in Africa (Sabelo et al 2013:1-3).

It is on record that the civilian government of Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d’état over his mishandling of the crisis in his country and for his inability to quell the insurgence tearing his country apart. The military was therefore forced to take over power and to restore and reunite the country which the civilian government could no longer manage, among other socio economic reasons which were given for staging the coup (Associated Press, 2012:8). The rebels however proved to have been too tough for the Malian military, who could not suppress the activities of the rebel group. The group seeking self-determination had, in the space of a few days, taken over the major Northern cites of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. It only took further acts of militarism (the combined forces of the French Army and the AU forces) to reverse the country to the status quo and restore the country to civilian rule. Other notable examples in this category include: the second Sudanese North-South civil war, 1983-2005, and the Darfur case (Johnson, 2003, Denga, 2010, Bartrop, 2011); the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war (Jacun-Berdal and Plaut, 2004, Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, Abbink, 2003, Lata, 2003), the cases of military interventions in Mauritania, Guinea, and Niger (Thurston, 2012), as earlier discussed. The issues discussed under the statelessness factor therefore have strong implications in explaining poor CMR among African states.

The Sanctity of Colonial frontiers (Uti possidetis)

This factor, many writers (Bonchuk, 2013:323-329); Nsogura (2002:3); Lord Curzon (1902:23); and Boggs (1940:97); have argued, exerts one of the greatest influences on leadership crisis in Africa. The point being made here is associated with the principle of self-determination which allows an individual or a group of persons, the privilege or freedom to live their lives as they wished, wherever they chose to do so and within a given context. Uti possidetis (Latin expression for "as you possess") however, is “a principle in international law which holds that territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless otherwise provided for by treaty; if such a treaty doesn't include conditions regarding the possession of property and territory taken during the war, then the principle of Uti possidetis will prevail (USLegal, 2010). Originating in Roman law, the phrase is derived from the Latin

54
expression *Uti possidetis, ita possideatis*, meaning "may you continue to possess such as you do possess" (literary: "as you possess, thus may you possess") Boggs (1940:79). This principle enables a belligerent party to claim and lay hold to a territory and a people which it had acquired by war. It means that where this principle is adopted, certain individuals who were products of such conflicts – resulting from forceful amalgamations by colonial masters at the Berlin Conference, who did not take into considerations, the various multiethnic and multinational natures of the groups of persons involved in the unholy marriage. By implication, all the groups of persons involved in this division become automatically alienated without an identity in this new country which they now find themselves in. A scenario enforced by the principle which insist that such people – as in the case of ‘The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad’ (MNLA), and other groups discussed in the paper - no longer have the rights to reverting to what the status quo was before the conflicts ensured.

More recently, the principle has been used in a modified form to establish the frontiers of newly independent states following decolonization, by ensuring and insisting that the frontiers followed the original boundaries of the old colonial territories from where / they emerged (Hensel, et al, 2006). This study however, finds this act very inimical and detrimental to sister African states who have found no reasons whatsoever to continue to co-exist with each other. The recent stories of the Republic of Eretria which was carved out of Ethiopia, South Sudan from Sudan and more recently, Azawad from Mali before they were forcefully – via military action – denied the rights to autonomy, all bear evidence to the violent bloody civil wars that could take place among different ethnic and religious groups, leading to crisis of various sorts between civilian governments and the military who are often caught between the divide. These calamities, this paper argues, is associated with the continued adoption of the principle of *Uti possidetis* by African leaders.

In contemporary times, groups which constitute minorities in their states have evoked the rights to self-determination in their demand for autonomy – or in some cases, secession – and have resorted to violence to pursue their aims. These groups typically justify their claims for self-determination as a way to end years of repression and human right violations by the majority ethnic groups or the central government. This paper however notes that the absence of a precise definition of what the right to self-determination entails has left the international community, and the states concerned without guiding principles with which to respond (Hussein & Sally, 2001:9-11). Many of the multiethnic and multinational tribal conflicts in Africa, leading to weak political government structures in the states affected, are as a result of nations seeking greater degrees of self-determination within a larger territorially based state. These conflicts as witnessed in Mali, makes governing for both the civilians and various military regimes difficult if not impossible.

At present, tension exists between the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of sovereign states. Self-determination which is predicated on the notion of giving individuals more control of their lives could also imply claims to independent sovereign states. This conflicts with the long standing reckoning that international borders are inviolable (De Silver Wijeyeratne & Beard, 2010:12-13). This paper therefore acknowledges that in dealing with the issues of sovereignty and self-determination in Mali and in the rest of African states under review, cognizance should be placed on emotional issues in both contemporary African and human rights debate. The legal interpretation of self-determination and the place of the individual versus the group in human rights discourses remain items of serious contention. This is because ethnic groups seeking to empower themselves as witnessed in Mali and in other states under review, often collide with the desire of the state to maintain centralized control either under the civilian or a military regime. Thus pluralism, far from being viewed as an essential building block and a safe guard for competitive democracy, is perceived as a weapon of potential destruction (Olusola, 2013:290-291).

Consequently, it is further arguable that strong focus on the state as a core and only unit of analysis by most political analysts and leaders of governments are inadequate for the realities of contemporary African politics. Similarly, trying to sustain policies based on unreconstructed, traditional, ethnic and linguistic based notions of nation - states nationalism, as discussed earlier, will also lead to unbridled
ethno-nationalism with painful social, political and economic consequences. Where these scenarios exist in any state, a poor and unstable CMR becomes the order of the day.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion
The paper identified and discussed ‘Socio-economic’ and the ‘Political development’ theory of CMR as applicable to current African political leadership situation. While the socio-economic theory holds that ‘in a country where democratic tenets failed to be the guiding and major modus operandi among the civilian populace, the military, more often than not, seize the opportunity to intervene with a view to salvage the already deplorable state of the country in question’. The political development theory on the other hand holds that ‘where public attachments to civilian institutions are strong and firm, military interventions in politics and civilian governments will be weak. On the contrary, where public attachment to meaningful political activities and ideologies are weak or nonexistent in some cases, military intervention in politics will find scope both in manner and in substance’. The scenario in the countries under review espoused the relevance of these theories.

The study identified the earnest quest for self-determination among multiethnic and subnational groups who have found themselves entangled in states which have subsumed their identity, culture, religion and freedom. In states where they could no longer determine their own political status and economic, social and cultural development. Internal crises among the plural and disparate segments of those artificial nation-states become inevitable. These where some of the pertinent factors which the paper identified to be at the root of the many violent political crisis which in turn, basically made a stable and mutual CMR in the countries under review quite difficult.

Recommendations

Given that the problem of self-determinism is one of the major root causes of political violence and instability of civilian governments, leading to military interventions and counter coups especially where the rank and file of the armed forces are known to also experience one form of alienation or the other arising from inequitable division of resources for development in their various multiethnic and multinational groups, it becomes very imperative that leaders of AU and UN General Assembly should begin to seriously consider the implementation of Article 2 of the UN charter which states that: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (UN Charter, 1960:Article 2).

Having identified weak political cultures and the non-existent basic institutions of governance in states as part of the causes of violent political and ethnic crises, culminating in poor CMR in the countries under review, this paper submits that the time is right for Africans and African leaders to cultivate and entrench democratic practices and institutions which will ensure that neither the majority nor the minority in a state are threatened with permanent exclusion from power and resources for development. Thus democratic societies must develop the institutions, resources, and the flexibility in the long term to aid peaceful management of conflicts, since it has inherent potentials for conflict resolutions and provides non-violent method for selecting leaders. With the understanding that democratic practices in the 21st century has the fundamental aim of affirming and asserting the sovereignty of the people, and ensure that one is imbued with equal power to determine how individual destiny is to be managed.

Finally, there is the urgent need for African states to embark on a massive reorientation of the armed forces. The need to revamp their roles in the pertinent project of nation building in the 21st century; alongside their traditional duties of protection and preservation of territorial integrity of their nation state, cannot be overemphasized at this time.

REFERENCES


Guide to Appendix

- Please note that under the caption “Success”, we have used four different numbers (1, 2, 3 & 4) to represent the following: Successful Coups (1), Attempted Coups (2), Plotted Coups (3), and Alleged Coups (4).
- For brevity, this study has analyzed just the records of coup d’états in four countries in Africa, they include: Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. The coup in these four countries represents 13.28% of the entire coups recorded within the specified period in the entire continent of Africa.
- In all, 40 known cases of coups or attempted coups d’états were recorded as represented here which spanned a period of 47 years. Guinea had 13 known cases of coup d’états, Mali had 9 known cases, Mauritania had 12 known cases, Niger had 6 known cases.
- Coup Leaders must seize and hold central authority for at least two weeks to be considered “successful” coups d’états. The names of coup leaders listed above are those contained in reports, accusations and / or subsequent trials.
- The date of the coup is the beginning date for successful or attempted coups and the date of announcement for discovered coup plots and coup allegations.
- An entry of “999” under deaths indicates that no casualty figures were given and there may have been no deaths associated with this event, an entry of “998” indicates that no casualty figures were given but there were some indications in the reports that casualties did occur during /or in the immediate aftermath of the event.
### Appendix 1: Military Coups In Africa, 1946 - 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Guinea</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>M. Foderba Keita and Col. Kaman Diaby</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guinea exiles in Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>inclusion Col. Lansana Keita, Col. Kaman Diaby</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>inclusion Col. Lansana Keita, Col. Kaman Diaby</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Col. Traore</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Captain Moussa Dadis Camara</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>General Sekouba Konate</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lt. Moussa Traore</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Col. Kissima Doudkara, Tiecoro Bagayoko</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Karim Sissoko</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maj. Lamine Diabira</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Oumar Diallo</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mady Diallo</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Captain Amadou Sanogo and the Committee (CNRDR)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Ould Salek</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Col. Ould Salek, et al</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Col. Mousoua Taya</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lt. Ba Seydi, Lt. Sarr Amadou, Lt. Sy Saidou</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maj. Salah Quld Henena, Abderrahmane</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Quld Mini, Mohammed Quld Cheikhna,Mohammed Quld Salek</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;Knights of Change&quot; Mohamed Quld Abdel Aziz,</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>General Mohamed Quld Abdel Aziz, Col. Ely Quld Mohamed Vall, Military Council for Justice and Democracy,</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mahamane Sidikou, Lt. Amadou Dumarou</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mahamane Sidikou, Lt. Amadou Dumarou</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Col. Ibrahim Barre Mainassara</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hama Amadou</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maj. Dauda Malam Wanke</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Colonel. Salou Djibo</td>
<td>998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>