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Chapter Summary

The foundation for terrorism in Nigeria was laid in 1966. Since then, terrorism in the country has had the predictable voice and skin of violence. However, since 2009, Nigeria has gradually slipped into a terrorist enclave where terror acts have become the regular signature of the country's social narratives with a group called Boko Haram playing the lead character. Aside promoting the revivalism of Islamic fundamentalism and hitting at perceived state and non-state opponents, the Boko Haram terror machine has established itself as a businesslike terror agency of no mean reputation. Once tagged a band of misguided religious zealots, the sect has assumed a cyclopean stature with attributes of a shadow government. Aside other damages done to the state and its institutions, citizens and infrastructure, the sect and others of its kind have succeeded in throttling industrial development and putting domestic and foreign investments in the flashpoints on the scuttle. This chapter has tried to do justice to the topic by perusing the debouchment of terrorism in Nigeria, providing a theoretical matrix to explain the phenomenon, identifying some of the causes of terrorism in the country and proffering solutions. It is the contention by the authors that the fight against terrorism in Nigeria must be sustained in order to protect the domestic economy, guarantee the

flourishing of trade between and among states, encourage industrial development, attract a continuous stream of foreign investments, protect critical infrastructure and help Nigeria realise its economic potentials as the giant of Africa.

Introduction

For several years, different publics in the country had seen terrorism as chiefly a Western narrative and nothing more. This Western conundrum was perceived to be alien to the country because of its pristine traditional society enmeshed in a very strong cultural and religious matrix.

The emergence of the Niger Delta militants, which was seen to be a manifestation of the frustration and ennui experienced by the youths of the region about the unjust and undeserved dehumanising economic and environmental conditions of the people in the region, took on a dangerous dimension as bombs and weapons of mass destruction were used to prosecute their cause. This was the first wakeup call that the establishment received that within its borders could rise an army of militants and ethnic militias that would engage the state in a battle for supremacy.

It took federal might and a conflation of diplomacy and crude force to contain and cower the Niger Delta militants into receiving the amnesty offered it by the government of the day.

According to Imhonopi & Urim (2012), when the Nigerian government and people were about heaving a sigh of relief from their experiences with the Niger Delta militants, the country woke up to the onset of the vociferous calls from a supercilious army of then Islamic fundamentalists and later terror extremists bent on pursuing their grievances with government in a new violent fashion. What had appeared an innocent-looking and harmless band of Muslim devotees strutting around the northern region with their fiery messages that ordered a return to Islamic law and purity had suddenly transmogrified into a determined group of terror merchants who initiated a recurring pattern of violent and bloody riots, attacks and bombings. The Boko Haram insurgency against the Nigerian state gradually assumed political, religious and socioeconomic permutations as not only police stations, army

barracks, government establishments were targeted but also banks, businesses, churches, Christians, Christian leaders and later some Muslim clerics fell to the raging inferno of the Boko Haram violence (Imhonopi & Urim, 2012). The cheekiness of the Boko Haram terror machine was its insistence on foisting a strict Islamic religious order on what is largely a culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse nation-state. Their introduction of suicide terrorism on Nigerian soil, a tradition alien to the country and its citizenry, was the red flag the nation and international community needed to confront and contain the insidious conflagration.

Like the Niger Delta militants, the government has offered both diplomacy and counterinsurgency measures, including the enforcement of a state of emergency in the three most affected states in the North, in order to restore normalcy and calm in the region. Boko Haram fighters, like all ethnic militias cum terror-looking groups in the country, have been a product of a country that is purportedly wealthy but that has been characterised by poverty, crime, underdevelopment, poor health provisions, asymmetrical power relations and resource distributions, corruption and ethnicity (Adesoji, 2010; Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007, 2008;Ipe, Cockayne & Miller, 2010; Okafor, 2011). For Imhonopi & Urim (2012), the Nigerian state through poor leadership style, continued neglect of its responsibilities to the people, byzantine corruption, poor governance, weak and compromised institutions had created its own lethal Frankenstein.

Not only has the Boko Haram ogre threatened the political stability of the Nigerian state, it has also threatened the economic stability, and in this sense industrial development, of the states in the Northern region. In this chapter, therefore, the focus is on examining how industrial development in Nigeria has fared under terrorism.

Conceptual Analysis: Terrorism and Industrial Development

As Omotola (2010) opined, whatever its motivations, whether political, economic, religious, or ideological, terrorism constitutes a serious negation of human rights and national security. Citing The African Union (AU), Omotola sees terrorism as any act which

is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage. Trosper (2009) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Bockstette (2008) adds that terrorism is political violence in an asymmetrical conflict designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimisation and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols), involving acts meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organisation. He argues that the purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term purposes. Thus, terrorism has become an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetrical conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the clandestine nature and small size of terrorist organisations, terrorists often offer opponents no clear organisation to defend against or to deter. Consequently, terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim and the strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause, while obtaining the greatest publicity and choosing targets that symbolise what they oppose (Imhonopi & Urim, 2012).

As an important mode of production in modern society and the key in pigeonholing countries into developed, underdeveloped or emerging economies, industrialisation is the process that provides livelihoods for millions of people all over the world because it creates a massive pool of employment opportunities for white- and blue-collar workers (Onyeonoru, 2005). Through the deployment of modern technologies, division of labour, specialised skills and large-scale production, organised economic activity is consummated

resulting in the production, manufacture, or construction of a particular product or range of products. According to Onyeonoru (2005), the elements of industrial production are as follows:

* There is a presence of technologies with complex machinery that aids large scale production;
* There exists a wide range of raw materials often processed through the use of complex technologies;
* It is characterised by a relatively complex technical division of labour within units of production;
* There is a complex cooperation and coordination of specialised tasks inside the unit of production;
* And an aggregate of a diverse range of skills exists within the workforce.

Industrial development signifies the progress made in the expansion of the economy and commercial activities in a country through massive industrial production of goods and services. Imhonopi (2004) sees industrial development in Nigeria over the years as being low because of factors such as poor infrastructural development, low level of technology, inadequate capital, poor state of the agricultural sector, low manpower development, poor planning and implementation, high degree of dependence on foreign raw materials, political instability, unfavourable government policies, entrenched official corruption, tribalism and nepotism. While these factors are true, another challenge that may further set the country back in achieving rapid industrialisation is the deepening terrorist activities in Nigeria especially as triggered by the Boko Haram existentialist corps.

The Historical Development of Terrorism in Nigeria

In his very fecund and articulate insight on the historical development of terrorism in Nigeria, Okafor (2011) avers that the foundation for armed insurrection (and later terrorism) against the Nigerian state was laid when Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw nationalist led an armed campaign for greater Niger Delta autonomy, resource control and

self-determination for the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. Okafor (2011) argued that as the founder and leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed militia consisting members from his fellow Ijaw ethnic group, Isaac Boro rose to address what he saw as the marginalisation and deprecation of his people and their economic interests by the Nigerian state. On February 23, 1966, mobilising a force of 150 recruits, who were trained in the use of firearms and explosives, he and his men attacked a police station, raided the armory and kidnapped some police officers, including the officer in charge of the police station. They blew up pipelines, engaged the police in a gunfight, and declared the Niger Delta an independent republic. Although the revolt was successfully quashed and Boro was jailed for treason, that effort of his and the NDVF willy-nilly laid the foundation for armed resistance against government's highhandedness in the region and in others, many years to come.

Then came Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa (popularly known as Ken Saro-Wiwa), his compatriots, who formed the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which advocated for the rights of the Ogoni people, demanding increased autonomy for the Niger Delta region, a fair share of the proceeds of oil extraction, and remediation of environmental damage to their lands. He was successful in drawing global attention to their cause through his peaceful non-violent measures until 1995 when the government of Abacha sentenced him to death for a crime he was purportedly accused of committing. The killing of Saro-Wiwa in November 1995 became the turning point in the politics of the Niger Delta (Ogundiya, 2009).

Then rose ethnic militias who confronted what they saw as the high-handed and despotic leadership style of the Abacha junta and flourished during the Abacha years (1993-1998). As Douglas, Kemedi, Okonta & Watts (2004) noted, in the Abacha years, Nigerians experienced the most severe political repression and economic hardship in the country's history. Douglas *et al.*, (2004) brilliantly chronicles the emergence of ethnic militias in that era. The O'odua People's Congress (OPC) was established in the Yoruba-speaking southwest in 1994 largely to protest the annulment of the

1993 elections in which Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim, had seemingly won the presidency. Led by mostly disenchanted Yoruba youth and supported by some of the Yoruba elite, the organisation claimed that a "northern cabal" in the Army had denied Abiola victory and aggressively pressed for Yoruba political autonomy. Two vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), emerged in the Igbo-speaking southeast two years later. MASSOB claimed that the Nigerian state and its functionaries had systematically oppressed the Igbo since the end of the civil war and sought to secure self-determination by resuscitating the Republic of Biafra, whose bid to secede from the Federation was crushed by Nigerian troops in 1970. The Arewa People's Congress (APC) emerged in the north in 1999 as a reaction to the killing of northern elements in Lagos and other Yoruba cities and towns by OPC cadres, and as a foil to the new Obasanjo government which many northerners viewed as a "Yoruba regime". The APC claimed that the harassment of northerners in the southwest was part of a Yoruba plan to secede and establish an "Oodua Republic" and that President Obasanjo was sympathetic to it. The group threatened to go to war if necessary to prevent national dismemberment. These and other ethnic militias heated up the polity by seeking to protect the interests of their ethnic constituencies, employed jungle justice to fight their real and perceived enemies and played sectional roles in the political life of the nation as party thugs, enforcers, and champions of local interests.

While these ethnic militias were contained by the democratic government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the next phase of engagement with government by disenchanted Niger Delta youths was spearheaded by Niger Delta militants who unleashed violent attacks and bombings of oil installations, kidnapping, hostage taking and assault to press home their demands. The "judicial murder" of Ken Saro Wiwa, their worthy ambassador and mediator, had created a leadership vacuum which over 150 militant ethnic groups scrambled to fill. The actions of these militants earned them such titles as terrorists, criminals, ethnic militias, rebels, freedom fighters, insurgents, revolutionaries and political agitators (Adejumobi & Aderemi, 2002; Ikporukpo, 2007; Ogundiya & Amzat,

2006; Osaghae, 1995; Suberu, 1996, 2001), while some scholars believed the Niger Delta militants employed terrorist strategies in the pursuit of their grievances which constituted serious threats to the nation's economy, human and national security and qualified Nigeria as one of the world's terrorist trouble spots (Ogundiya, 2009; Okafor, 2011).

The rise of Boko Haram terrorists in Northern Nigeria paled into insignificance the insurgent and terrorist activities of the Niger Delta militants even though the emergence of the sect had been predated by similar uprisings in the past in the northern region. The Boko Haram-styled terror acts took on a more virulent, sophisticated and religious dimension. In his erudite treatise, Adesoji (2010) traced the evolution of the crisis to the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi. These were the first attempts to impose a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, and marked the beginning of ferocious post-independence conflict and crises in that region (Ibrahim, 1997; Isichei, 1987). Following the Maitatsine crises, or interspersing them, were several other crises such as the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the nationwide crisis over Nigeria's membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in January/February 1986, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/ Zaria/Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 1988, the acrimonious nationwide debate on Sharia (Islamic law) at the Constituent Assembly in October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi/Katsina riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis of April 1994 (Ibrahim 1997; Imo 1995; Imhonopi & Urim, 2012; Enwerem 1999).

As some scholars observed, between 1999 and 2008, 28 other conflicts were reported, the most prominent being the Shagamu conflict of July 1999 and the recurrent Jos crises between 2001-2008 (Akaeze, 2009; Omipidan, 2009). The Jos crisis recurred in January 2010 and has become recurrent till date. According to Imhonopi & Urim (2012), virtually all these crises, many of which

took a violent turn, have been explained or justified by one reason or the other. Where the crisis was not borne out of the need to curb the excesses of some groups, prevent them from being a security threat, or contain their spread, as was the case with the Maitatsine riots (Albert, 1999; Ladan, 1999), it arose out of the proselytisation drive by one religious group and the resistance by another religious group of its perceived stronghold. This was the case with the Kano riot of 1991 during which Muslims complained of preferential treatment in the approval of conduct of a religious crusade by Christians and the use of Kano Race Course earlier not approved for Muslims to hold a similar programme (Albert, 1999; Williams, 1997). In some other instances, it was the seemingly unresolved indigene-settler problem that was at its root. The Zangon-Kataf riots and the recurrent Jos crises fall into this category (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Ibrahim, 1998; Nwosu, 1996; Uchendu, 2004; Williams, 1999). While these crises have all been subsumed under religion and explained by even some authors as religious factors, it is apparent that other extraneous and underlying factors like economic disequilibrium/inequality, envy, poverty among youths (who easily become willing tools in the hand of barons), and the unhealthy contest for political offices have all played parts in accentuating them (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Ibrahim, 1997; Sulaiman, 2008). It seems all ethno-religious crises have behind them a perceived domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups (Ibrahim 1998; Ladan 1999). Specifically, the Maitatsine uprisings, to which those of Boko Haram compared in terms of philosophy and objectives, organisational planning, armed resistance and modus operandi, have generally been explained by a combination of factors like economic dislocation, deprivation, and income inequalities, as well as poverty aided by local disasters like drought and a rinderpest (cattle plague) pandemic, all with links to Islam. Significantly, many of the explanations offered for the outbreak of the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s are relevant to the Boko Haram uprising.

The Boko Haram sect has shown itself to be a radical Islamic fundamentalist organisation that seems to hate the West and everything Western. Boko Haram translates to "western education

is a sin" and its members follow a strict interpretation of the Koran. The sect is built on an Islamic faith that its members consider as the panacea for the country's endemic moral, social, political, and economic problems; hence, their determination to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state to be ruled on the basis of the "Sharia" (Imhonopi & Urim, 2012). This doctrinal foundation makes the Boko Haram similar to other terrorist groups whose cause is entwined in and driven by Islamic fundamentalism, especially al Qaeda. Followers of such groups are a menace to society, especially in situations where their target is a secular state which supports, without let or hindrance, the co-existence of multiple religious sects. Their attempt to impose their will on adherents of other religions certainly leads to disaster. Even in Northern Nigeria where Sharia law has already taken root, Boko Haram terror messengers believe they can only achieve their version of extremist Islamic rule by overthrowing the Federal Government of Nigeria. According to a report, many terrorist organisations like the Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and their ilk share a common distorted narrative, in spite of differing and often local objectives, which narrowly and simplistically interprets history and current affairs through the lens of the alleged oppression of Muslims (Australian Government, 2010). These groups want people to believe that:

❖ the West, led by the United States of America, is engaged in the systematic exploitation and repression of Muslims;

❖ governments in Muslim majority countries are illegitimate, corrupt and un-Islamic;

❖ the solution is the removal of Western interference in Muslim majority countries and the establishment of "truly Islamic" systems of governance; and

❖ it is the religious duty of all Muslims individually to use violence to attack the political, military, religious and cultural enemies of Islam anywhere around the world.

In his lucid observation, Adesoji (2010) argues that while the Boko Haram uprising was not the first forcible attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society, it was very well the

first major attempt and subsequent small-scale attempts to widen the scope of Islamic revivalism and escalate the use of terror and violence, including suicide terrorism, in expressing grievances against the state. Adesoji adds that despite the brutal suppression of previous attempts, the gallantry of the Boko Haram soldiers to recuperate, the spread and swiftness of its military organisation, and the belief of its leadership, and perhaps its membership, that it could successfully engage a modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to their cause. It is evident that the Boko Haram terrorist organisation has adopted an al-Qaeda-styled terrorist strategy which is decentralised, elusive and difficult to neutralise as the group's terror performances have repeatedly revealed the shortcomings of the Nigerian security forces. It is expected that the present emergency declaration in Bauchi, Yobe and Borno, three states in the northeast of Nigeria to neutralise the throttlehold the sect has within the zone and region will be successful and result in a united Nigeria with better ethnic relations in the years to come.

Identified Aetiologies of Terrorism in Nigeria
Khan (2003) has identified aetiologies that are central to the manifestation of terrorism within society and Imhonopi & Urim (2012) have successfully applied them to the Nigerian situation. These factors include:

1. Ethnicity, nationalism or separatism. Terrorism has been seen to occur when an aggrieved group resorts to terrorist strategies to achieve nationalist or separatist goals. However, ethnic conflict could arise from a complex combination of class, inequality, political opportunity, mobilisation of resources and "ethnic strength".

2. Poverty and economic disadvantage, globalisation. The lopsidedness in the distribution of scarce resources and benefits within the state can push vulnerable groups to take up arms and unleash terror on an apathetic and complacent population and the establishment. The Boko Haram fighters are believed to have received support from or share links with international terrorist organisations like al Qaeda.

3.   Absence of democracy. Democracy is not civilian rule as some civilian regimes have tended towards gagged and isolated press, peremptoriness, sit-tight political leadership and strangling of the opposition. According to Imhonopi & Urim (2012), in its truest sense, democracy is supposed to be representative of the people, their wishes and interests. However, because this is not always the case in reality, terrorism could arise in a democracy for these two reasons: (a) when there is a case of a minority whose basic rights and liberties are denied or taken away by arbitrary action of the government or its agencies; and (b) when one minority is attacked by another minority and does not receive adequate protection from the state and its forces of law and order. Additionally, those who are the subjects of a liberal state, but who are not admitted to its rights of citizenship cannot be morally bound to show allegiance or obedience to the state. They are not bound by political obligation either because they have not been accorded any rights by the state (Wilkinson, 1977).

4.   Disaffected intelligentsia. According to Rubenstein (1987), terrorism could be triggered by disgruntled and disaffected intelligentsia who are in a social and moral quagmire unable to mobilise the masses. When rigid social stratification shatters hopes for social transformation, this provides the intelligentsia with the ingredients to commence terrorist activities in an attempt to reconnect with the masses who they claim to represent and aspire to lead.

5.   Dehumanisation. It is also felt that it is not the disaffected intelligentsia, but simpleminded people who are gullible enough to be indoctrinated and shoehorned into believing that they are fighting to be heard, recognised and treated as equal human beings in the society.

6.   Religion. Religion has been seen as the opium that some groups feed on to misinterpret the requirements of their religion and to carry out their fundamentalist beliefs which is generally aimed at conquering, expanding and consolidating on their religious gains and territories.

In support of some of the points raised above, the Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations speaking before the UN Sixth Committee in October 2009 conceded that, in adopting a global and comprehensive response to terrorism, a coherent international response must give priority attention to address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, such as poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanisation of victims of terrorism, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalisation and lack of good governance (Imhonopi & Urim, 2012). Therefore, there should be support for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law as a *sine qua non* to the successful combating of terrorism and the implementation of the strategy (Onemola, 2009).

Generally, aside its religious and political nexus, terrorism thrives in West Africa, nay Nigeria, because of the linkage of development challenges and security (Ipe, Cockayne & Millar, 2010). In other words, the recurring deficiencies in governance, a lack of state capacity to address a range of interlinked security and development challenges, a history of intra- and interstate conflict, and segments of the population that are arguably increasingly vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment by extremist movements and criminal organisations are knotty issues to address. Look (2011) adds that the roots of the problem are not only religion-oriented, but are also connected to the country's economic hardships and unemployment, as well as to alienation from the central government. He mentions the incapability and lack of political will of the government to handle terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram to have allowed the spread and resurgence of the group within the Nigerian state.

Contextualising the causes of terrorism in Nigeria, it is pertinent to point out that many years of poor governance, militarism and abandonment of the Niger Delta and Northern regions by the government and the conspiracy between the managers of the state and the local elite who connive with the international bourgeoisie to expropriate the resources of these regions have led to the rise of a Frankenstein bent on taking its pound of flesh (Ibegbu, 2009; Imhonopi & Urim, 2012). For instance, the history of military dictatorships or autocratic rule fostered a legacy of peremptory

political leadership that practised patrimonial rule and clientelism and created poorly run governments that legitimatised injustice, inequality and inequity among the Nigerian population. However, a growing concern in West Africa, including Nigeria, is the deluge of torrents of Islamic fundamentalist ideology due to the high concentration of African Muslims in the sub-region leading to the growing population of hardline Muslims who are clearly anti-American or Western and may provide a sanctuary for terrorists as a form of religious persuasion or devotion. Therefore, the issue that currently faces the US, Western and Christian elements is the radical ideology of Islam which is currently spreading in many West African countries, posing a threat to anything not Islamic (Charisma Magazine, 2011; Elombah, 2011).

Theoretical Matrix

This chapter has adopted the theory of religion in extrapolating the emergence and activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. The disciplines of theology, religion, and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism(Kraemer, 2004; Stitt, 2003). According to Hoffman (2006), about a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns. They believe that God not only approves of their action, but that God also demands their action. Their cause is sacred, and consists of a combined sense of hope for the future and vengeance for the past. According to Imhonopi & Urim (2012), of these two components, the backward-looking desire for vengeance may be the more important trigger for terrorism because the forward-looking component (apocalypse or eschatology) produces gullible and radicalised fanatics who are more a danger to themselves and their own people. They add that the chicanery to a successful use of terrorism in the name of religion rests upon convincing believers or converts that a "neglected duty" exists in the fundamental, mainstream part of the religion. Religious terrorism is, therefore, not about extremism, fanaticism, sects, or cults, but instead is all about a fundamentalist or militant interpretation of the basic tenets of a religion (Imhonopi & Urim, 2011). Some religious traditions are filled with plenty of violent images at their

core, and destruction or self-destruction is a central part of the logic behind religion-based terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2001). Evil, which can assume any real or perceived entity, is often magnified and religion easily serves as moral cover for self-centered terrorists and psychopaths (Stitt, 2003).

Imhonopi & Urim (2012) observe that the usual pattern in religious-based terrorism is for a psychopathic, spiritual leader to arise that is regarded as somewhat eccentric at first (a tendency toward messianism), but then, as this leader develops charisma, he tends to appear more and more mainstream and scholarly. He begins to mingle political and religious issues (a tendency toward theocracy), and little-known religious symbols or pieces of sacred text take on new significance. Quite often, these symbols are claimed to be an important part of that religion's history that has somehow been neglected. The stage is then set for blaming somebody for the betrayal of this sacred heritage. First, the politicians in one's own country are blamed, but soon a foreign influence, like secularisation or modernisation is blamed. Religious terrorists quickly move to blame a foreign influence for at least three reasons: (1) it does not serve the religion's survival interests to blame a homeland (2) it makes use of a long history of competition, animosity, and war between the world's different religions; and (3) any blaming to be done must occur on the symbolic or cosmic level, which is to say that the enemy cannot have a face, but must be some impersonal, evil-like force or influence. Hence, the most specific enemy religious terrorists can have is some global trend like secularisation, modernisation, or Westernisation (Imhonopi & Urim, 2012). The strength of fundamentalism is its ability to guarantee that a radical change is coming without specifying exactly what it will look like. However, once a semi-vague enemy has been identified, the religious movement borrows the idea of "sovereignty" from the political realm and begins to see itself as the legitimate defender of the faith and legitimate restorer of dignity to the homeland. Most importantly, such "defenders" justify terrorist actions in their accountability only to God, for it is God who has chosen them for this sacred mission in history.

As Imhonopi & Urim (2012) argue, a theological linchpin of terrorism would be the notion that communal violence, even though violence is despised, is still a form of worship that may help discover the true nature of God and open up two-way communication with God. They add that religious terrorism not only seeks to avenge a long history of persecution and injustice, but it also frequently carries out preemptive attacksbecause a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about the actual degree of threat that the enemy poses. Importantly, the recruitment process in religious terrorism is followed by a reeducation programme that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, secular, or modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good. The only exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of experimentation. It is important to understand the practice of martyrdom in the terrorist context. Not only does a martyr serve recruitment and other purposes after their death, but a whole mythology develops around them, which Ranstorp (1996) calls a process of martyrology.

Although there is a wide divide of opinions regarding the Boko Haram sect, the voice and skin of the group point to religious terrorism. In other words, the utterances of the group, its actions, its targets and the many totems it represents point to an Islamic fundamentalist group. Perhaps, the embroilment of its members within a depressed context typified by poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, marginalisation, infrastructural development, political and moral corruption and others, could explain the rise of this terror machine, events have shown that the group is a beguiled frontline campaigner for the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism on Nigerian and African soil.

Terrorism and Industrial Development in Nigeria

Unarguably, industrial development thrives in an atmosphere of security, socioeconomic and political stability and peace. It follows that with the creation of an environment of violence, destruction of infrastructure, unleashing of bloodletting, fear, terror, incessant and unpredictable killings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, carjacking,

harassment, threats and bombings, including suicide bombings, emissaries of violence have inadvertently or wittingly put a cog in the wheel of industrial development and progress with adverse effects on the immediate affected states in Nigeria and on the country as a whole (Imhonopi & Urim, 2012). In what they call a spectral bite to industrial development, Imhonopi & Urim (2012) and Onifade, Imhonopi & Urim (2013), have argued that not only has terrorism threatened the very fabric of national integration in the country and created the ecology of fear, disquiet and anxiety, it has also meted a deadly blow to industrialisation in the country. A look at the economies of the affected states in Northern Nigeria which are in tatters is all that is needed to confirm this position.

Imhonopi & Urim (2012) have identified the following as the impact terror has had on industrial development in Nigeria.

1. Terror acts have forced many Nigerians to limit their social obligations in flashpoints because of the palpable fear of being killed or injured which could bring about permanent disability. Prima facie, this might look harmless and extraneous to industrial development, but a deeper look reveals a lot of damage on the growth of business as citizens who may have to meet outdoors over breakfast, lunch or dinner to discuss business issues may not be willing to take the risk anymore. It is common knowledge that so many deals are closed in informal settings such as on golf courses, on lawn tennis courts, during social get-togethers and in eating establishments. Therefore, when people are forced to limit their social engagements which have the potential of facilitating commercial activities and they become excessively cagey of outdoor activities which could expose them to terror attacks, industrial advancement is throttled.

2. There is a mass exodus of large corporations and small medium enterprises (SMEs) to commercial centres outside terror hot spots to preserve their investments and business. Incessant bombings and bloodcurdling chaos in the North and the erstwhile Niger Delta militant strongholds have forced many large and small businesses to move out of the regions. This is

because the owners of such businesses are not willing to risk their investments and capital. Not only are these businesses moving away, they are carrying their taxes along; they discontinue their operations in the affected areas leading to unemployment of indigenes who work in such businesses, there is disruption in the value chain and future investments into such areas are withheld. In other words, terrorism leads to the disruption of SMEs within the value chain with a deleterious ricocheting impact on industrial development.

3.   Most times, too, there is mass exodus of skilled workers of Southern and Northern origins to other parts of the country or to their states of origin for safety. Many of these workers are tired of the threat to their lives and property and move out of the trouble areas. The emigration of these skilled workers to other parts of Nigeria will definitely starve the industries that remain in the terror zones of the needed manpower to run their business processes. This ultimately could lead to more costs in terms of hiring and insurance and sometimes when some skilled workers are hard to get could spell the death or discontinuation of business.

4.   The state of insecurity has lowered the trade velocity within and between states in the North where Boko Haram terror activities have lingered. Without trade activities, employment cannot be generated, personal economies will bite the dust, goods and services cannot be bought or sold creating scarcity due to lack of supplies, inflation in the local economy can be engendered, traders may no longer be able to sell as the population of consumers to buy the products dips and commercial activities could grind to a halt making it impossible for financial intermediaries like commercial banks, microfinance institutions and finance houses to close shop or move their businesses elsewhere.

5.   The economy of the northwest and northeast is in tatters as most suppliers of goods and services to the north have withdrawn their services for fear of becoming targets of terrorist attacks. There is the destruction of markets and market linkages.

in place are forced to remain at home or leave the trouble spots momentarily or for good.

10. Finally, terrorism in different parts of Nigeria has limited the potentials of the country's or affected state's tourism and hospitality sectors. For example, Bauchi state with its Yankari Game Reserve, Sokoto with its Argungu Festival and Jos touted as the Tin City with its temperate climate have experienced low or non-existing patronage as many citizens and foreign tourists no longer go to such places for fear of becoming easy targets to the terror bloodhounds. Hostage-taking and kidnappings of expatriates have also reduced the number of these visitors to such unique tourist places and denied the respective government concerned the income, goodwill and business opportunities that could have been generated from such encounters.

Conclusion

While terrorism in Nigeria is not synonymous with the Boko Haram terror envoys, the emergence of the latter gave potent virulence and insidious dynamism to the practice of terror acts, not with the introduction of suicide bombers, the use of weapons of mass destruction and the widening of state and non-state terror targets. Similarly, the rise of the Boko Haram terror envoys has further underpinned the revivalism of Islamic fundamentalism. Using modern tools like bombs, fast-racing trucks, phones, the internet, video and broadcast technologies and others, totems that represent Western material culture, which the group paradoxically repudiates, the group has redefined the business of terror and taken it to sublime and dizzying heights of megalomania. The aetiologies of terror will continue to fan the embers of ethnic disquiet, armed insurgency and militancy in the country so long the political and economic managers of the state look the other way. Until issues like poverty, youth unemployment, infrastructural development, popular governance, and official and responsible leadership form the fulcrum of political agenda and get the commitment of state resources, Nigeria may continue to experience the birth of terror gangs who hide under the cloak of ethnic or religious disaffection to fight the

state and all it represents. As Imhonopi & Urim (2012) and Onifade *et al.,* (2013) posited, there is need for a multi-stakeholder approach to handling the terror war. The success recorded by the Joint Task Force in the northeast is also attributable to the martyr role played by the soi-disant civilian JTF, made of young Nigerians of northeast descent who jumped into the fray, tired of the inglorious and destructive impact of the Boko Haram sect, to help the Nigerian military tackle the insurgents. To turn around this negative narrative and engender industrial development in the country, the government must join forces with other stakeholders in the state to fight this menace. Principally, too, government must invest more in its people, promote welfarist policies that target the vulnerable sectors of society, put in place popular policies that promote equity, justice and fairness, pursue popular rule, put in place transparent and high ethically conscious political leadership and invest in youth empowerment schemes that can improve the lives and personal economies of Nigerian youth at the lowest rung of the social pecking order. The fight against terrorism in Nigeria is inevitable to foster human security, protect the domestic economy, guarantee the flourishing of trade between and among states, cultivate industrial development, attract a continuous stream of foreign investments, protect critical infrastructure and help Nigeria realise its economic potentials, which are long overdue.

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