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Abstract

The study examined empirically the factors that influence industrial conflicts in Nigeria during the period 1980 – 2010. Earlier studies have isolated the economic and non-economic determinants of conflict in developing countries but the impacts of the identified factors have not been estimated. The work attempted to bridge the gaps that exist between the theoretical and empirical analyses. The study employed simultaneous equation model techniques (SEMT) in which strikes and wage rates were made endogenous. As a descriptive study which made use of three research questions and three hypotheses, 400 staff across six selected companies in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria, after stratification, were chosen randomly through simple random techniques. Secondary data were obtained from the Federal Ministry of Labour, Employment and Productivity, Lagos and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Lagos. Results show that changes in wage rate, price expectation and union membership concentration influence industrial conflicts in Nigeria. Also the simultaneous equation model revealed that wages were significantly affected by strikes activity. Strike activities were not affected by wages only during the period under study.

Keywords: Industry, conflict, trade union, bargaining, contract, employer/employee.

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Nil
1.1 Introduction

Broadly defined, conflict is a situation of disagreement between two parties. A conflict situation is characterized by the inability of those concerned to iron out their differences.

The concept of industry involves an exchange relationship between two major actors namely, employers and employees, as well as the intervening role of the state. Industrial conflict can therefore be defined as the inability of these parties (either between employer and employees or within their groups) to reach agreement on any issue connected with the object of employer-employees interaction, whether or not this inability results in strikes or lock-out or other forms of protestation.

Conflict is by nature ubiquitous and inevitable in human existence. It is a product of human interaction and relation, and its occurrence is only among and between parties or groups.

Conflict arises from a desired scarce resources, status or power. Conflict is considered as a fact of life. God made each individual unique; therefore some of our views and opinions differ from one another. This is because people of various backgrounds, culture, belief and religions came together and exist within the same environment. No matter how hard we try to avoid it, conflict is a natural phenomenon in all human society that occurs in our day to day activities. Conflict is a disagreement through which the parties involved perceived a threat to their needs, interests or concern. It may be a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, goals, pride, self-concept, ego and sense of mission or purpose. Conflict is therefore, inevitable in our daily life but could be minimized, diverted, managed and resolved.

One implication of the reports of the various ways of expressing conflict in Nigerian Industry is that attempts to suppress specific symptoms of conflict without removing the underlying causes may merely divert the conflict into other forms. Thus, it is not unusual for leaders to emerge among the workers to help in the proper organization of the grievances whether or not a union already exists.

In the process involving the deployment of a strike action, two kinds of disputes are usually identified: viz, disputes of interests and rights disputes. The disputes of interest pertain to conflict in collective bargaining arising out of the making of new contracts or the renewal of existing ones; while rights disputes involve the violations (alleged or established) of rights already existing in collective employment contracts.

Pertaining to the first type, therefore, conflict already exists even at the bargaining table and whether the bargaining fails or succeeds does little to remove the conflict situation and the possibility of using the strike to further the interests of the parties.
Rights disputes arise largely out of the default of one of the parties. Both types of dispute may call for the strike or luck-out, although there are procedures for resolving such disputes. Besides making agreements about conditions of employment, employers’ associations and trade union also negotiate a programme or procedure to be followed in an industry for settling a dispute at a place of work without resort to industrial action such as a strike.

**Statement of the Problem**

Against this background, the recent industrial reform measure and the trends in strike activities which led to the reduction in workers productivity is thus identified as a problem to the realization of industrial harmony in the country. As a result, the following research questions were advanced for the study:

**Question 1:** Does public or private policy affects worker’s agitation in the management of industrial conflict?

**Question 2:** To what extent does the crisis-proneness affects productivity within the industrial sector?

**Question 3:** What relationship exists between the strike activities and wage rate policies of the government?

**Hypotheses**

\( H_0: \) There is no significant difference between the public or private policies and workers’ agitations in the management of industrial conflicts.

\( H_1: \) There is significant difference between the public or private policies and workers’ agitations in the management of industrial conflicts.

\( H_{02}: \) There is no significant difference between the crisis-proneness and the productivity measures in an Industrial sector.

\( H_{12}: \) There is significant difference between the crisis-proneness and the productivity measures in an Industrial sector.

\( H_{03}: \) There is no significant relationship between the strike activities and wage rate policies of the government.

\( H_{13}: \) There is significant relationship between the strike activities and wage rate policies of the government.

**1.2 Review of Literature**

Yakubu (2000) observes that conflict could be classified into four broad spectrums: These are Intrapersonal conflict, Interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict and Intragroup conflict.

Intrapersonal Conflict is the most difficult conflict because it occurs between oneself and it is caused by being pushed into two or more directions at a time.
Ige (1998), in his findings classified industrial conflict into four types: The first category is that between individuals in industry; the second is conflict involving a non-union members and management; the third is conflict between a labour union and one of its members and the management group or the manager; the fourth is conflict within collectivises.

According to Ige, Industrial disputes involve certain issue on which the workers or the employers or both are dissatisfied. These issues which are, in the main, substantive in character should be distinguished from the causes and circumstances of industrial dispute which are, in the main, procedural in character or having to do with how the real issues were handled by the parties.

Wage disputes ranged over demand for wage increases, change in method of payment, wage and salary structure, irregular pay day, payment through a foreman or headman rather than directly by the cashier or paymaster, delay in making payments, failure to pay wage increases recommended by government-appointed commissions, demand while on strike, change in overtime rate, deductions from wages, annual increments, to underpayment. All these show the different aspects of wage and salary administration in the country which cannot be settled for all time.

In the word of Gregory and Georgia (2010), conflict in the workplace is a painful reality and a key reason for poor productivity and frustration... it does not magically go away and only get worse when ignored. If sufficiently widespread, these can have the same effect on the efficiency of the enterprises as organized action. If the situation deteriorates badly or has become endemic, locating and dealing with the individualized cases, can often be more difficult than dealing with collective industrial actions.

The general tendency of industrial relations analysis is to emphasize worker grievances in the work situation and almost completely to ignore those of the management. Since the work "contract" is bi-partite, however, it is well or realizes that management can have grievances against the work force just as the employees frequently have grievances against the employer. Grievances are generally manifested in response to a given situation or environment and, therefore, tend to differ in their extent of specific form, from time to time and as between the said situations.

We, therefore, concluded that much the success of an enterprise depends on how well it is organised and geared to utilize effectively its human resource. It is therefore, essential to forestall and or minimize industrial discontents, disputes or grievances. This constitutes the major aspect of the personnel function and a challenge to personnel management.
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 MARSHALL RULES OF DERIVED DEMAND

Economists have a strong conviction that the conditions which are propitious for the exertion of Union power are conducive to Union growth. The traditional approach to explaining union growth then centres on Marshall’s four rules of derived demand which state that the trade union is likely to be better placed vis-à-vis the employees in obtaining higher wages and better conditions of employment of union labour if:

- Final demand for the product of unionized labour is less elastic;
- It is less easy to substitute other inputs for the union labour;
- The union labour’s share in the total cost of production is smaller; and
- The elasticity of supply of co operant factors is lower than the elasticity of the supply of unionized labour.

In addition to these rules, the union must have effective control over alternative supplies of labour. The effectiveness of the operation of these rules however, varies directly with the changing fortune of the economy. Thus, union membership rises during periods of prosperity because, in anticipation of an ever tightening labour market, the employers try to appease their work force by granting wage increase and other concessions so as to maintain their present workforce and also attract new ones. Workers join the union without fear of reprisals from their employers and they regard membership dues as a wise investment. But during economic recession which often results in widening unemployment, the union loses much of its prestige and bargaining power. Some workers are discouraged from maintaining their membership, seeing how ineffective the union is in dealing with their plight. There is contraction in union membership during recession.

SENIOIRITY AND THE CONTROL OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES:

The uncertainty of employment in a capitalist economy coupled with the fear of anti-union discrimination on the part of employers has made workers and their union decidedly “job-conscious”. The explicit and detailed provisions covering job opportunities which most work agreements contain reflect this concern. The importance of seniority as the guiding principle in controlling job opportunities is apparent in some of the labour law Acts of 1974. It should be noted, however, that in many cases seniority is not rigidly applied. Strategic workers, or “key” personnel, will often be exempted from seniority regulations. And unions are typically willing to recognize that, particularly where promotion is concerned, ability must take precedence over seniority.

2.5 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

It has been quipped that a collective bargaining is to labour relations what the wedding ceremony is
to domestic relations only the beginning. Despite formal agreements, it is the “living together” that counts. It is unthinkable that even the most detailed and comprehensive work agreement can anticipate all the issues and problems which might occur during its life.

As a result, virtually all agreements contain a more or less explicit procedure for the handling of disputes which arise during the life of agreements. In our sample agreement a very complete four-step procedure is clearly outlined. In this instance, the grievance machinery culminates in arbitration, that is, a neutral third party is designated to render a decision by which both labour and management must abide. Albeit, compulsory arbitration as required by law for settlements of labour disputes may frustrate rather than promote industrial peace. It undoubtedly undermines the collective bargaining process, particularly if such machinery has been successful for labour, for they are relieved from bargaining and negotiations and could clog the arbitration process by making irrational demand.

The following four stages are provided for in the collective agreement:

**Stage One:** The employee is expected to make his grievance known to his immediate sectional supervisor who will investigate the matter and inform the employee of his finding in 3 days after he has been informed.

**Stage Two:** If the employee is unsatisfied with action taken at the first stage, he may make his case known to the sectional manager in writing within 3 days.

**Stage Three:** If the grievance is not resolved after 7 days the aggrieved, accompanied by the union representative in the company, may present the dispute to the head of the department.

**Stage Four:** If the dispute is not resolved at stage three, it may be referred to the managing director through the personnel manager and the decision reached at this stage shall be final.

Irrespective of whether the grievance is collective or individual, the grievance machinery provides for several stages in settling disputes between union’s members and management. Emphasis on the earlier stages of the grievance method is very important because not only is it time-saving to settle early, but successful use of the initial stages at the plant level is capable of boosting the status of supervisory personnel and union stewards who are more familiar with the particular situation. Where grievances are satisfactorily settled at one of the initial stages without having to go to the top officials on both sides, the grievance procedure would increase the sense of solidarity between union leadership and members, strengthen the union, and reinforce the bond of loyalty between employer and employees. The figure 2.5 below shows an integrated model for the settlements of grievances and disputes.
Dispute or Grievance

| Workers vs. his immediate foreman | S |
| Worker vs. head of section | E |
| Union steward vs. head of department | T |
| Union steward vs. division manager | T |
| Union leader vs. personnel manager | L |
| Grievance committee | E |
| Mediation | |
| Conciliation | |
| Arbitration | |
| Industrial Court | |

**Figure 2.5: The Grievance Process**

**Sources: Author's Specification**

It can be seen that the model combines in-plant machinery with statutory machinery as provided for in the Trade Disputes Decree of 1976.

2.6 BARGAINING THEORIES

In economics, models of bargaining process are used to provide insight into the cause of work stoppages. Strikes occur as a result of miscalculation on the part of the parties involved in a labour disputes (Olaloye, 1995). Here we consider models of collective bargaining in particular, Chamberlain bargaining process. Chamberlain defines bargaining power as the ability to secure one's opponents agreeing to one's terms.

This could be explained as management willingness to agree to the union's terms or demands. It is the rate of mediation between union and management in terms of opportunity cost i.e. how costly disagreeing will be relative to agreeing. In other words, there is an opportunity cost as well as real cost between cost of agreement and cost of disagreement on the part of the management and unions.

The model is given as

\[
UBP = MCD - MCA
\]

Where:

\[
UBP = \text{Union Bargaining Power}
\]

\[
MCD = \text{Management Cost of Disagreeing with union's terms}
\]

\[
MCA = \text{Management Cost of agreeing with union's terms}
\]

When and if the management estimates that it is more costly to agree than to disagree (i.e. the union bargaining power is less than one) management will choose to disagree and thereby reject the unions terms. On the other hand, if management recognises that it is more costly to disagree than to agree i.e. the union bargaining power is greater than one) management will choose to agree.
Management chooses to disagree

Management chooses to agree

On the other hand, management bargaining power is quantitatively given as:

\[
MBP = \frac{UCD}{UCA}
\]

Where:

MBP = Management Bargaining Power

UCD = Union perceived cost of disagreeing

UCA = Union perceived cost of agreeing with management terms.

If management bargaining power is less than one, the union will reject management offer and conversely if it is greater than one, the union will accept management offer. In other words, the union cost of disagreeing is stochastic of loss of wage income during a strike action.

Note that whenever the denominator is greater than the numerator in the above equations (i-iv) the implication is disagreement or rejection.

Methods and Sources of Data

The study uses data from secondary sources. All the data for number of strikes, level of productivity and unemployment rate were obtained from the federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity, Lagos. While those on general level of prices are taken from various issues of Annual abstract of statistics, published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The data for Union membership was obtained from Ananaba’s Trade Union Movement in Nigeria and from the Federal Ministry of Labour’s Annual Reports for various years. The review period lasted from 1980 through 2010.

The structural form of strike equation is postulated as follow:

\[
\ln S_t = \ln \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln \Delta W_t + \alpha_2 \ln \Delta P_t + \alpha_3 \ln \Delta T_t + \epsilon_t
\]

Where:

\( S_t \) = the number of Strikes per year,

\( \Delta W_t \) = changes in wage earnings,

\( \Delta P_t \) = changes in price expectation level,

\( \Delta T_t \) = changes in membership concentration, and

\( \epsilon_t \) = a stochastic error term.
From the theoretical literature, \( W_t, P_t^e \), are key economic variables, while \( T_t^c \) is an institutional variable that influence strike. Equation (1) says that the number of strike per year \( (S_t) \) is determined partly by changes in wage earnings \( (\Delta W_t) \), changes in price expectation \( (\Delta P_t^e) \) and changes in membership concentration \( (\Delta T_t^c) \).

Furthermore, a single equation as it affects strike activities states that changes in wage rates are expected to be influenced by changes in price expectation, productivity level and unemployment rate.

\[
\ln \Delta W_t = \ln \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln \Delta P_t^e + \beta_2 \ln \Delta X_t + \beta_3 \ln \Delta U_t + V_t
\]

\( ................. (2) \)

Where:

\( \Delta W_t = \) changes in wage earnings,

\( \Delta P_t^e = \) changes in price level,

\( \Delta X_t = \) changes in productivity level,

\( \Delta U_t = \) changes in unemployment rate, and

\( V_t = \) the error term for log-linear form.

Equation (2) says that changes in wage earnings \( (\Delta W_t) \) are determined partly by changes in price level \( (\Delta P_t^e) \); changes in productivity level \( (\Delta X_t) \); and changes in the unemployment rate \( (\Delta U_t) \).

It should be noted that the sensitive impact of wages on industrial relations demand that the formulation and enforcement of a fair wage policy should be a matter of central importance whether at the national, industrial or the enterprise level. The essence of such a wage policy should be to establish coherent and acceptable principles for continuous application in determining the levels of wages, how these can be changed, on what basis, to what extent, and how often. However, these are influenced not only by economic but by social as well as political factors. In the economic plane, the level of the wage is influenced very much by the forces of demand and supply. Workers have their supply price, which is determined partly by the prevailing cost of living; hence \( P_t^e \) is included in the model to reflect the fact that expectation in price rises may make the workers to demand for an increase in the wage earnings. No employee could work or offer his services for long at starvation wages. \( X \) is included in the model as a measure of changes in productivity level. Where the workers earn income commensurate to their productivity, crisis would be minimized or may be avoided. It is often argued that if wage increases are to change in line with the average productivity of labour, wage push-inflation would be contained. Grievances may arise when there is wide disparity between the worker's pay and productivity.

\( U \) is also included in the model to reflect unemployment rate. We recognise that wage negotiations cannot take place independent of labour market conditions.

The reduced form equation of the model is obtained by substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and this is expressed in the form:
Equation (3) is the reduced form equation used to assess the relative impacts of the factors influencing industrial strikes during the period 1980 – 2010.

The model presented here considers the basic elements of wage determination under collective bargaining but also allow for interaction between industrial conflicts and wages.

Furthermore, the role of price expectations is incorporated through wage rate specifications. It is assumed that wage negotiations take place over nominal wages with the rate of inflation in view, such that the workers’ real wages are protected.

Accordingly, the expected rate of price inflation enters nominal wage considerations. However, the unions are aware of the fact that there may exist a surprise element in items of unexpected inflation, and hence, we incorporate changes in price expectation in the wage equation. We further assume that union take productivity gains into account during wage negotiations, therefore, we equally identify changes in productivity level as part of wage equation.

In Nigeria, the factors and products markets are not perfectly competitive; therefore, the assumption of perfect competition is invalid. Wages and prices are determined partly by market forces and partly by non-market forces. Market forces are those working directly through the demand and supply of labour. Non-market forces are those associated with government policy decisions which directly affect wages and labour union actions which could be in the form of economic or political pressures, for example, Nigerian Governments have actively and repeatedly intervened in the determination of wages and conditions of employment through independent wage commissions. Different Governments in attempts to restrain rapid inflation have repeatedly interfered with the equilibrating mechanisms of supply and demand in factors and products market through the freezing of wages and price control policies.

Results

Applying the ordinary least square (OLS) techniques, the estimated forms of equations (1) and (2) are as follows:

In\(S_i = \ln a_0 + \alpha_1 \ln L_1 W_1 + 0.0690 \ln L_1 P_1 \ldots (3)
\)

\(R^2 = 0.83 \quad F = 43.83 \quad D.W = 2.3
\)

In\(W_i = 0.0490 + 0.5337 \ln L_1 P_1 e + 0.1261 \ln L_1 U_1 \ldots (4)
\)

\(R^2 = 0.38 \quad F = 4.36 \quad D.W = 0.34
\)

The t-values are in parentheses. In the log-linear form of equation 4, the coefficients of \( W_t \), \( P_{te} \) and \( T_{tc} \) are significant. For instance, examining the two-tailed test for each of the explanatory variables, the percentage point of the t-distribution for each \( W_t \) is significant at 0.05 levels, that of \( P_{te} \) is significant at 0.10 levels while that of \( T_{tc} \) is significant at 0.20 level respectively. The F-statistic for the equation (4) is 43.83. With (4, 21) degrees of freedom \( F_{0.05} = 2.84 \) i.e. \( P(F>2.84) = 0.05 \) indicating that a significant association exists between the level of strikes activity and the explanatory variables. The estimated value of the co-efficient of multiple determinations, \( R^2 \), is 0.83; and this indicates that 83 percent of the total variation in the level of strikes activity is explained by the log-linear influence of the explanatory variables. This implies that a good fit has been achieved by the equation. The negative sign of the intercept in strike equation indicates that trade union is a defensive organisation that is out to protect the real incomes of members. The positive and significance of coefficients of wage earnings \( (W_t) \), price expectations \( (P_{te}) \) and membership concentration \( (T_{tc}) \) indicates that these variables have positive influence on the incidence of strikes.

In the case of the log-linear form of equation 5 only \( X_t \) is significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed test); while \( P_{te} \) and \( U_t \) are not significant at all. The F-statistics for the equation 5 is 4.36. With (4, 21) degrees of freedom \( F_{0.01} = 4.37 \) i.e. \( P(F>4.37) + 0.01 \). This indicates that only changes in productivity level determine changes in the level of wage earnings in this equation. We discovered with this equation by its estimation yielded spurious correlations and erroneous inferences because there is existence of auto-correlation, the Durbin – Watson statistics is very low and the multiple determination \( R^2 \).

If we compare equation 4 with equation 5, the former performs creditably well than the latter. Given their statistics, it appears that one functional form out performs the other, since there are significances between equation 4 and equation 5 in their relevant statistics.

With the high value of \( R^2 \) in equation 4, the indication is that the main determinants of strikes activity in Nigeria are changes in wage earnings, changes in price expectation and changes in union membership concentration. The result of the two equations 4 and 5 indicated that wages were significantly affected by strike activity; strikes were not affected by wages only during the period 1980-2010.

The estimated form of the reduced equation is as follow

\[
St* = 0.00224 + 0.08704 \ln \Delta P_{te} + 0.00426 \ln \Delta X_t + 0.02288 \ln \Delta U_t + 0.4036 \ln \Delta T_{tc} 
\]  

Equation 6 is the reduced from equation when we substitute equation 5 into 4. This is done to be able to identify the direct and indirect effects of each explanatory variables vis-à-vis strike incidence in...
Nigeria. We can therefore make the following inferences from the reduced form equation.

(a) Changes in price expectation determines to a larger extent strike activity in Nigeria as observed from the figures. Expectation of future rise in price makes union to demand for improved condition of service and this can lead to strike activity if the management refuses to grant the union their demand.

(b) Concentration of union membership in a particular organisation often leads to strike activity. When we look at the strength of the union concentration, there is the possibility of information generation which can lead to workers coming together to agitate for common front on issues affecting them. Thus strike may occur as a result of management refusal to grant workers such demand.

(c) Unemployment rate according to this result does not affect strike activity during the period covered by this study i.e it is not significant in predicting the incidence of strike. However, the sign of each variable appears to be in accord with the postulate of economic theory.

(d) Finally, consider the parameter estimates of the strike equation. The coefficients of Wt and Pte are statistically different from zero. For example, the coefficients of changes in wage rate (Wt) and price expectation (Pte) show that a 10 per cent decrease in each variable will lead to 39.04 per cent and a 63.51 per cent decrease in the incidence of strikes in each case. These results imply that strike action is highly inelastic with respect to wages and price expectation. Thus a significant increase in wages and decrease in prices will lead to a substantial decrease in the incidence of strikes both in the private sector and the public sector of the economy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper posited and tested a simultaneous equation model involving the feedback effects between strikes and wages in Nigeria for the time period 1980-2010. The model incorporated the role of price expectations through wage rate specifications. The underlying assumption was that strike is determined by worker experiences about price inflation, the labour market situation as proxies by the rate of unemployment, and by the ability of unions to enforce wage contracts. More specifically, strike activity was modelled as a function of changes in wage earnings, which were, in turn, a function of current rate of price inflation, the growth in labour productivity, and the unemployment rate. One reduced form equation was estimated in order to obtain predicted values of strike activity and wage changes.

There are specific policy conclusions that can be drawn from this study. First, the clustering of strikes after a general wage review is an indication that the government and private sector employers have not allowed the growth of the
labour institutions that would advance the successful implementation of wage polices in Nigerian industrial relations.

Studies show that countries that have experienced successful non-inflationary wage polices are those whose central labour organizations poses considerable authority within the labour movement over national union which are organised primarily on an industrial basis, and which also wield considerable authority over affiliated locals. Second, it is clear from the regression result that unemployment rate variable has no significant effect, but it has positive influences on strike activity in Nigeria Economy.

The empirical analysis shows that strike action is highly inelastic with respect to change in wage rate and changes in price expectation, but elastic with respect to unemployment. In other words, the propensity for strike action and the opportunity to strike exist, but the opportunity cost in term of unemployment is negligible. In view of these finding, it is important that government should encourage collective bargaining that will lead to industry-wide agreements, and reduce the use of wage commissions to eliminate the strike that erupt at the time of each wage review. There is the need for a fundamental restructuring of industrial relations in the country such that would permit continuous dialogue and joint problem solving, this is the essence of industrial democracy and it is what makes collective bargaining work.

Furthermore, maintaining a reasonable stable price level is essential for the successful implementation of wage policies, particularly as rapidly rising prices have led to workers’ wage demands and ultimately the appointment of government commissions.

Moreover, adequate arrangements should be made for the unions and the employers to play well the role assigned to them in the system of industrial relations in the country.

The government need to address itself to the real issues involve in the disputes rather than the outward manifestations in the form of strikes and lockouts. In this connection, it is important for the country to have an abiding faith in the ability of her people to solve their own problems and where such ability has not been demonstrated, the country’s best strategy is to improve the ability of the parties through joint consultation forum to solve the problems in a socially acceptable manner. It is only in this way that the country can ensure that path of its economic, social and political developments and the welfare of her citizens are not obstructed by industrial strike and that conflicts are resolved with minimum disorder.

In conclusion, the above inferences are not to say that a carefully formulated and prudently executed wage policy or labour decree aimed at peaceful industrial relations will guarantee that there would be no strikes. Strikes are a part of the industrial growth process, and the threat of strike action is
what makes collective bargaining work, but measures such as those suggested above could be taken to minimise the incidence of strikes in Nigeria.
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