FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION UNDER OLUSEGUN OBASANJO’S ADMINISTRATION (1999-2007)

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Abstract

This paper examines Nigeria’s foreign policy making and implementation under Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian administration. Therefore, this work interrogates how Obasanjo’s administration formulated and implemented Nigeria’s foreign policy. To successfully accomplish this task, both primary and secondary data were collected. Interviews conducted with principal actors and secondary data obtained from books, journals, magazines, bulletins, newspapers and government records were analysed to achieve the objectives of the study. Among other findings, the study observed that there were structures put in place for Nigeria’s foreign policy making processes under Obasanjo’s civilian rule. It is important to note also, that the actual foreign policies formulated were dictated primarily by Obasanjo’s personality and executive leadership decisions. The paper therefore recommends, among others, that strong institutions should be put in place to facilitate foreign policy making and execution, and there should be standard operational procedures in foreign policy making and execution that would strengthen institutions and limit personalities.

Key words: foreign policy, civilian administration, decision making theory

Introduction

This paper examines foreign policy making and implementation under Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian administration between 1999 to 2007, taking into consideration the politics of foreign policy making and implementation processes during this period.

States all over the world relate with one another on the basis of certain issues (such as, economic, agriculture, sport, culture, military etc) as no nation can exist in isolation. Therefore, foreign policy is the determinant of states relations. Governments, whether military or civilian, formulate foreign policy to anchor their relations with other countries of the world. Both developed and developing countries formulate foreign policies to guide their actions and relations with the international community. Therefore, it suffices to state that foreign policy guides states’ relationship. Nigeria cannot exist in isolation, since she is a member of the international community. And she has to formulate policy to guide her relationship with the international community. Foreign policy anchors this relationship. It is therefore, suffice to state that, the main focus or objective of this paper is to examine Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation and execution during Obasanjo’s civilian rule (1999-2007). At this juncture, it is imperative to state the pattern of this paper. This paper will be divided into four parts. Part one is the introduction, conceptual analysis is the part two, part three examines the foreign policy making and implementation under Obasanjo, while part four is the conclusion.
Conceptual Analysis

Foreign policy can be conceived as pursuit of national interest of a state in relations with other states in the global setting. It involves decision making by governmental agencies on matter of national interest. In order to provide classical clarification of the concept, it is imperative to examine some of classical definition provided by scholars on the subject matter.

Hartmann (1973) defines foreign policy of a nation as consisting of selected national interests presumably formulated into a logically consistent whole that is then implemented. For Holsti (1985) foreign policy is the actions of a state toward the external environment and conditions, usually domestic, under which those actions of the state are formulated. According to Holsti (1988) the foreign policy of a state is determined by domestic realities. Thus, Nigeria's experience, clearly demands an elaboration on this definition. Hartmann (1973) posits further that any foreign policy can be viewed analytically in three phases: namely, conception, content, and implementation. Conception involves the strategic appraisal of what goals are desirable and feasible. Content is the result and reflection of that appraisal. Implementation looks to both the coordinating mechanisms within a state and the means by which it conveys its views and wishes to other states. Although inefficiencies and failures can be very costly in any of these three phases, it is apparent that the most critical phase is conception, which is the formulation stage. Flowing from the above conceptual analysis of foreign policy, foreign policy is conceived as the policy makers' aspirations and intentions and relations with the external community. And for the purpose of this paper this definition is adopted. And the theory to explain this study is the decision making theory because of its focus on the policy makers.

The Decision Making Theory

It was never in doubt that Obasanjo was fully in-charge as he established a monopoly over foreign policy affairs; Obasanjo overshadowed his foreign ministers often leaving little or no role for them. Admittedly, he surrounded himself with a number of advisers, including the Presidential Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations. According to Adeniran (1983), decision making focuses on the individual statesman. When individual decision-makers are the focus, their idiosyncrasies, values, motivations and ideals are examined, particularly as they relate to their leadership style as decision-makers. Their goals or choice of objectives as well as expectations are analysed to determine state policies. This is because state action is considered to be that which is taken by the decision-makers acting in the name of the state. Foreign policy decision making is an aspect of a state’s governing system. Because the concept of governing is rooted in the Greek verb “to steer,” foreign policy decision making can be viewed as the process of steering the state within the seas of global society (Amstutz, 1999). Fundamentally, such steering involves choices (decisions) by political leaders and government officials (decision makers) to advance states’ transnational interests (goals). As with all human decision-making processes, individual and collective self-interests are assumed to be the major motives for determining foreign policy goals (Amstutz, 1999).

Following from above, Obasanjo never consulted the Presidential Advisory Committee. Akindele (2006:196) posits that it was quite apparent that he believed himself to be an institutional centre of excellence in foreign policy. Describing Obasanjo's resentful belief in his ability to control events in the public domain, Nwosu (quoted in Akindele 2006:196) bluntly depicted his attitude as “a know-all stance” which has earned him a lot of criticisms of possessing a “messianic complex”. It must be appreciated that throughout Obasanjo's civil rule (1999-2007), he exhibited a domineering attitude in both domestic and foreign policies. Institutional constraints that are typical in democratic regime appeared not to have checked Obasanjo's strong personal dispositions on policy matters, this is possible because his of political party has majority seats in the national assembly.
For instance, following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 2002 on the disputed Bakassi Peninsula, that awarded the territory to the Republic of Cameroon, Obasanjo went ahead to cede the disputed territory to the Republic of Cameroon on August 14, 2006, without prior approval of the National Assembly. Two weeks later, the Nigerian Senate approved a motion declaring the transfer illegal because it had not been ratified by the National Assembly (Ploch, 2008:30). Similarly, despite the aversion by Nigerians to the grant of asylum to Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, Obasanjo went ahead to grant the asylum in disregard to dissenting public opinion and again, without recourse to the National Assembly. The influence of Obasanjo’s personality on foreign policy during his democratic rule surpasses even those witnessed under successive military regimes in Nigeria including his brief interregnum from 1976-1979 (Ngara, Esebonu & Ayabam, 2013).

On the basis of this analysis, decision making model is appropriate in explaining foreign policy making process and implementation during the administration of Obasanjo, taking into consideration character, the governmental structures, and agencies that are involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation.

The Foreign Policy Making and Implementation under Obasanjo

Ideally, foreign policy making under civilian rule goes through some processes as laid down in the constitution. There are structures responsible for it. But scholars differ in their analysis of these structures. According to King (1996) decision on foreign policy making is taken by bureaucrats and “publics” who have been exposed to the socialisation of colonialism and the counter currents of Africanism and nonalignment. King (1996) argues further, that the foreign policy making process under civilian and military regimes has been influenced primarily by (a section of) the senior bureaucracy/technocracy bureaucrats and the opinion of small, but intense, issue-oriented publics.

In other words, Fawole (2003) asserts that decision-making in both domestic and foreign policies was usually conducted through a rigorous process that involved at least two main branches of government, i.e. the executive and legislature. Both branches had separate roles assigned to them under the constitution of the First Republic in the governance of the country. While the executive branch had the responsibility for day-to-day administration and decision-making on all issues, the Parliament, on the other hand, was charged with the function of law-making for the whole nation. The activities of the executive must conform to the laws made by the Federal Parliament. This way, there were checks and balances provided in the constitution to bridle the excesses of each branch of the government.

Invariably, there is structure put in place for foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria. The question now is: how did Obasanjo formulate and implement foreign policy under his civilian rule?

On ascending into power in 1999 as civilian President Obasanjo inherited what Bolarinwa (2014) called “moribund foreign policy” as Nigeria was a pariah state during military rule. Nigeria’s isolation started during Babangida rule, immediately after the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential elections and the situation got worse during Abacha era. The Abacha era was referred to as the darkest days of Nigeria’s foreign policy. On the restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria by General Abulsalam Abubakar in 1999, General Abubakar transferred power to President Olusegun Obasanjo. And Olusegun Obasanjo’s foreign policy was described by Sule Lamido as personal activities. According to Lamido (2014) Obasanjo was the chief diplomat, chief foreign policy instrument, foreign conveyor and image maker. Therefore, it is
obvious from the activities of the administration, that Obasanjo was actively involved in the making of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

No wonder, Akande (2001) asserts that, the main achievement of Obasanjo’s administration was mostly in foreign affairs where the denoted image of the country, caused by the past military governments had been at least taken care of.

But, in the words of Lamido (2014)

President Olusegun Obasanjo has clearly paid a lot of personal attention to foreign policy in the past as he has always done (if Joe Garba’s testimony in this in his book Diplomatic Soldiering) is anything to go by.

Other words, Obasanjo as President continued to champion the course of Third World nations particularly Africa. He consistently and untringly canvassed for the reversal of the abysmal socio-economic conditions in the Third World especially Africa, a role which no doubt rubbed off his personality as an important international statesman. His international campaign for debt cancellation and forgiveness for Third World countries is a case in point. As a result, “in 2005, creditors wrote off 60% ($18 billion) of Nigeria’s estimated $30 billion in external debt to the Paris Club and other creditor nations” (Aluko 2007:28). Furthermore, Nigerian foreign reserve rose from $2 billion in 1999 to $43 billion on leaving office in 2007 (Ajetunmobi, Osunkoya, and Omotere 2011:313). In spite of Obasanjo’s avowed advocacy for Africa and by extension Third World development, it is worthy of note that his level of nationalism became diluted as a civilian president compared to his military era.

Aluko (2007:31) corroborates this view when he asserts that:

Since the second coming of Obasanjo and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) regime in 1999, reverse nationalist stance has become the order of the day. Rather than pursue nationalistic economic and political policies to the benefit of Nigerians, the regime has completely sold out to the Western imperialistic nations, to the extent that Nigeria, today, is less independent, economically and politically, than it was in 1960 or in 1979.

At the domestic level, corruption became the order of the day and continued unabated as his government fight against corruption became highly politicized. His government was highly criticized for abuse of power, flagrant disregard for due process and the rule of law (Aluko, 2007:31).

Obasanjo conducted foreign policy as a personal affair with brazen disregard for other foreign policy making institutions, like National Assembly, Ministry of foreign Affairs etc.

In connection to the above, is the issue of Bakassi Peninsula and the Greentree Agreement.

Bakassi Peninsula and the Greentree Agreement

Obasanjo was accused of having unilaterally signed an agreement ceding Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon without recourse to the National Assembly. In view of this, Ajomo (2012) posits that since 1913, Nigeria’s border with the Cameroon has been problematic. According to Momah (2012), Nigeria has five international boundaries, namely, Republics of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and Equatorial Guinea, all, except the later, are Francophone countries, with strong ties with France. According to Momah (2012), the problems between Nigeria and Cameroon can be traced to the inability of the British and the Germans to properly demarcate the boundaries, stretching from Lake Chad to the area around the Atlantic.

In line with the above, Ajomo (2012) states that the Germans were interested in shrimps in particular and an undertaking that Britain would not seek to expand eastwards while the British were in an uninterrupted and secure sea lane access to Calabar; a key trading post. At the
end of the First World War, the Allies had defeated Germany and as a result all German territories were divided between Britain and France, the victorious Powers, by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. The League of Nations placed the territories taken over from Germany under British or French Mandate. By a Franco-British Declaration of July 10, 1919 Bakassi and the rest of what became known as British Cameroon were placed under British mandate and administered coterminous with Nigeria but not merged with it. After the Second World War, South and Northern Cameroons were replaced by Trusteeship Agreements under the newly established United Nations, a Trust approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1946. These UN Agreements re-ratified the prior borders as codified by the previous Anglo-German and Anglo-French Agreements. Maps accompanying these Agreements from that period show Bakassi Peninsula is in the Cameroon.

Ajomo (2012) asserts further that on August 2, 1946 Britain divided Cameroon into two - Northern Cameroon and Southern Cameroon, none of the two was put as part of Nigeria. In 1954, according to Nawa Onoigui (cited in Ajomo, 2012), a historian on Bakassi, the secretary of state for the Colonies issued a Legal Order defining the border between Nigeria’s “Eastern region” and “Southern Cameroons” distinct from Eastern region and the Calabar province, and maps from that period showed clearly that Bakassi was not in Nigeria. In March 1959, the UN asked Britain to clarify the wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern Cameroons Trusteeship territories in the run up to the independence of Nigeria and Cameroon (Ajomo, 2012). Maps from that period also show Bakassi Peninsula in the Cameroon and not in Nigeria. On January 1, 1960 the French Cameroon became independent. Instruments creating the new country and Exchange of Notes between France and Cameroun rehearsed all its colonial boundaries as defined by previous colonial Agreements. None put Bakassi in Nigeria (Ajomo, 2012).

Exchange of notes between Britain and Nigeria after her independence, rehearsed all its colonial boundaries as defined by all previous colonial agreements. Maps dated 1960s show clearly that Bakassi was within Southern Cameroons and not in Nigeria. Administrative maps of Nigeria itself used in schools, and government offices continued to reflect the reality, that is, showing Bakassi inside the Cameroon. During the Cameroon/Nigeria plebiscite of 1961, 21 polling stations were physically located in Bakassi Peninsula. UN records clearly show that approximately 73% of the people living in Bakassi at that time, mostly Nigerians, voted not to be administered under independent Nigeria. Though there were, behind the scenes moves to effect an amicable settlement between the two countries (Ajomo, 2012).

A number of diplomatic delegations were sent to the Cameroon to see whether some compromise could be reached in the spirit of give and take but the Cameroon Authorities were obdurate, realizing that the law was on its side were there to be any recourse to law. On 1st June, 1975 the then President of the Cameroon, AhmaduAhidjo and Nigeria’s Gowon signed the Maroua Declaration. It has been alleged that it is by that Agreement that General Gowon formally gave away Bakassi to the Cameroon to compensate Ahidjo for the support and cooperation he gave Nigeria during Nigeria’s civil war. It is on record that Ahidjo did not allow war materials to ‘Biafra’ through the Cameroon. There is no truth in this as one does not give what one does not possess (nemo dat quod non habet) (Ajomo, 2012).

Ajomo (2012) indicates that Murtala Mohammed, Gowon’s successor, denounced the Matoua Agreement and questioned its validity on the grounds that it was not ratified by the SMC which stood in the place of the Nigerian Legislature and was required to assent to a Treaty or an Agreement of this nature for it to be valid. These arguments can be punctured. As regards Ahidjo’s sympathy for Nigeria, this was apparently due to the primordial link between Ahidjo and Northern Nigeria. Ahidjo’s father was a Fulani from Kano and only his mother was from Gerara in Cameroon, so the sympathy for Nigeria was natural. As to the authority of Gowon
which Murtala Mohammed, his successor, disputed, Gowon’s authority was derived from a decree originally promulgated by the Ironsi regime. The SMC, under the decree was only an advisory body to the Head of State. Neither Ironsi nor Gowon after him required legal ratification from the SMC for anything done by them. So Gowon was within his legal power as far as Marou’s Declaration was concerned. And lastly, the Marou Declaration was to extend the demarcation of the maritime boundary between the two countries from point 12 to point “G” on the British Admiralty Chart no 3433 which was attached to the Declaration. It had nothing to do, whatsoever, with Bakassi itself (Ajomo, 2012).

The International Court of Justice Judgment of October 10, 2002

According to Ajomo (2012) since all negotiations with the Cameroon over the years have failed, Cameroon filed an action against Nigeria at the ICJ in the Hague on March 29, 1994. Nigeria assembled a team of local and international lawyers to prosecute her case. During the preliminary meeting of the team in Abuja, the British High Commissioner to Nigeria had sent a confidential letter to Abacha then Head of State, Abacha in which he expressed the view that Nigeria’s case was a bad one and her chances of success very slim. It is, therefore, not surprising that the ICJ ruled against Nigeria, and that Bakassi, which was the main bone of contention, between the two countries, was adjudged to belong to Cameroon.

Again, Ajomo (2012) asserts that some analysts have expressed their opinion as to the further line of action, Nigeria could take to reverse the ICJ judgment. And some have blamed Nigeria for even responding to the Cameroon’s summons to the JCJ in 1994, suggesting that Nigeria should have ignored the summons. According to Ajomo (2012) Nigeria being a party to the Optional Clause (Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has by that very fact recognized as compulsory, ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

(a) The interpretation of a treaty
(b) Any question of international law, etc.

This imposed an obligation on Nigeria to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in all cases regarding a and b above, Nigeria could not, therefore, have reneged on its undertaking in this respect. There have also been views expressed that the Anglo-German Treaties of March 11, 1913, April 12, 1913 and the Treaty of Versailles 1919, upon which the Court relied for its verdict, should have been repudiated by Nigeria at independence to the extent that Nigeria, as a sovereign state was not a party to any of them. Nigeria, at that time, was a colony (Ajomo, 2012).

Britain, realizing the possibility of colonies repudiating after independence, agreements entered into on their behalf while colonies, caused her colonies to each sign a ‘Devolution Agreement’ or ‘Inheritance Agreement’, as a pre-condition for independence. Balewa signed the Agreement on behalf of Nigeria. In two terse clauses, it provided as follows:

i. All obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom which arose from any valid international instrument shall henceforth, in so far as such instrument may be held to have application to Nigeria, be assumed by the Government of Nigeria.

ii. The rights and benefits enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of the application of any such international agreement to Nigeria shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of Nigeria.

According to Ajomo (2012) the implication was that the validity of all treaty obligations entered into by Britain, involving Nigeria, like the pre-colonial Treaty of 1913 and others which transferred Bakassi to France was not to be questioned but accepted as binding on
Nigeria automatically after independence. All colonies signed the agreement, except Tanganyika (now Tanzania), whose President Julius Nyerere declined to sign it. Nyerere was incensed by an earlier lease in 1921, to Belgium by Britain, of a portion of the Ports of Dares-es-Salaam and Kisoma facilities, in perpetuity, for an annual rental of only one franc (about 100 centimes). In a poignant statement to Parliament, Nyerere took the view that a lease in perpetuity, at whatever consideration, was incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of his country, more so when the lease was granted by an authority (Britain) whose jurisdiction was limited in duration. Nyerere, therefore, refused to sign an undertaking to inherit all such obnoxious Agreements. He was hailed as the most authentic African nationalist that emerged at the time.

Nigeria having adopted the principle of Uti Possidetis, has also accepted the inviolability of colonial borders and Nigeria in adopting it, by implication restated its commitment to the Nigerian-Cameroon colonial border which did not put Bakassi in Nigeria.

Also, the Green Tree Agreement of June 12, 2006, subsequent to the ICJ judgment did not also put Bakassi in Nigeria. Obasanjo has been castigated in many quarters for signing the Green Tree Agreement. According to Ajomo (2012) there were rumblings and murmurs from the Senate, on the validity of the Agreement, criticising it for non-compliance with Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution. It reads as follows:

No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.

Also, Akindele & Akinsanya (2012) question the validity of 2008 Green Tree Agreement signed by Obasanjo without the approval of the National Assembly because the Bakassi Local Government Area (LGA) is one of the 774 LGAs of the Nigerian federation, ceding it to Cameroon requires a constitutional procedure involving an amendment of the 1999 Constitution which expressly maintains that Nigeria is "one indivisible and indivisibilil State." (Section 2(1) of the constitutional role of the National Assembly).

But Ajomo (2012) posits that the criticisms levied on Obasanjo on the Green Tree Agreement are totally misplaced. Non-compliance with Section 12(1) of the Constitution with respect to the Green Tree Agreement may be used as a defence if an action is to be maintained with respect to it within Nigeria, but as to the external consequences, Section 12(1) of the Constitution is irrelevant. The Green Tree Agreement is not a treaty. It is an ad hoc arrangement brokered by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, to ensure the smooth implementation of the ICJ Judgment on the Bakassi and to ensure that Nigeria does not renege on its obligation with regard to the judgment and so peacefully implement it.

Even if the Green Tree Agreement is a Treaty, a King, President, Prime Minister or whatever appellation or nomenclature assumed by a Head of State, personifies the State he represents in totality at the international level. Once he signs a Treaty, Plenipotentiary, or whatever, he represents, absolutely, that is, without any further ado. He does not need any mandate from the state as would a Minister or a Plenipotentiary would. The question of compliance with internal process is not a matter for the moment from the international perspective. It is entirely a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. It does not affect the validity of the measure, whatever it is at the international level (Ajomo, 2012).

If Nigeria reneges on its obligations arising from the ICJ Judgment of October 10, 2002 on Bakassi or its undertaking under the Green Tree Agreement of June 12, 2006, it will be subject to the strictures and sanctions prescribed by the UN Charter to which Nigeria is a firm subscriber. It should be noted that there is this omnibus sanctions Article 25 of the UN Charter which is referred to as Article of Faith of the Organization. By it every member on joining the organization binds itself, solemnly, to abide by their obligations under the Charter in all entirety including, of course, decisions of the ICJ or be visited with sanctions
prescribed under Chapter VI and VII of the Charter. If, therefore, Nigeria had declined jurisdiction of the Court in the first instance, or now refuses to abide by the decision of the Court, then Nigeria would have been in violation of the Charter and would have opened itself up to the sanctions stipulated in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. These may be economic or more punitive sanctions and Nigeria is a small country (not in terms of population or geographical spread) to be able to withstand the rigours of such measures. The only wise thing Nigeria should do (and has done) is to gracefully abide by the decision of the Court and find ways and means to resettle Nigerians affected by the cession of Bakassi to Cameroon and to alleviate their suffering and so assuage their feelings. That is why the Green Tree Agreement is a step in the right direction if Nigeria wants to remain a law-abiding member of the UN. From preliminary reports, the 33 communities ceded by Nigeria to Cameroon in the Chad Basin area are not of significant importance in the sense that there is no oil in them. Not only that, Nigerians and Cameroonians who inhabit these enclaves have never known any difference as far as geographical spread is concerned. They have been interacting with each other before and after the judgment as if there was no boundary. Their cattle have been grazing across the boundary to and fro reciprocally, such that it was difficult to know that a boundary exist between them. It is the demarcation in the maritime area that is of concern to Nigeria because of the oil embedded in it.

The Gulf of Guinea Commission which is an emanation of the judgment is a result of the efforts of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission. The demarcation, in which Nigeria has made some gains, follows the criteria laid down in the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea by adjacent states. The joint exploration and exploitation of minerals in the maritime zone has Nigeria as the major stakeholder. Viewed from this angle, Nigeria is not much of a loser. Again, it being suggested then that Nigeria should, before the expiry date, apply to the PCIJ for a review of the case. According to Ajomo (2012) this would have been a waste of time, resources and efforts. Up to October 10, 2002, Nigeria had spent well over US $300 million on the case. Asking for a review, which had no chance of succeeding, was to open another avenue for financial drainage of Nigeria's meager resources, since there is no new facts had emerged since the Judgment to warrant a review. What is more, since the Court was established in 1922 as the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and later transformed into the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1946, no State has successfully asked the Court for a review of its case. Sentiments apart, there is nothing Nigeria can now do at this stage than to comply with the ICJ's decision on Bakassi if Nigeria does not want to be labeled an outlaw state among the comity of nations or open itself to sanctions for breach of one of its obligations under the UN Charter.

Finally, the Green Tree agreement as signed by Obasanjo is binding as stated above, but it is observed that the internal mechanisms were not taken into consideration when it was signed. And since the agreement will affect the internal structure of the country, there is the urgent need for necessary mechanisms to be put in motion to accommodate the effect of the agreement on the internal arrangement of the country.

The one-man knows it all government by Obasanjo in which he and he alone, initiates policies and determines who and how such policies are designed and implemented; thereby bypassing civil service convention, professional bureaucrats, technocrats and technical advisers. As a result of this, the formal procedures of governance were compromised in a number of instances. Former President Obasanjo's direct control of Nigeria's foreign Affairs and control of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources are good examples of his impulse to centralize and dominate governmental affairs at all times. That is why for example, since 1999 Nigeria did not have any well articulated and focused foreign policy anchored on any philosophical foundation.
It therefore, suffice to state that structures of foreign policy making were not active during Obasanjo civilian administration.

The return of democracy, ended 15 years of unbroken military rule. And it can be said that Obasanjo inherited a country suffering economic stagnation and the absence of democratic institutions. Apart from that, the country also faced many problems, including a dysfunctional bureaucracy, collapsed infrastructure, and a military that wanted a reward for their return to the barracks. Obasanjo administration moved quickly to retire hundreds of military officers that held political positions; established a blue-ribbon panel to investigate human rights violations; released scores of persons held without charge; and rescinded numerous questionable licenses and contracts left behind by military juntas. His government also moved to recover millions of dollars kept in overseas accounts.

Nigerians witnessed marked improvements in human rights and freedom of the press under Obasanjo. However, conflicts persisted between the Executive and the Legislative arms over appropriations and other forms of legislation. A sign of federalism has been the growing visibility of state governors and the inherent friction between federal government and the state governments over resource allocation.

In addition to the above, communal violence plagued the Obasanjo administration from inception. In May 1999, violence erupted in Kaduna State over the succession of an Emir resulting in more than 100 deaths. In November 1999, the army destroyed the town of Odi, Bayelsa State and killed scores of civilians in retaliation for the murder of 12 policemen by a local gang. In Kaduna, in February–May 2000 over 1,000 people died in a riot over the introduction of Sharia law in the state. Reprisal attacks were witnessed in south eastern Nigeria. In September 2001, over 2,000 people were killed in inter-religious riots in Jos. The following months, hundreds were killed and thousands displaced in communal violence that spread across the states of Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa. On October 1, 2001 Obasanjo announced the formation of a National Security Commission to address the issue of communal violence. Obasanjo was reelected in 2003 (Alistair, 2013).

The former president faced the daunting task of rebuilding Nigeria’s petroleum-based economy, whose revenues had been squandered through corruption and mismanagement. He was challenged by the longstanding ethnic and religious tensions which slowed down economic growth and hamstrung political stability. Also, oil issues point the intersection of local and international politics in the unrest in the Niger Delta over the environmental destruction caused by oil drilling and the poverty occasioned by environmental pollution in the oil-rich region (Alistair, 2013).

Another major problem created by the oil industry was the drilling of pipelines by the local population in an attempt to drain off petroleum for personal use or as a source of income. This often led to major explosions and high death tolls. Notable disasters have been: 1) October 1998, Jesse, 1,100 deaths, 2) July 2000, Jesse, 250 deaths, 3) September 2004, Atlantic Grove, Lagos, 60 deaths, 4) May 2006, Ibad, approximated 150-200 deaths (Alistair, 2013).

Apart from petroleum related crisis, there were also recurrent eruptions of religious tensions. For instance, two militants of an unknown faction killed Ustaz Ahmad Adam, a Muslim religious leader and Kano State official, along with one of his disciples in a mosque in Kano during dawn prayers on 13 April 2007. To compound all this, there were also intra-administration tensions. Obasanjo had stated on national radio that he would “deal firmly” with election fraud and violence advocated by “highly placed individuals.” His comments were interpreted by some analysts as a warning to his Vice President and 2007 presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar.
Conclusion

This paper examined the Nigerian foreign policy making and implementation under Obasanjo’s democratically elected presidents. Essentially, civilian governments have structures put in place for foreign policy formulation and implementation. This study has discovered that foreign policy under civilian rule of Olusegun Obasanjo has not followed due process, since Olusegun Obasanjo was very active in foreign policy making. Lamido (2014) posits that Obasanjo asserts a lot of influence over foreign policy making. Flowing this, it is clear that the structures for foreign policy making were not fully active and followed during Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian rule and foreign policy implementation followed normal processes.

Therefore, it is observed that: there were structures put in place for Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation and implementation under Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian rule. But the structures were never used and implementation followed laid down processes during Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian leadership.

References


