

LEADERSHIP AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC SUSTENANCE

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Abstract

All over the world, the place of leadership in security of any country cannot be overemphasized. Hardly is there any country in the world without a standing army and other security forces under political leadership to protect it against external aggression and internal insurrection. In other words, there seems to be a correlation between leadership and national security. Thus, leadership is seen as the symbol of security of any country. The inability of any political leader to manage the security of a country can be the greatest undoing of such a leader. This is because there cannot be development in the midst of insecurity. Anchored on system theory, with heavy reliance on secondary data, the study examines leadership and security management in Nigeria with a particular focus on the Fourth Republic. The study finds that leadership failure is a major factor responsible for inability to manage insecurity in the country with grave implications for democratic sustenance. It is therefore suggested among other things the need to sensitize the people to shun sentiment in recruiting people to positions of leadership in the country.

Keyword: Leadership, Security Management, Nigeria, Fourth Republic

Introduction

One major issue that continues to engage the energies of political leaders everywhere in the world is the management of the security of their individual territorial domain and all that is therein (Joshua and Olanrewaju, 2014). This same energy is dissipated by all government regardless of their type. That is why Nwozor (2013) asserts that “within nation-states, whether it is military authoritarian regimes or civil democratic governments, considerations surrounding national security sit at the apex of the hierarchy of states’ national interest”. The implication of this is that security management decisions are primarily the responsibility of the political leadership, as all other factors hinge on it. In other words, democracy is at the mercy of the political leader, who by virtue of being the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces is also responsible for making security decisions for its preservation.

Nigeria therefore serves as a relevant case for examination as it has had its democracy threatened a number of times in history due to activities or/and inactivity of leadership in managing the polity.

However, this paper seeks to examine leadership and security management in Nigeria with the Fourth Republic appropriating major attraction. With historical and descriptive approaches, the paper also examines leadership management of security since independence in a bid to preserve Nigeria’s corporate entity.

Existing literature on leadership and democracy in Nigeria has been silent on the pivotal role of leadership to take front line in making strategic and wise security decisions and asserting self on all national security forces to ensure the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

Leadership

The concept of Leadership has been exhaustively defined by a number of scholars. Indeed, Stodgill (1974: 259) noted that there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept. This implies that there is a multitude of ways and parameters along which leadership can be defined. Barnard (1968) defines leadership as the ability of a superior to influence the behavior of subordinates and persuade them to follow a particular course of action. For Tannebaum, (cited in Ogbeidi, 2012)

leadership is the exercise of power or influence in social collectivities, such as groups, organizations, communities or nations. Similarly, Chemers (2002) sees leadership as a process of social influence by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the organisation in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent.

Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2009) adopt a different approach to leadership. They note that leadership is an essential feature of all government and governance and to this extent, “weak leadership contributes to government failures”, whereas “strong leadership is indispensable if the government is to succeed”. They further posit that “wise leadership secures prosperity in the long run while foolhardy leadership may bring about a catastrophe”. Another important aspect of their approach is the recognition and appreciation that “the lack of leadership routinizes governance”. According to them, its political and creative aspects fade away thereby rendering it “no different from administration, focusing solely on pattern maintenance and repetition of the same”. However, Ajayi (2012) provides the most suitable definition for the study. He defines leadership as that exalted position that bestows on the occupant the power, influence and wherewithal to organize, supervise and order the society or body under his or her jurisdiction.

Security Management

The elusive nature of the concept of security has been observed by a number of scholars. Security has many meanings, some of which are not necessarily logically linked to conventional understandings (Dalby, 1997). In the same vein, Buzan (1991) noted that security is a contested concept which defies pursuit of an agreed general definition. Security is ‘a crosscutting and multi-dimensional concept which has over the last century, been the subject of great debate. This is not surprising because as a social phenomenon it is often approached from different perspectives (Anyadike, 2013).

Despite its ambiguity, a number of authors have sought to define the concept. Cohen and Tuttle (1972) defined security as a protective condition which statesmen either try to acquire, or preserve, in order to guard the various components of their polities from either external or internal threats. Wolfers (1973) stated that security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. Security therefore can be seen as a situation where a person or

thing is not exposed to any form of danger or risk of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or deterioration (Anyadike 2013).

Some security experts have argued that the concept of security has always been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destruction or from dangerous threats. Those conceptions generally hold that the state is the only institution with the primary responsibility and power for the safety of its territory and its people (Zabadi 2005 cited in Anyadike 2013). It is within this framework therefore that the concept of security management will be operationalized in this work.

A simple definition of management defines it as “getting things done through other people”.

Flowing from the aforementioned, Security Management within the framework of this study has to do with the way and manner through which different leaders in Nigeria addressed the various security challenges faced by the country at one time or the other. The next section is on theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this paper, system theory is adopted as the scientific framework upon which the study is analyzed. While system theory is generally traced to natural sciences, particularly to biology, the theory, in its operational part in social sciences, is said to have developed first in anthropology, from where it was adopted in sociology, a little later in psychology and still later in political science (Varma, 1999). The main impact of the system theory on social sciences is traceable to the works of Bronislaw Malinowski and Radcliffe-brown in 1922. What was common to both, and which runs like a thread through the entire application of the system theory in political analysis, was the statement that in the study of a given political system, it was not so important to try to find out how a pattern of behaviour had originated as to find out the part it played in maintaining the system as a whole. The system theory is useful in understanding system changes or systemic breakdown and capacity to survive (Varma, 1999). By application, Nigeria is a political system. The survival of the systems depends on every part of the system. Some of the parts include the internal environment, external environment, and the various states that make the federation among others. The political leadership is a major part as it harmonizes the various parts and oversees them. Anything that affects a part affects the whole and anything that affects the whole

affects the parts. The harmonization function performs by political leadership determines the stability of the system. The inability of political leadership to perform its functions very well can lead to the breakdown of the system, while the ability of a political leader in a political system to square up to the occasion in times of crises can bring about stability and survival of the system. The inability of President Jonathan to effectively manage the security problem in the country may spell doom for the sustainability of the Nigeria's democratic experiment.

Leadership and Security Management in Nigeria: A Historical Overview

Nigeria has been bedevilled with quite a number of problems of insecurity from independence till date. Some of the major crises that constituted a threat to Nigeria's insecurity in the First Republic included the Action Group (AG) crises of 1962, the census crisis between 1963-1964, the Federal election crisis between 1964-1965 and the Western election crisis in 1965. The AG crisis came about as a result of personal vendetta between Chief Obafemi Awolowo the leader of the party and S.L Akintola his deputy. While Awolowo believed through mounting of strong opposition against the government in power he could wrest power from them, Akintola believed in the south-west joining the parties in government (the Northern People Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC)) to share from the national cake. The ideological differences led to the polarization of the party between the two which culminated in intra-party crisis attended with violence (Oyeleye, 1981; Oluleye, 1985).

The resultant effect was the declaration of a state of emergency in the western Nigeria and the trial and imprisonment of Awolowo. The crises that occasioned the conduct of census between 1963 and 1964 came about as a result of the politicisation of census by all the three regions. Census became a matter of politics because it was one of the major parameters for sharing federally collected revenue. Another sign post of disaster was the election crisis in the First Republic. The election crisis that dogged the path of the First Republic was as a result of alliance and counter-alliance that characterised party politics in the First Republic. While most of the parties in the south formed alliance under the umbrella of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), the faction of AG loyal to Akintola had formed the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP), teamed up with the NPC in the north to form the Nigeria National Alliance (NNA). There were boycotts and crisis. The last hay that broke camel's back was

the western election crisis in 1965. This particular crisis popularly known as *operation wet e* characterised with violence, destruction of lives and property as a result of stiff competition between Awolowo loyalists in the AG and Akintola of the NNDP for the control of South west region. All the aforementioned crises which had ethnic colouration had grave security implication on the country. The inability of the government of Azikiwe and Balewa to manage them culminated in military intervention in January 1966 (Oyibo, 1971; Oyeleye, 1981).

After the coup, Aguyi Ironsi emerged as the new military head of state. Ironsi an Ibo man was believed to be playing ethnic game and this made another crop of military officers mostly from the north to plan another coup in July 1966. In this coup, Aguyi Ironsi was killed and Gowon a northern military officer assumed the position of Nigeria head of state. The late Ojukwu who was the military governor of the eastern region refused to accept the leadership of Gowon. Several attempts were made to resolve the differences between Ojukwu and Gowon to no avail, hence the civil war that broke out between 1967 and 1970. It was believed that over one million people were killed. Gowon succeeded in prosecuting the war and peace eventually returned to the country. However, Gowon's regime was toppled when he went for a meeting of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) by the late General Murtala Muhammed. He was eventually assassinated and General Olusegun Obasanjo took over the mantle of leadership and eventually handed over to a civilian government headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979 (Oyibo, 1971; Oyeleye, 1981).

After the expiration of his tenure, Shagari contested again in 1983 but the election was characterised by series of violence that Shagari could not managed. This paved the way for another military intervention. The military held sway from 1983 to 1999. This period was punctuated with coups and counter-coups. Worthy of note were the regimes of General Babangida and Abacha. Babangida put in place an unending transition programme. In the process, the presidential election which was acclaimed to have been won by a Yoruba man M.K.O Abiola was annulled. This annulment generated anger and violence most especially in the South-west. Babangida stepped aside to assuage anger in the land and handed over to an Interim National Government headed by Ernest Shonekan which was toppled by Abacha less

than four months of its inception. Abacha came on board and started another round of transition programme. He expired with his transition programme. His inability to manage the surge of insecurity emanating from the June 12, 1993 annulment led to his demise and that of the acclaimed winner (M.K.O Abiola). General Abdulsalam took over, started another round of transition and then successfully handed over to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo that led to the commencement of the present Fourth Republic (Osaghae, 2002; Akinwumi, 2004).

Leadership, Insecurity and its Management in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: An Overview

Democracy is believed to bring about peace as it is expected to facilitate the emergence of political leaders acceptable by the majority of people via competitive elections. However, this is not always the case as the situation in Nigeria especially that of the Fourth Republic democratic experiment riddled with different levels of violent conflict from inception till date authenticates the fact that democracy may not necessarily be at peace with itself. The annulment of the presidential election in June 1993 which was believed to have been won by the late Chief M.K.O Abiola a Yoruba man but annulled by Ibrahim Babangida (a Hausa man) contributed in no small measure to Nigeria chaotic experience in the Fourth Republic.

The political climate from 1998, when Abacha died, till the final transition in May 1999 to the Fourth Republic has been captured in this manner:

One of the many legacies of June 12 is the heightening of discomfort over the disequilibrium in our body politic. At no time in our history has this awareness been more acute than now. The Ogonis are crying over "neglect". The other oil producing states feel "cheated". The northern minorities feel left out. The west feels "robbed". The core north feels it has held the titles but real power has been elsewhere. The east says it has always been oppressed and "marginalised" (Agbaje, 2003: 9).

The Republic started on 29th May, 1999 with the handover of political power to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo after a long period of military rule. The advent of democracy after decades of military rule however, gave impetus to the expression of bottled up anger and frustrations from different quarters. It is therefore not a surprise that the first few years were marked with the formation of different ethnic militias.

Jega (2002) sounded a word of caution when he said there were many causes of ethno-religious tension and conflicts in Nigeria and quite a number of them are actually interrelated. He also observed that the pervasive nature or spread of ethno-religious conflicts gained

unprecedented momentum since the emergence of democratic government on May 29, 1999. Jega (2002: 35) notes:

It seems as if decades of bottled up anger under military rule has suddenly exploded and found expression in violent, ethnic, religious and communal conflicts, in the context of the little democratic space which has opened up since May 29, 1999, furthermore, Nigerians now spend much energies trying to redefine their national identities, as a consequence of the emotive feelings and perceptions which these clashes have engendered. Where conflicts have not occurred, or have somehow abated, associated tensions have remained high with all the attendant negative consequences on the socio-economic and political development in the country.

From the ideas expressed above, one can make the following deductions: first, that the long years of military rule in the country was characterized by excessive repression and dehumanization; that democratic dispensation created the latitude for all and sundry to rediscover themselves and make excessive demands on the system. And lastly, the failure of the Nigerian state to meet the excessive demands of the teeming population basking in the euphoria of emancipation found expression in violent conflict with devastating consequences.

Although Oodua People Congress (OPC) was formed earlier in the 1990s shortly after the June 12, 1993 annulment, other ethnic militias that were formed in the Fourth Republic include: the Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys of Africa, Arewa People's Congress (APC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) (Agbaje, 2003). Others include the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND).

The activities of the aforementioned and many other ethnic militia groups that championed the courses of their various ethnic affiliations, coupled with ethno-religious and communal conflicts, with the recent upsurge in Boko Haram insurgency combined to create a spiral of insecurity in the country. However, the leadership factor in the management of the various insecurity problems from 1999 till date is of great concern to democratic sustainability in Nigeria. Some of the cases of insecurity and the way they were managed from 1999 till 2009 when President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan took over are discussed. The management of insecurity issues under the present administration are also discussed.

One of the first major issues of insecurity that dogged the path of the first administration in the Fourth Republic aside the proliferation of ethnic militias was the adoption of Sharia by some states in the north. Sani Yerima the then Governor of Zamfara state was the first to

adopt Sharia the Islamic legal code. Some states in the north like Kano, Kaduna among others subsequently followed suit. The adoption of Sharia sparked violence in some states in the north, particularly Kano. Obasanjo being sensitive that the adoption of Sharia was motivated to achieve political aim was able to overcome it through avoidance approach as Sharia issue died naturally.

Fayemi (2000: 17) argues that beyond all the arguments about ethnic and religious crisis, the bane about Sharia lies at the heart of politics in Nigeria and the centrality that “identity” politics has assumed. Fayemi put it more pungently:

There can be no doubt that the Sharia issue is clearly a reaction to perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum that is predominantly “northern” and also “Muslim”. What is happening is a contest over raw political power. Who lost power, who won power, and who wants power back? The processes that threw up General Obasanjo as the candidate of this elite stratum were intimately bound up with the political crisis that has gripped the northern political class.

He continues:

Obasanjo, who they had supported, refused to play their game, prompting some northern political leaders Datti Ahmed, himself a former presidential candidate to allegedly claim the president had allowed himself to be hijacked by South West politicians. Since General Obasanjo as a politician does not have a political base, not in the army, nor in his ethnic group, nor anywhere else, it would seem understandable that the forces in retreat dusted up the dormant Sharia issue, confident of its populist value, to challenge him, to intimidate him, to force him to back down and play things their way.

In curbing the violent activities of the militia groups, Obasanjo gave a shoot at sight order. With this disposition, some of the militia groups faded away. The Niger Delta militant groups that proved a hard nut to crack was approach through various means. He used carrot and stick approaches. Diplomacy was employed; derivative principle was given prominence (13%) in sharing the federally collected revenue which continues to favour the oil producing states, Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) was established to replace the former OMPADEC and the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) among others. Obasanjo also instituted the Joint Task Force (JTF) an integrated force made up of the Police, the Military and Naval Officers to confront militants in the area (Joshua, 2007). It was also believed that Obasanjo choice of Jonathan as the running mate of the late Yar’ Adua who was the President of Nigeria between 2007- 2010 was to placate the militant groups in the Niger Delta area. The idea was believed to give voice to the Niger Delta people who felt they produce oil which has been the economic mainstay of Nigeria, yet have no voice in government and that

underdevelopment of the area does not reflect the enormous resources Nigeria derived from the area.

In addition, in Odi community, Bayelsa State where some youths killed some security personnel in their fight for resource control was not treated with kid gloves by the Obasanjo administration. The entire community was levelled. Although he was accused of excessive use of force but the issue was contained. In Zaki-Ibiam where the Tivs and Jukuns have been at each other's throat. Obasanjo sent some soldiers to quell the crisis; nineteen of them were killed, although it was believed that they were killed on their alleged partisanship in stopping the riots (Ukiwo, 2003). The soldiers went on vengeance mission and killed quite a lot of the Tivs believed to have masterminded the killing of the soldiers. When William Walis of the Financial Times interviewed Obasanjo on the issue he said:

My dear man, you must think of cause and effect. You have a situation in Taraba and Benue where two tribes from time immemorial have been at each other's throats. The two governors called on the need to send troops. And 19 soldiers were captured by local men. They were decapitated. I told the governor of Benue to look for the culprits. For two weeks he did not do anything. You don't expect me to fold my hands and do nothing because tomorrow neither soldiers nor policemen will go anywhere I send them. I sent soldiers. When you send soldiers they do not go there on picnic. They went on operation (Ukiwo, 2003:142).

He continues:

The people who killed them (the soldiers) were civilians, and the people who killed them were not innocent. They were looking for the people who killed them. This is the kind of thing one finds really irritating coming from people like you. Those soldiers, are they not human? Have they no rights too? Are their lives not important? They have wives. They have families... It is not justification. But what you must bear in mind is, as I always say, action and reaction are not equal and opposite. They are equal and opposite in physics. In human nature, reaction is always more than action (Ukiwo, 2003: 142).

Although Obasanjo was able to calm the fray nerves orchestrating insecurity in the country, his approach seems too brutal. There were times the Niger Delta youths even pressed charges that he ought to be tried for crime against humanity.

The late Yar' Adua succeeded Obasanjo in a presidential election that was believed to have been massively rigged. As part of his efforts to bring permanent solution to the Niger Delta crises, he introduced amnesty programme for the Niger Delta militants. They were given specific period of time to lay down their arms or face state action. Quite a number of them are currently benefitting from the programme in which those of them that embraced the amnesty programme were pardoned and given opportunities for education abroad and other training programmes that will help them to be able to fend for themselves through legitimate

means. Yar' Adua died after a protracted illness and Jonathan the then Vice-President emerged the president to complete Yar' Adua's term. He also contested in the 2011 general elections and won and has remained the President of Nigeria since.

The management of insecurity under President Jonathan has not been impressive. For one, Jonathan appears to have confronted issues of insecurity more than his predecessors and his approach to security management seems not to be very effective. The crises in Jos and the menace of Boko Haram remain the major security problems for the Jonathan's administration.

Comments by well-meaning Nigerians and from international community actually authenticate that Jonathan security management approach is not yielding the required result.

For example the feelings among soldiers is that President Jonathan shouldn't have kicked out Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, former Chief of Army Staff, who they said should have been upgraded to Chief of Defence Staff where he could continue to oversee the counter-insurgency campaign in the north-east. This is based on the fact that he made tremendous impact in the fight against the insurgents while in service (Agbo, 2014: 24).

Fani-Kayode former Aviation Minister also blamed the Federal Government for allowing the insurgency to fester. He said "I am one of those that believe that the Federal Government has failed woefully in its primary duty to protect the Nigerian people". Noble laureate Professor Wole Soyinka and Tunde Bakare one of the delegates to the current national confab and a running mate of General Buhari in the 2011 presidential election also accused Jonathan of allowing the insurgency to fester and not doing enough in curbing the menace of Boko Haram (The Source, May 19, 2014: 22). He added that "... it is time for him to be a commander-in-Chief that we can be proud of..." (The Source, May 19, 2014: 22).

Commenting on the abduction of some girls at Chibok in Bornu State on April 14, 2014, Oluokun (The News, May 19, 2014) stated that the girls were abducted on 14 April, the same day there was a bomb blast masterminded by the Boko Haram in which over 75 lives were lost. The President visited the scene of the blast and injured victims in the hospitals and made the usual promise of his resolve to bring the terrorists to book. The next day the President was in Kano, where he was shown on national television dancing at a political rally, to the dismay of many Nigerians. His attitude to the abduction was even more cavalier. It was after two

weeks of the girls' abduction before President Jonathan could make official statement and initiate action to rescue them. Indeed it was after international condemnation and street demonstrations became a daily affair did President Jonathan tell his country that he would take all necessary actions to see to the release of the girls to their parents.

It was also observed that the kidnapping of the Chibok girls occurred just as President Jonathan was about to hold the World Economic Forum on Africa, with 6,000 troops deployed for security. That show of force actually kept the delegates safe, but Nigeria's deeply troubled government cannot protect its people (Onyemaizu, 2014 The Source, May 19, 25). The reaction of Mr. President's wife, Patience, was also stunningly callous as she was alleged to have told one of the protest leaders, "You are playing games. Don't use school children and women for demonstration again" (Onyemaizu, 2014; The Source, May 19, p. 25).

Comment from the international community has also been negative about Jonathan's handling of the country's security problems. For instance, Sarah Sewall, the United States under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights said corruption is hindering Nigeria's efforts at ending insurgency in the north-east. He said that despite Nigeria \$5.8 billion security budget for 2014, corruption prevents suppliers as basic as bullets and transport vehicles from reaching the frontlines of the struggle against Boko Haram. The picture above has resulted in the low morale and desertion among soldiers in the 7th army division fighting the insurgents (Ameh and Oladimeji, 2014). It is therefore not a surprise that Adeyemo (Tell, 2014, May 14, P.11) conclude that unfortunately, with the calibre of Nigeria's national leaders, Boko Haram is here to stay. That the present lukewarm attitude of Mr. President is certainly uncalled for as he cannot win the fight against Boko Haram except he change tactics.

The above lend credence to the position of Okene (2005) that the greatest cause of ethno-religious and indeed other identity-based conflicts in Nigeria in this period is the enthronement of bad leadership. It is important to state at this juncture that although President Jonathan has made some efforts in this direction, but his efforts are not seen as good enough to produce the desire result that would curb activities of insurgents in Nigeria. For example, there was a time he wanted to dialogue with the Boko Haram which did not work. He has equally employed the military in the war against Boko Haram but frustrated by division in the

military with some soldiers conspiring with the Boko Haram group. However in spite of these obstacles people believed that he allowed insurgency to fester too long by treating them with kid gloves. The Boko Haram group has killed thousands of innocent Nigerians. It is important to state that the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as the president in the presidential poll of 2011 was sentimental. He was voted in not because people believed in his charisma but rather for religious and ethnic reasons. His inability to actually confront Nigeria's insecurity problem is not far-fetched from this.

Implications for Democratic Sustenance

The visible ominous signs of recent point to the fact that except something drastic is done to redress the tide, the present Nigeria democratic experiment may not last beyond 2015. As forces from the north are making the country ungovernable for President Jonathan sensing that he may want to run for presidency come 2015. The implication of this is that if Jonathan should run and win in 2015 presidential election, he may likely face more obstacles in governing the country. If he succeeded in curbing Boko Haram the major threat to Nigeria security, another insurgence may emerge from the north to frustrate him and may even be more brutal than Boko Haram. This is because the north wants to have the presidential slot at all cost come 2015. If the north succeeded in wresting power from the south, the Niger Delta militants will come up to challenge the north and make the country ungovernable for whosoever emerge from the north. Thus, it is not overstatement to say that Nigeria present democratic experiment is in a precarious state. Apart from this, the fear of disintegration of the polity also looms large.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the analyses above, it can be concluded that although Nigeria has faced series of insecurity problems in the past that of the Fourth Republic is unique with the menace of Boko Haram adding dangerous dimension to the situation. It can also be concluded that President Jonathan handling of Boko Haram has made it to aggravate to the present seemingly uncontrollable conflagration capable of tearing the country apart. It is therefore recommended among others that the president should live up to expectation in curbing insecurity in Nigeria by exploring various means. It is therefore suggested that there is need to sensitize the people to shun sentiment in recruiting people to positions of leadership in the country. The president

should really behave as somebody who has full control in managing security situation in the country. He should be decisive and use maximum force where necessary. The president should overhaul the security apparatuses of the country; appoint credible people to investigate cases of some military officers and politicians conniving with Boko Haram in the country and those found culpable should be severely dealt with. If the country must divide for peace to return the on-going national confab should be given the mandate to deliberate on that and reach a conclusion in re-defining the future of Nigeria without war. There is need to embark on mass job creation that will absorb the jobless youths in the country that politicians have been using as cannon fodder to foment violence for their selfish political gains. There is need to cut down on remunerations of political office holders so as to make them less attractive. Government should emphasize entrepreneurship studies in our school system so as to make school leavers self reliant. Governors of northern states should do more to encourage western education and place it in high premium above quranic education so as forestall youth being brain wash through teachings that can make them susceptible to uncivilised behaviour.

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