Corruption and Public Accountability in the Nigerian Public Sector: Interrogating the Omission.

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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to interrogate the omission in the system of public accountability in the Nigerian public sector that has made corruption a monster. It is germane to state that corruption heightens wherever systems for ensuring effective accountability are weak. There are internal and external mechanisms for achieving accountability in the Nigerian Public life, but it appears that they are ineffective. This is due mainly to lack of political will in redressing the corruption dilemma. Additionally, the Nigerian penal (code) system or sanctions for weighty crimes such as corruption are weak and serve no deterrence to actual and potential offenders. The paper is segmented into: Abstract, Introduction; Conceptual clarification; Corruption and Public Accountability in Nigeria: A Discourse, Conclusion and recommendations. In order to rise above this challenge and make progress, the fallen status of our laws must be addressed through pragmatic implementation and committed leadership anchored on sound values and practice.

Keywords: Corruption, Accountability, Transparency, Public Sector

1. Introduction
Corruption is a global issue, but it varies in intensity, sophistication and forms from country to country. The deduction or inference from extant literature, public commentaries, analyses, media (print and broadcast) including social networks seem to suggest that corruption is the largest industry with many practitioners in Nigeria. This has a lot of implications for development generally in the country. It is therefore not surprising that Adegbite (2009:33) averred that “…where there is no accountability, development will inevitably be stunted.” The author (Adegbite, 2009) corroborated thus:

In human history, no nation ever prospers with perverse values. In fact, no nation can prosper where personal will supplants the general will, where established procedures are observed in the breach, where governance is for self-enrichment rather than public service. Where there exists a yawning gap between leadership and stewardship…. virtuous societies are built by leaders who are accountable to the led and are driven by the altruistic desire to improve the lot of the highest number of the people.

The latter part of the above averment adds the dimension of elite complicity in the public accountability and corruption dilemma in the country. In an earlier study, Onah and Ibietan (2012: 263-286) underscored this (governing) elite factor in public resource mismanagement and corruption in Nigeria. How do we account for the origin of corruption in Nigeria? Ikejiani-Clark (2001:114) argued stridently that “corruption was more or less introduced in Nigeria by colonialism. Corruption in politics, administration and business. .. has its counterpart in similar tendency by the clerk to extract bribe for a file to be moved through the process to the Administrator”. She explained further that “government property was not regarded because it was alienated from the population”.

It is pertinent to note that the contributions of Ikejiani’s. Clark (2001) in linking the origin of corruption to colonialism follows the traditional political - economy approach to blaming all the woes of African society on colonial rule. The colonialists departed physically from the Nigerian Political landscape nearly fifty three years ago. Tenable arguments must be sought elsewhere. Some scholars argued that aspects of African cultural and religious practices predisposes one to corruption. To buttress this, Bloom in Egwu (2001: 131) “observed that African societies are characterized by a network of gift - giving and gift taking”. He posited further thus:

That our families, ethnic relations, religious groups and cultural societies encourage corruption is amply demonstrated in the demands and expectations placed on people during festivals, ceremonies and other religious feasts, such as Christmas, New Year, Easter and Id-El-fitr.

Egwu (2001) clearly resonated with a Biblical and Quranic allusion that “it is better to give than to receive, because giving is a token symbolism of superiority and power” With respect to the above cultural explanation for corruption, Kolade (2001:81) countered saying “this is erroneous on several counts”, as it ignores the prevailing
norms in traditional gift-giving. The norms are:

- The gifts are modest in proportion, and are to be given for favours received, not for favours expected.
- The gifts may be accepted, but should never be demanded
- Each party to the exchange considers it a matter of honour to ensure that their own part of the exchange has been faithfully performed.

Corruption must be seen as one of the major obstacles to consolidating democratic governance in developing countries (Nigeria inclusive), and an efficient system of public accountability with transparency as a corollary and tenet of good governance offer a remedy in this regard. The next section of this paper focuses on conceptual discourse. Accordingly, corruption and public accountability will be explained

2. Conceptual Clarification

The concepts of Corruption and public accountability will be discussed in this section.

2.1 The Concept of Corruption

Attempts at defining concepts in social and management sciences have not been easy in view of the behavioural inclination of these disciplines. The concept of Corruption is not an exception to this. Various Scholars see it from different perspectives depending on their orientation.

Nye in Onwuka, Okoh and Eme (2009:11) see corruption as deviant behaviour and progressed to define it thus:

Corruption is a deviation from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary exercise of certain types of private regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in position of trust); nepotism (appointment by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private regarding uses).

The above definition appear rather clumsy for analysis, especially by the choice of words or syntax. Its usefulness however lies in the attempt to characterise corruption as deviation from the norm (in ordered societies), pecuniary motive, bribery, nepotism and misappropriation of public resources to achieve private advantage.

Another way of conceptualizing corruption is to see it as:

…the abuse of public office through the instrumentality of private agents, who actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and process for competitive advantage and profit. Beyond bribery, public office can also be abused for personal benefit through patronage and nepotism, for example the theft of state assets or the diversion of state revenues (Bello-Imam in Onwuka, Okoh, and Eme, 2009:117).

It is pertinent to note the comprehensive nature of the above definition and the negative correlation between corruption and development. This manifests in circumventing public policies and process solely for personal gains, public office that should be built on trust is abused and converted to selfish advantage through outright theft or diversion of public resources.

Ogbuke and Enojo (2007:63) building on the works of Hornby (2001) see “corruption as a dishonest illegall behaviour”, especially of people in authority or the act of making somebody change from moral to immoral standards of behaviour.” This view adds an ethical /behavioural dimension to this discourse, and it suggests that unless sound moral principles anchored on enduring cultural values and practices are imbibed, the anti-graft campaign could amount to chasing shadows, especially in a country like Nigeria. These authors asserted unequivocally that “top level corruption is often controlled by hidden networks and represents the sum of various levels and types of irregular behaviour including abuse of power, conflict of interest, extortion, tribalism, nepotism or fraud”.

In corroborating this ethical angle to the conceptualization of corruption, Ifesinachi (2004: 79) captured it “as all those behavioural orientations that impinge on and necessarily vitiates and destroys rules and basis of public and political conduct”. He linked corruption in political and public life to “natural human factors of greed and ambition for social-psychological, economic and political power”. Poverty and serious economic hardships are often added as part of the motivations for corruption in Nigeria. This argument may be tenable for petty corruption as against grand corruption in public office. Petty or survival corruption according to Onwuka, Okoh and Eme (2009:119) “is practiced by civil servants, who may be grossly, underpaid and depend on small rents from the public to feed their families and pay school fees.” Grand corruption which translates to kleptomania occurs among “high public officials and it often involves large sums of money”. In whatever form corruption
private sector) who have access to national economic resources in their vantage positions as custodians and position for private gain, and... as the exploitation of a system for securing unmerited advantage”. The first part of the definition according to him relates to holders of influential positions (in public office, bureaucracy and private sector) who have access to national economic resources in their vantage positions as custodians and stewards of these resources. “The second part relates to people who lobby such office holders for access to preferential or undue advantage”. He referred to both groups as agents of corruption. It is obvious from the allocation of inequities and distributional inequities in Nigeria’s public life, that access to public office confers enormous power on those saddled with political and economic management and it takes unusual /uncommon discipline to resist the urge or “temptation for corruption” in the words of Shinkafi in Idemudia (2008:513).

Implied in the foregoing explanations are what Ikejiani-Clark (2001:111-112) characterised as public office-centered, public interest –centered and market centered definitions. To underscore this, the characterisation of corruption are as varied and was documented by Onwuka, Okoh, and Eme (2009:119) as follows: “according to the rule” where an official receives private gains for doing his/her job; against the rule “where he / she is bribed to do that which he/she is prohibited from”. There is also petty or survival corruption and grand corruption (earlier discussed). Corruption can also be classified based on the arena it occurs namely: Political, Economic, Bureaucratic, Judicial and Moral. Political corruption may manifest in activities connected with elections and succession, taking the form of manipulating people and institutions to retain power or office. Economic corruption could assume the subversion of institutional regulations and circumventing procedures to get unmerited advantage.

Bureaucratic corruption goes beyond obtaining pecuniary benefits. It includes cronyism, favouritism, nepotism, and associated ills that warrant merit to be slaughtered on the altar of mediocrity in recruitment, promotion and motivation of employees as necessary planks upon which personnel administration rests and offer cardinal explanations for low productivity, inefficiency and poor service delivery in the public sector. Judicial corruption implies perversion of justice, compromising attitudinal disposition of law enforcement agents/ agencies, sundry ills and avoidable human errors in the administration of justice. Moral corruption entails committing morally reprehensible acts deliberately and on a sustained basis.

In addinguce explanations for corruption and other unethical conducts in Nigeria, IKejiani-Clark (2001 a 130-133) reported that “the complexities of modernity and the fact of cultural transmission have resulted in unsettled value systems”. These unsettled value systems must be explained in the context of interface of Nigerian cultural values with those of the capitalist west, economic interaction and inherited capitalist economic systems and values which infused western behavioural patterns /values into the Nigerian culture. Others are: lack of commitment to public cause, generalized poverty of Nigerians, infrastructural deficit or non existent social services, political interference characterized by spoils system in administrative and political practice.

2.2 The Concept of Public Accountability

In the common or ordinary sense, accountability presupposes that an official or person who has been assigned duties should be held responsible for his/her actions and the consequences emanating from them. Takaya (1989: 61) took this point further with references to organizational contexts, and defined accountability as “an official personal obligations to carry out assigned duties or activities and be responsible for results or outcomes” Adegbite (2009:33) conceptualized accountability as “the obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards and the officer reports fairly and accurately on performance results”. Implied in the above definition are the indispensable roles of due process, transparency and feedback in achieving accountability.

Some scholars insist that transparency is a corollary of accountability and both are essential planks upon which democratic governance and development anchor (Olowu, 2002: 139) Idemudia, 2008:502 and Ujah, 2010:77). Olowu (2002:140) posited that “accountability refers to answerability for one’s actions or behaviour” He corroborated that it has three crucial components namely: a clear definition of responsibility, reporting mechanisms, and a system of review, rewards and sanctions. From the foregoing, it is deductible that responsibility, feedback and transparency underline accountability. What (then) is public accountability?

Ujah (2010:78) operationalised it as “a system whereby public officers are made to give account of their stewardship to members of the public”. He progressed to explain the term “public” as referring to the generality of the populace, the people or segment of the society particularly touched by the subject matter on which an account is demanded. It is important to note that public interest is supposed to be crucial to public accountability. If this is so, why do public office holders and civil/public servants work against public interest? In other words, public bureaucracy and policy making are expected to reinforce public administration and then galvanize service
In an attempt to exonerate the bureaucratic class, Adebayo (2000:20) argued that “officials are constantly conscious of public accountability and are, therefore, anxious not to make mistakes that would expose them, and the system they operate, to public criticism”. This paper contend that the above assertion does not reflect the correct and current situation and practice in the Nigerian public bureaucracy. We affirm further that the averment belies the inefficiency, ineptitude and general rot as exemplified by various and several media reports of corruption, nepotism and sundry malfeasance in the public service.

The notion of public accountability therefore is premised on the fact that public servants and office holders hold their positions and everything connected thereto as trusts for the people (the true and general public) who are expectedly their masters, and they must render proper accurate and timely accounts of successes or failures to the public.

Transparency is therefore very cardinal to accountability and it stands to good reasoning that all forms of secrecy and shady dealings detract from effective and proper practice of accountability. Accountability can be typologised into: financial; administrative, political and social. Financial accountability translates to obligation on the part of an official handling resources, public office or other positions of trust to report on the intended and actual use of the resources. This calls for transparent process/procedures to attain this. Administrative accountability involves critical internal systems of control that can ensure or complement effective checks and balances. Adherence to or enforcement of Civil Service Rules, Financial Instructions and other Due Process instruments are tangential to achieving this. Political accountability entails orderly and reliable systems of election, effective legislative oversight functions/control mechanisms, distinct and effective separation of powers that guarantees serving the public interest. Social accountability necessitates a demand driven approach that relies on productive civic engagement as bastion for greater public accountability. The foregoing require clear application of standards and access to information for utmost effectiveness.

In a related discourse, Idemudia (2008:508) reported that “public auditing and reporting give effect to (public) accountability”. Building on a 1998 UNDP report, he categorized accountability in relation to audit types thus: Fiscal accountability requires financial and compliance audit; management accountability demands efficiency and economy audit; programme accountability needs effectiveness audit, and individual accountability with focus on transparency calls for investigation. Public accountability must underscore prudent and effective public financial management. Sound principles of accountability demands that government at all levels ensure that public funds and resources are judiciously utilized and be backed with adequate and appropriate records.

Why is it important to have accountability in the public sector? Olowu (2002: 140-142) canvassed the following reasons in response to the above question: *Accountability is necessary for the efficient functioning of all organizations, especially the public sector in democratically governed states. *Accountability structures in the public sector are surrogates for market forces in non-market situations helping to reflect the preferences of the public as citizens and consumers in the public domain. It also serves as a quality control device by ensuring that those who hold public trust account for the trust to the citizens, and it is expected to reinforce the superiority of the public will over private interests especially in the provision and delivery of services to the public. Accountability is closely linked to the enjoyment of democratic life and democratic governance supposedly implies the supremacy of citizens in the governing process.

*Accountability is one of the five norms of good governance, the rest are efficiency; transparency, rule of law, and legitimacy. *Interest in public sector accountability is motivated by the need to curb waste occasioned by inefficient use of public resources and collusion between the top bureaucratic and political class in rent-seeking and sundry corrupt practices.*The need for efficient management of the meagre resources in the face of rising expectations from the populace for service delivery calls for proper accountability in the public sector. *The increasing role of multi-lateral financial institutions, donors and actors through aid giving, technical and other forms of official assistance has increased the demand for accountability in order to improve governance and galvanise development.

In order to achieve the foregoing or enforce accountability, a number of strategies (mechanisms) are advocated namely: internal; external voice; and exit options. Internal mechanisms are those used by organizations to enforce compliance (of workers) or conformity with organizational goals. This include hierarchy reinforced by inspectorates, merit system of recruitment linked to education, training and retraining aimed at improving workers skills. Other internal mechanisms include rules and regulations (codes of conduct); other operative functions of HR management and procedures for internal reviews and audits.

External mechanisms are created and applied by agencies/organs outside the formal organization of the civil service in form of executive-based compliance systems such as Ministerial control of civil servants, Minister’s accounting duty to the cabinet, the parliament and electorate. Legislative controls on the civil service entail parliamentary committees investigative powers through audit, scrutiny of drafts of executive bills, appropriation
bills, screening of political appointees, heads of independent commissions and ambassadors. There can also be parliamentary questions, letters to Minister’s, summons and debates. The judiciary provides the citizens as victims of administrative actions/ inaction contrary to law with judicial remedies like order of mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus, natural justice, ultra vires, rule of law and ombudsman to mention but a few. Some countries have specialized agencies to investigate abuse of office, misuse of power or anti-graft campaigns/war such as EFCC and ICPC in Nigeria. Exit opportunities are utilized where goods and services are produced by various service providers. Utilities such as electric power, water supply and telecommunications offer ready examples here, and privatization; commercialization; joint enterprises; strengthening small/medium/micro enterprises can be useful here. Voice mechanisms afford citizens opportunities to express their feelings about maltreatment or abuse of position/public resources by office holders. It is important to emphasise the role of elections in voting out non-performers as instrument for ensuring public accountability. Other mechanisms for enforcing accountability include decentralization of powers, responsibilities and resources, grievance ventilation through Ombudsman; right/access to information; activities of interests and pressure groups. A combination of environmental, socio-cultural, political, economic, religious beliefs and geographical factors can inhibit the foregoing mechanisms from effectively enforcing accountability in the Nigerian public sector (see Ujah, 2010: 83-86 for details).

3. Corruption and Public Accountability in Nigeria: A Discourse

The basis for tackling this section of the paper has been laid in the preceding segment (conceptual clarification). The task here is to identify and discuss the link between corruption and public accountability in Nigerian public sector. It must be stated unequivocally that the test parametre for measuring an accountable government lies in the extent to which it can tolerate corruption or how far it would go in fighting corruption. It is common knowledge that corruption largely explains Nigerians consistent poor performance on the Human Development Index (HDI), infrastructural deficits, socio-economic instability, impediments to foreign direct investment (FDI) flow, and lack of development generally.

Obuah(2010:17) was more pungent in reporting “…that corruption accounts for 20 percent of the GDP of Nigeria...(and) for several years, Nigeria has been at the bottom of Transparency Internatonal (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking”. Successive administrations in Nigeria have designed measures and initiatives at combating corruption ranging from the Criminal Code (section 98-115); penal code; 1976 corrupt practices decree; Shagari’s ethical revolution to combat corruption through the introduction of code of conduct for public servants; Buhari/Idiagbon’s War Against Indiscipline; Babangida’s ethical and social mobilization crusade, the creation of Special Fraud Unit of Nigeria Police Force. There are also legislative acts and functional schemes supposedly designed to fight graft such as the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act (1991) the financial malpractices in Banks Act (1994); the Advance Fee Fraud and other related offences Act (1995); the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences (ICPC) Act (2000); the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2002; Budget Monitoring ad Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) , otherwise known as “Due Process Mechanism”.

As laudable as the above gestures are, they have not been able to effectively address the corruption dilemma, even as the country is perceived as a “crippled giant, a veritable modern wasteland, a nation where corruption is extolled as national culture...” (Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010:15). This can be explained by the desire of political office holders and public officers to use their positions of trust and authority to perpetuate corrupt activities. Available literature traced the origin and growth of corruption in Nigeria to the colonial period when “court messengers and native authority used their privileged positions to appropriate wealth for themselves...” (Ikejiani-Clark, 2001b:113). This author also documented the setting up of Foster Sutton Commission of Enquiry by the Colonial Office in Britain to probe allegations of mismanagement and corrupt practices in African Continental Bank plus charges of improper conduct leveled against Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as the founder of the Bank. Ikejiani-Clark (2001b: 116) reported that this was as attempt to embarrass Dr Azikwe as no case of corruption was established.

The Coker Commission of Enquiry was instituted in 1962 to look into allegations of corruption and diversion of funds by Chief Awolowo and some leading members of his party into private use. It was held that funds were moved through the Marketing Board and the National Investment and Properties Company controlled by the Western state government. Chief Awolowo was exonerated but the direction of the use of funds was condemned (Ikejiani-Clark, 2001b: 116-117).

Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010:17, 20 ) recorded that corruption was adduced as one of the reasons for the first military coup in 1966. The military kept hanging on to this factor to justify every successful coup, but the cure turns out to be worse than the disease and the country pays adversely for it. We contend that a fundamental explanation of perpetuation of corruption is weak or non-accountability, relative anonymity which is fertilised by absolute discretion.
In a similar discourse, Egwu (2001:126-147) using the social system theory to analyse “the psycho-dynamics of corruption in Nigeria” presented an audacious and point blank account. He argued that probes and commissions of enquiry never lead to punishment of culprits, especially government officials who commit corruption. Apart from the Forster- Sutton Panel and Coker Commission of Inquiry (1962) on Eastern and Western Nigeria respectively, he identified the following: Joda Commission of Inquiry in Northern Nigeria (1967); Asset Investigation Panel of 1975-1976 instituted by the Murtala /Obasanjo regime which found 10 of the 12 Governors under Gowon regime guilty of enriching themselves through corruption, graft and fraud; the probes into FESTAC 77 leyland buses and cement importation scandals which found some notable politicians guilty; the 1984 Awoyiyi Panel in Niger State under Governor Anwal Ibrahim over illegal contracts and corrupt payments in respect of Bi-Water project, Buhari initiated several panels to investigate the Shagari administration and found many governors and high ranking politicians guilty of corruption. Babangida set up a panel to investigate the Buhari administration, so did Abacha to look into the administration of Babangida.

On thorough scrutiny, most of the above actions amount to subterfuge to divert public attention elsewhere. For instance, Obuah (2010:24) asserted that “…an official report indicated that an estimated $12.2 billion had been side-tracked to off-budget accounts from 1988 through 1993. He further hinted that “Transparency Initiative’s Global Corruption Report listed General Sani Abacha (1993-98) among the top ten presidents who had allegedly embezzled between two and five billion dollars”. It was also recorded that during the eight years of Obasanjo civil administration, Nigeria lost a minimum average of $4billion to $8billion annually to corruption. It has equally been estimated (by EFCC sources) “that between 1960 and 1999, about $220 billion or $380 billion has been plundered and squandered by public officials in Nigeria” (Obuah, 2010: 23). The narrative added that this is more than six times the amount the USA provided for the post World War II reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan.

Transparency International’s records posited that corruption accounts for about 20 percent of Nigeria’s GDP. It is painful to also learn that the country was identified among the top nations in the over $1 trillion annually paid globally in bribes (Malgwi in Obuah, 2010:18). The implication of these is that the internal and external mechanisms plus other options of upholding accountability is either weak or outrightly ineffectively. It is doubtful if the country can join the league of big players globally in economic growth and development generally.

Various reports (apart from the foregoing) in the media (print, broadcast and social networks) attest to the fact that corruption has attained a mega status in Nigeria with high level sophistication in its modus operandi, especially during this democratic dispensation. It is plausible to argue that the theatres of corruption permeate the Nigerian federal structure from the federal government to the local government and their bureaucracies. We contend that for as long as the fraud triangle of need, opportunity and weak sanctions subsists, corruption will not be tamed and it will continue to have more active converts. Virtually all the corruption cases of politically exposed persons (PEPs) handled under this democratic experiment including the latest (Maina’s) show that the judiciary has demonstrated within its self-inflicted affliction to be a dubious ally in the corruption conundrum, especially through carefully orchestrated plea bargaining and procured judgments. It must be stated clearly that for as long as the leadership of the country plays with corruption the consequences are bound to be grave and these include: weakening of public bureaucracy; diversion of scarce resources from public purposes to private ends; perversion of political and administrative decisions through lobbying and clandestine manipulations; deceleration in economic progress/development; lack of commitment to national values and civic responsibilities.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

Through a heavy reliance on secondary sources of data backed by the analytical approach, the paper observed that corruption in Nigeria predates the independence. Predicated on the works of some scholars, it was reported that aspects of African cultural and religious practices predispose to corrupt practices among public office holders/officials, although Kolade (2001) argued otherwise with reasons. The importance of public accountability and its link with transparency in stemming corruption were highlighted. The mechanism for enforcing public accountability namely: internal, external, voice and exit options were thoroughly discussed and their weaknesses in redressing corruption in the Nigerian public life were exposed.

In order to address the omission in the system of public accountability in Nigeria and strengthen its mechanisms in attenuating corruption in the country, the paper recommends as follows:

(1) Adherence to internal mechanisms for enforcing accountability should be total. Attitudinal reorientation is required on the part of top bureaucrats in the discharge of their duties and in reinforcing the various internal controls that guarantee merit in the recruitment system and other operative functions of human resource management.

(2) Institutions of governance once created takes a life of their own. Therefore, deliberate attempts should
be made to ensure that these institutions are built on sound ethical values and orientations, their operators should be made to go through and imbibe enduring moral training and virtues that can be passed on to future generations in order to guarantee rectitude, transparency and accountability in public service. These can redress the decadence in agencies and organs of government, especially watchdog institutions such as judiciary, police and anti graft bodies.

3. Stiffer penalties /sanctions for corrupt practices is also canvassed. The current provisions in the laws/statute books offer limited or no deterrence to actual and potential offenders. Corruption and similar offences should attract capital punishment as practised in China. The legislature can do this by reversing itself through discipline and probity in office to enact laws that can halt the country’s downward plunge or regression into abyss.

4. A general reorientation of the populace is a necessary condition in electing credible leaders at polls. Leaders with moral convictions and driven by altruistic service delivery are likely to possess the required political will to address the corruption conundrum and sundry self-afflicted ills.

5. Whistle blowing and protection for the blowers should be strengthened to nip all the negative devices and tendencies in the bud.

6. It is commonplace to emphasise that the present deceleration and selective prosecution of the antigraft war should be reversed through purposeful and determined vigour to rid the Nigerian public life of corruption and allied infractions on a sustainable basis.

7. All inhibitions to the full and effective operations of the FOI Act through the perpetuation of official Secrets Acts and regulations /practices of similar and allied mandates should be removed or repealed. This is with a view to upholding transparency as a corollary of accountability in the Nigerian public service and public affairs.

8. The attempt and romance with Public –Private Partnership should be invigorated, so that government at all levels can divest themselves of functions, duties and services (thus stop creating “jobs for the boys” that will not be done or poorly executed) that can be better offered by the private sector, thereby releasing resources into vital areas that the public sector is traditionally equipped to handle.

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